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Abstract  
 
  Pluralism, the dominant theory in citizen involvement in the United States Forest 
Service since the 1950s, has prolonged the process of determining the public interest by 
promoting the use of appeals and lawsuits.  The advent of more collaborative public 
involvement strategies in the past fifteen years offers the opportunity to assess whether  
participatory democracy offers a better paradigm for determining the public interest.  
This research focused on four cases of reported successful collaboration in Region One of 
the Forest Service and involved in-person interviews with 17 Forest Service officials and 
24 citizen and interest group leaders.  The researcher translated pluralist and participatory 
democracy paradigms into characteristic human actions and behavior in the setting of 
Forest Service public involvement, then analyzed reported actions and behaviors 
accordingly.  Interviewees were asked to choose between two contrasting descriptions of 
group culture to characterize interactions with the Forest Service, one drawn from the 
rational choice model in the pluralist paradigm, the other from collaborative literature in 
the participatory democracy paradigm.  Collaboration was rejected as a term for analysis 
because it lacked specific definition among both Forest Service and public interviewees.  
Instead, the researcher analyzed the cases using characteristics of participatory 
democracy drawn from civic republican theorists that also encompassed the 
characteristics contained in textbook descriptions of collaboration.  Two of the cases had 
all characteristics and provided empirical examples of participatory democracy at work.  
Another of the cases used stakeholder negotiation that contained some of the aspects of 
participatory democracy, but lacked the characteristics of being voluntary and of 
fostering a sense of community.  The last case used informed consent and was found to 
be a combination of participatory culture and synoptic administration.  Based on these 
cases, the researcher concluded that public involvement that uses a participatory 
democracy paradigm has the potential to increase public trust in the Forest Service and to 
minimize appeals and lawsuits by creating strong diverse support for Forest Service 
decisions.  The research also examined characteristics of the leadership in the cases and 
found trust and integrity to be essential to creating a participatory democracy paradigm. 
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To Terra,  
 
And to all those in these cases and beyond  
Who believe in our ability 
To talk together, 
Create solutions,  
Build community, 
And make it work. 
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If human nature is seen less as an immutable gift from God than as a consequence of the 
expectations we have for it, political institutions cannot take human nature as a given, but 
must accept responsibility for their involvement in its creation. 
 
    J. G. March and J.P. Olsen, Democratic Governance 
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PREFACE 
 
 
This dissertation gave me the opportunity to test and confirm through research a 
life-long belief I have had about how people work together.  I first experienced people’s 
abilities and willingness to come together to solve community problems in the early 
1970s, while working on public participation for a multi-agency study of the Flathead 
River basin in northwestern Montana.  Most of my work since then involved elements of 
these same phenomena through varied content from water planning and local government 
charters to affordable housing and organic farming.  Although people had a tendency to 
attribute the successes I’ve had in bringing people together to “my unique personality,” I 
knew there were basic principles beneath what I was doing that others could do, and were 
doing.  My research allowed me to plumb the literature of multi-disciplines to find what 
others have said about cooperative problem solving, and then go off into the world to talk 
with those who were a part of making it happen. 
My research required identifying four success stories of non-agency people 
working with the U.S. Forest Service in Region One to solve contentious problems.  The 
wonderful part about this research is that these are good news stories.  In our culture, 
most of the attention goes to people who create conflict.  In contrast, my research was 
focused on groups that eliminated conflict, and did so in ways that formulated elegant 
solutions far beyond the typical political solution.  Every interview allowed me to meet 
and appreciate the best part of the person I was interviewing.  I discovered courage, 
heroism, and experiences of deep personal change among my research participants.  In 
these cases are people who had never met, let alone talked with someone from “the other 
side,” yet who went away with new friendships and great respect for each other.  In some 
cases, these initial successes have led groups to tackle other problems, implementing 
even more far-reaching solutions with broad-based support previously considered 
impossible.  
    vii 
 
Politics in the twentieth century was characterized by the phrase “who gets what, 
where, and when.”  My research has convinced me that the most important dimension of 
political behavior is missing from that characterization, and that is how.  As one of my 
interviewees put it, the “politics of polarization” no longer serve us well, if they ever did.  
As we move into the twenty-first century, we can’t afford the waste of time, talent, and 
resources that result from win-lose, adversarial political processes.  There is an 
alternative that works, as my research and that of others has proven.  I look forward to 
integrating the “how” into the practice of politics and public administration in the 21st 
century. 
I’d like to acknowledge those who have helped me with this research.  Dr. 
Jonathan Tompkins was my intellectual ally in believing there was a better way, and was 
always there with the right word or conceptual framing to help me move on to the next 
thought.  Dean David Strobel demystified the process and provided wide horizons of 
inquiry.  Special thanks to Roger Strobel and Marion Leifer who believed in me, and 
helped me come back when other things intervened, and Laura Kelly for her excellent 
proof reading.  Finally, although she was far away physically, special thanks to Terra 
Leifer as the hope for the future that kept me going; may she and her peers view the ideas 
here and say, “but, of course!” 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Predicament 
 
…(t)he Forest Service operates within a statutory, regulatory, and administrative 
framework that has kept the agency from effectively addressing rapid declines in 
forest health.  This same framework impedes nearly every other aspect of multiple-
use management as well.  Three problem areas stand out:…excessive 
analysis….ineffective public involvement…and management inefficiencies.1 
(emphasis added) 
 
The above statement is an excerpt from a report internal to the Forest Service 
entitled “The Process Predicament,” published in 2002.  The report chronicled the 
increasing inability of the Forest Service to manage national forest lands effectively 
because of largely bureaucratic reasons: legal requirements that call for excessive 
documentation and analysis of planning and decisions; processes that require public 
involvement yet fail to generate public support; and management inefficiencies.  
According to the report, these factors combined have brought the agency to an impasse; 
the Forest Service can no longer assume that it will be able to respond to on-the-ground 
management issues in a timely and effective fashion.  As a result, the health and 
resources of national forests are declining.  The old remedies, such as chemical controls 
for insect infestations, or salvage log operations to reduce timber loss after wildfires, are 
frequently challenged by the public. Whether in routine timber sales, fire-fighting policy, 
upgrades of public facilities, or fifteen year forest plans, national forest managers can no 
longer assume that they will be able to make and implement their decisions.  Procedural 
requirements and public involvement, appeals and lawsuits have forced the agency to 
invest in extensive documentation of the planning and decision-making process.  The 
                                                 
1USDA Forest Service, The Process Predicament: How Statutory, Regulatory, and Administrative 
Factors Affect National Forest Management  (Washington, D.C:  2002),  5. 
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National Academy of Public Administration estimated that 40% of the total direct work 
at the national forest level was consumed in planning and assessment.2  However, even 
investment in thorough planning and analysis cannot prevent delays from appeals and 
lawsuits; documentation only helps to ensure that Forest Service decisions hold up in 
court.   
The magnitude of the management task before the Forest Service is enormous.  
The U.S. Forest Service is responsible for the management of 191 million acres of public 
land, which equals a land area the size of the original thirteen colonies, nearly one tenth 
of the land area of the entire United States.3  Delays in implementation of Forest Service 
decisions can mean severe economic dislocation for communities reliant upon timber 
sales to keep local lumber mill jobs intact.  Delays in forest restoration after wildfires can 
similarly depress the economies of recreation and tourism towns, and allow streams to 
become degraded with mud and ash.  Delays in the treatment of forests for insect 
infestations can mean the spread of blight over much larger areas of the forest.  Delays in 
the preservation of habitat for key species can mean remaining populations are no longer 
viable.  Delays in the preservation of roadless areas can mean permanent loss of potential 
wilderness.  Delays in the approval of grazing permits can bankrupt ranching operations.  
Especially in the West, where national forests constitute one fifth of the land base, action 
or lack of action by the Forest Service affects the livelihood of local residents, the 
lifestyles of individuals who seek recreation on these public lands, and the health of the 
country’s natural resource legacy.4   
This research project addressed the public involvement component of the 
predicament.  Public involvement is not unique to the Forest Service, but was created 
because of the evolution of governance in the United States.  Representative democratic 
theory separates the functions of government into three distinctive functions:  the 
legislative or law-making function; the executive or law implementing function; and the 
judicial or law interpretive function.  Under this scheme of government, elected officials 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 35. 
 
3 Ibid., 34. 
 
4 Charles Wilkinson, “The National Forest Management Act:  The Twenty Years Behind, the 
Twenty Years Ahead” University of Colorado Law Review 68 (1997),  659-669. 
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make laws through direct negotiation of the public values they were elected to represent.  
Non-elected agency officials are assumed to have no role in making value decisions; they 
simply implement laws.  However, the complexity and volume of issues facing elected 
representatives have blurred the legislative/implementation distinction for all federal 
agencies.  It is well recognized today that agencies are required to make value decisions 
previously the purview of elected representatives.5  As a result, the modern public 
administration paradigm, which was founded on the Progressive ideal of eliminating 
political influence from the implementation of government policy, can no longer separate 
itself from the task of reconciling values.  One of the first political theorists to address the 
question of participation in administrative decision making called this area of theory 
“democratic administration.”6   
How can legislative decision-making by non-elected officials be reconciled with 
the democratic theory of representative government?  This challenge calls into question 
the fundamental legitimacy of agency decisions that clearly involve value issues.7  One 
critic has characterized governance in the United States as constituting a “Second 
Republic” to reflect how far from the principles of representative democracy the federal 
government has gone in making substantive policy with little accountability.  Given that 
agencies are making legislative decisions that require the balancing of public values, two 
questions arise in assessing the process of agency decision-making.  One is the 
identification of public values in the absence of elected representation.  If agencies are 
going to be making decisions that involve the balancing of public values, then the 
agencies need, at the very least, to have information about what these public values are.  
Secondly, in the absence of elected officials, on what grounds will these values be 
                                                 
5Richard Stewart, “Reformation of American Administrative Law” Harvard Law Review 1975: 
1669-1813; Norman Wengert, “Citizen Participation in Search of a Theory” Natural Resources Journal 16 
no. 1 (1976):  23-40; Marcus Ethridge, “Procedures for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy: an 
Assessment of Policy Effects,” in Citizen Participation in Public Decision-Making, eds. J. Desario and S. 
Langton (New York:  Greenwood Press, 1987), 116-131; Jonathan Poisner, “A Civic Republican 
Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s Process of Citizen Participation” Environmental 
Law 26, no. 1 (1996), 53-94. 
  
6Dwight Waldo, “Development of Theory of Democratic Administration” The American Political 
Science Review 46 (1952) 81:103. 
 
7Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, Second 
Edition, (New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1979). 
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balanced?  These questions of values in agency decision-making are at the heart of 
democratic governance in the United States.8  
 Public involvement as a component of Forest Service decision-making attempts 
to address these questions.  Currently, there are three models of democratic 
administrative decision-making that emerge from the literature on public involvement in 
the Forest Service,  based on descriptions of what is happening in practice.9  The synoptic 
model, herein referred to as the expert model, is derived from Progressive-era beliefs that 
scientific rationality can produce the best answer to the balance of public values if given 
enough data and left to the analysis of agency professionals.  The pluralist model argues 
that a legitimate balance of public values is achieved in agency decision making through 
the influence of interest groups through pre-decision input and post-decision oversight 
from appeals and lawsuits.  The collaborative model focuses on the interactions through 
which people in agencies, interest groups, and the interested public come to understand 
the issues and values at stake and mutually negotiate solutions.  In actuality, effects of the 
expert and pluralist models in accumulating conflict and generating appeals and lawsuits 
help explain the Forest Service’s current process predicament.  The potential effect of the 
collaborative model to address conflict more effectively is not certain; the Forest Service 
has not been using the collaborative model long enough and consistently enough to 
evaluate its effects.  Although the agency has made a commitment on paper to pursue 
collaboration as its preferred mode of public participation, it remains to be seen whether 
this shift in policy will meet public expectations.   
One of the major criticisms of collaborative problem solving lies in its 
expectations for human behavior.  In order for collaboration to work, people must have 
the capacity to sit down with each other face-to-face, seek to understand each others’ 
interests, and work together cooperatively to formulate solutions that address the interests 
of all involved.10  These expectations coincide with the view of human nature that 
                                                 
8Stewart, 1688. 
 
9Poisner. 
 
10Barbara Gray,  Collaborating:  Finding Common Ground for Multi-party Problems, (San 
Francisco:  Jossey-Bass, 1989); David C. Crislip, The Collaborative Leadership Handbook, (San Francisco:  
Jossey-Bass, 2002). 
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characterizes various theories within the paradigm of participatory democracy, and 
directly challenge the attributes of political behavior posited by pluralism.  The pluralist 
paradigm is based on the rational choice model of human behavior that assumes 
individual self-interest is the only human motivation, that all human behavior is rational, 
calculated, and instrumental to achieving maximization of that self-interest.11  Human 
nature is fixed and one-dimensional.12  The public interest, if one can be said to exist, is 
the resultant aggregation of individual self-interests produced by competition among 
interest groups.13  Engagement in this competition does not change the individual’s 
understanding and definition of self-interest.14  Human nature and individual interests are 
static, predictable, and exogenous to the political process.15  In limiting individual 
behavior to the lowest common denominator of self-interest, pluralism endorses a vision 
of human nature that excludes the potential for other behaviors as invalid in a political 
process.  
In contrast, the participatory democracy paradigm is built upon a model of human 
behavior that supports the capacities required for collaborative problem solving.  
Participatory democracy is built on a transcendent approach to politics that assumes 
human nature is complex, mutable, and capable of being transformed from self-interest to 
an appreciation of the larger whole through the process of political participation.16  
Human nature includes the inborn capacity for reason, from which civic characteristics 
can be nurtured and developed through participation in governance, especially at the local 
                                                 
11Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 
 
12Robert A. Dahl,  A Preface to Democratic Theory,  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1956). 
 
13Ibid.; Carole Pateman,  Participation and Democratic Theory, (Cambridge, Great Britain:  
Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
 
14Daniel Yankelovich,  Coming to Public Judgement:  Making Democracy Work in a Complex 
World, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991); J.G. March and  J. P. Olsen, Democratic 
Governance, (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
 
15March and Olson.  
 
16Pateman; John Dryzek, "Discursive Designs:  Critical Theory and Political Institutions" 
American Journal of Political Science  31(3) (1987), 656-679; Poisner. 
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level.17  As human nature is mutable, so too the individual’s definition of his/her own 
interests changes as the individual’s understanding of the issues grows through public 
discourse and appreciation of the individual’s relationship to the larger community.18  
The public interest emerges from public discourse and transcends individual interests.19  
Democratic participation theory focuses on the individual’s development of civic 
character as the locus of democracy.20   
This research project focused on recent efforts of the Forest Service to use 
collaborative processes to determine the public interest in the context of forest 
management.  A collaborative process for purposes of this study was defined as repeated 
face-to-face meetings of a core group of citizen participants in which the broad range of 
interests involved in the issue was present, and the intent of the group was to formulate 
recommendations for action.  Research consisted of qualitative case studies of four 
contrasting examples identified as collaboration by Forest Service officials and outside 
observers of collaboration in Region One of the U.S. Forest Service.  The researcher 
gathered data for each case from agency records and from semi-structured interviews 
with Forest Service officials and diverse non-Forest Service participants.   The researcher 
corroborated the data through comparison of the four cases, diversity of interviewees, 
interviewee review of interview data, interviewee review of case descriptions, and 
comparison with agency written records.21  The researcher then analyzed the data using 
pattern matching with theoretical propositions in political and public administration 
theory to explore whether actual practice in the field confirmed or denied aspects of 
theory.22  
                                                 
17Pateman; Yankelovich; Poisner. 
 
18Poisner. 
 
19Poisner; John Dryzek,  Deliberative Democracy and Beyond:  Liberals, Critics, and 
Contestations, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
20Pateman; Poisner; Dryzek, 2000.  
 
21Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods,  (Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage 
Publications, 2003).  
  
22Yin. 
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At the level of political theory, this research examined and compared the 
expectations and behavior of the individuals involved in the collaborative process to the 
models of human nature that underlie pluralism and participatory democracy theory using 
theoretical propositions drawn from Poisner’s descriptions of public participation 
models.23  At the level of practical public administration, the research explored 
commonalities and differences of the four cases in achieving agreement and enabling the 
Forest Service to accomplish its mission.  Theoretical propositions were drawn from 
several sources encompassing organization theory, the practice of collaboration, and use 
of citizen involvement in the context of public administration.  Schein’s propositions 
about organizational change and leadership were used to analyze the underlying views of 
participants and Forest Service officials about human behavior.24 Crislip’s descriptions of 
collaboration were used to define and further assess the presence of collaboration.25 
Poisner’s characterizations of pluralism and civic republicanism were used to identify 
political behaviors.26 
As political theorists have noted, mainstream democratic theory in the United 
States is not so much a matter of coherent theory as it is a description of “what is.”27 On 
the one hand, the experience of the Forest Service can help define the next iteration of 
democratic participation theory.  On the other hand, this research into current practice in 
democratic participation can help illuminate the public involvement predicament of the 
Forest Service.  Recognition of the complexity and interconnectedness of human and 
natural world interactions is bringing a new humility to efforts to manage the natural 
world.28  So too, efforts to manage public values entail the recognition that human 
                                                 
23Poisner. 
 
24Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass, 1992). 
 
25Crislip. 
 
26Poisner. 
 
27E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, 
org. 1960 (United States:  Wadsworth Thompson Learning, 1988); Pateman; Norman Wengert, "Citizen 
Participation:  Practice in Search of a Theory." Natural Resources Journal 16(1) (1976): 23-40. 
 
28Michael Dombeck, Christopher Wood, and Jack E. Williams, From Conquest to Conservation:  
Our Public Lands Legacy, (New York:  Island Press, 2003).  
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interactions with each other are an essential component of democratic governance.  As an 
experiment in democratic administration, the Forest Service’s pursuit of collaboration 
offers rich and fertile ground for defining the evolution of democratic participation theory 
as a description of “what is” in the twenty-first century.   
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature on democratic administration can be divided into two general 
categories:  democratic administration as a matter of political rights; and democratic 
administration as a tool to achieve more effective administration.   The political rights 
literature lies within the body of political science and public administration theory, while 
the bulk of the literature on democratic participation as a tool is found in business 
administration literature.  
The modern view of public administration emerged in the late 1880s as part of the 
Progressive Movement’s reaction against too much citizen involvement in governance.  
In comparison to what came before, professional administration brought about great 
improvements in governance by effectively addressing the excesses of the industrial 
revolution and the spoils system.  The rise of professionalism in public administration 
eliminated democratic participation in public administration.29  Initially, public 
administration operated by what has been called the expert “transmission belt” approach; 
agencies sought and implemented the most cost-effective means to achieve ends that 
were determined by Congress and the President in their duly sanctioned roles as elected 
officials.30  Democracy was viewed as disruptive to the task of administration: 
“Autocracy during hours is the price of democracy after hours,” was the maxim of the 
Progressive age.31  Public administration was a matter of means, not ends, and the 
selection and implementation of means was viewed as value-free.  Democratic 
                                                 
29Waldo. 
 
30Stewart. 
 
31Waldo, 87.   
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participation had no place in the Progressive’s positivist scientific paradigm of public 
administration.   
As decision-making became more complex, and elected representatives were 
unable to handle the detail and speed with which decisions were needed, the transmission 
belt approach to public administration shifted to embrace the expert more fully.32  To the 
professionalism of administration, agencies added the mantle of substantive scientific 
expertise.  Agency experts were likened to a “doctor,” an expert who has the best 
interests of the patient (the public) in mind and who was non-political.33   The objectivity 
of the expert was accepted as part of the trust people had in science and the progress of 
technology.34  There was one reality that could be discovered objectively through the 
gathering and analysis of data by experts.35  Cultural beliefs supported the expert 
approach by accepting the role of the expert as having special knowledge that qualified 
the expert to make decisions that the public knew little about and were largely 
unconcerned with.36  Public values were largely united behind progress and technology 
and behind the utilitarianism and instrumental rationality necessary for advancement.37  
According to the expert approach to public administration, the expert represented the 
public interest by virtue of unbiased knowledge; there was no need for citizen 
involvement.  The expert model, sometimes referred to as the synoptic model in the 
literature, became the dominant model of public involvement.  
Faith in the expert approach to public administration began to erode as Congress 
and the Supreme Court legitimized broader and broader delegation of policy-making 
                                                 
32Stewart.  
 
33Ibid.; J. Desario and Stuart Langton,  “Citizen Participation and Technology” in Citizen 
Participation in Public Decision Making, eds. J. Desario and S. Langton, (New York:  Greenwood Press, 
1987), 158. 
 
34Desario and Langton.   
 
35Waldo; Desario and Langton; Wondolleck.  
 
36Yankelovitch. 
 
37Frank Fischer, "Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise:  From 
Theoretical Inquiry to Practical Cases" Policy Sciences 26 (1993): 167-187; Poisner.  
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responsibility to federal agencies.38  By 1946, Congress recognized that agencies were 
exercising enough discretionary authority that some guidelines were needed.  The 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was passed to ensure that individual property 
rights would not be harmed by agency actions.39  The procedures of the APA were 
modeled after the adjudication process wherein parties in disagreement present their 
cases to a third party who weighs the evidence and makes a determination.40  The 
adjudicatory process is adversarial in nature and is designed for situations in which the 
facts of the case are known and specific.41  With the passage of the APA, individual 
citizens had a legal avenue to challenge decisions made by government agencies, but 
their standing in court was limited to decisions that had a direct impact upon the citizen’s 
property rights.  Public administration was no longer free from citizen challenges in 
executing its growing policy-making responsibilities.  
In the 1950s, the public interest began to change.  With the rise of the 
environmental and social justice movements, the utilitarian efficiency of Progressivism 
no longer served the interests of all citizens.   As the government extended its power in 
defining the public interest to environmental and economic issues, agency decisions 
increasingly affected intricately related private and public interests.42  Interest groups 
across the broad array of social, economic and conservation values had no legal entry 
point from which to insert their values into the determination of the public interest except 
through the Congressional legislative process.  At the same time, evidence was mounting 
that agencies had failed to perform their charge to protect the public interest.  Rather than 
serving the public interest, agencies were serving the very interests they had been 
established to regulate.43  Moreover, the public had shifted its understanding of its role in 
                                                 
38Stewart; Ethridge; Robert D. Behn,  Rethinking Democratic Accountability, (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 2001). 
 
39Stewart.  
 
40Ethridge. 
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democratic governance.  By 1960 citizens had gained the belief that they should have 
power over the whole government, not just limited power over representatives through 
elections.44  
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress and the Supreme Court institutionalized citizen 
involvement by requiring citizen participation in agency-decision making and by 
extending legal standing in the courts under the framework of the APA to a wide array of 
non-property-based interests.  As government agencies extended power in defining the 
public interest to environmental and economic issues that intricately involved private and 
public interests, citizen access to agency decision-making was expanded as well to 
protect the range of citizen interests by extending the legal definition of standing under 
the APA.45  The array of public values to which agencies had to respond widened 
considerably beyond the property interests that had been dominant up through the 1950s.  
Requirements for public involvement also established substantive agency responsibilities 
for the inclusion of public notice and comment provisions that then became subject to 
judicial review.46  Public administration was no longer separate from the politics of value 
choices; agencies had to involve the broader public in determining the public interest.  
Direct citizen involvement in agency decision-making and implementation came to be 
viewed as a right.47 
In creating avenues for broader citizen involvement in agency decision-making, 
policy-makers broadly embraced the pluralist political theory of how the U.S. governing 
system worked.48   In pluralist theory, the role of citizens is to protect their self-interests 
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through forming groups with other citizens of similar interest.49  These interest groups 
then act on political institutions through various avenues of influence.50  The public 
interest is the aggregation of individual self-interests that results through competition in 
which those with the most power and influence win.51  The pluralist model endorsed the 
strategic and adversarial use of political influence in pre-decision citizen involvement, in 
the appeals process, and in the courts, as legitimate ways to bring public values into 
agencies’ effort to determine the public interest as part of the decision-making process.   
“(T)he public interest is most likely to emerge from the interplay and conflict between a 
multitude of interests actively pursing their own ends at crucial points in policy 
development.” 52  The Supreme Court recognized the importance of having citizen 
involvement as a means of representing the public interest in agency decision-making, 
calling it “essential to a just determination of the public interest.”53  Congress intended to 
contain agency power by opening up the agency decision-making process to citizen 
involvement: “Many commentators favor public involvement because it can reduce 
administrative freedom to make decisions from narrowly professional bureaucratic or 
self-interested motivations; it will force broader public concerns on agency 
consciousness.”54  Politics and administration were no longer to be kept separate.   
Two different models of citizen involvement emerged in the practice of natural 
resource agencies.55  Agency officials for the most part incorporated citizen involvement 
into their existing expert model.  In the expert model, citizen involvement served 
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essentially one function, to provide agency officials with more information from which to 
define the public interest.  The process of defining the public interest was based on the 
principles of scientific analysis and rationality, which discounted the non-scientific nature 
of most information garnered from citizen involvement and limited its usefulness.56   
  The other model of citizen involvement in natural resource issues, embraced 
primarily by interest groups, assumed citizen involvement in agency decision-making 
was an extension of the pluralist interest group competition that influenced Congress.57   
However, pluralism in citizen involvement had one major difference from pluralism in 
the politics of Congress.  Congress had the authority to determine the public interest by 
passing legislation because it was composed of elected officials, whereas agency officials 
were subject to the substantive and procedural structure of the APA in determining the 
public interest.   Under the APA, interest groups not satisfied with an agency action had 
recourse to appeals and lawsuits as legitimate venues in which to pursue their claims.  As 
agency decision makers continued to make decisions from the expert paradigm that 
discounted other interests, interest groups responded by using appeals and lawsuits as 
legitimate tools available under the APA.58  As legal challenges became more 
commonplace, interest groups enhanced their bargaining positions at the pre-decision 
stage as well, via the threat of appeals and lawsuits at the post-decision stage.59   
Two seminal works foreshadowed the litigious conflicts that became all too 
common in public involvement, particularly in the field of natural resources and land use.  
The first of these was an article in Policy Sciences in 1973, in which two professors of 
planning and design, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, first coined the term “wicked 
problems.”60  Rittel and Webber argued that the fundamental nature of problem solving in 
public policy had changed, becoming more social, complex, and value-driven. Because of 
                                                 
56Fischer. 
 
57Rosenbaum; Poisner. 
 
58Wondolleck. 
 
59K. Mathews,  "Hammering out the Cibola Plan" American Forests 94(7) (1988): 41-45. 
 
60Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" Policy Sciences  
4 (1973): 155-169. 
 
  14
the multiplicity of values embedded in complex problems, there were no objective 
criteria to determine the optimal solution, and therefore what was in the best public 
interest; many solutions were possible, each of which reflected a different mix of values.  
While science could handle “tame” problems in which the desired outcome was narrowly 
defined and agreed upon, it was incapable of solving “wicked” problems because science 
was not equipped to deal with the multiplicity of values embedded in complex problems 
for which there was no scientifically-based right answer.  Where wicked problems were 
concerned, the objective application of science could no longer be used to justify any one 
solution as more correct than any other. Experts could no longer use science alone to 
determine the public interest.  Subsequently, a number of other scholars noted the 
increasing inability of the scientific, rational approach to public policy and planning to 
deal effectively with public issues.61   It was not objective data analysis, but how to work 
legitimately with values that was missing from the expert policy analysis model.62  The 
expert model did not work with dynamic, complex and controversial problems.63  
The second seminal article appeared in 1975 in the Harvard Law Review, just as 
Congress was imposing public involvement requirements on the Forest Service.  In an 
article about administrative law reform stemming from the APA and subsequent 
expansion of standing to a wide range of public interests, Richard Stewart noted that the 
role of the courts had shifted to that of oversight to obtain fair representation of values in 
agency decision-making.64  The APA was intended to serve as a means to ensure that 
agency formulations of the public interest took into account private property rights 
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affected by agency decisions.65   The adjudicatory procedures of the APA were designed 
to deal with concrete situations of limited complexity, not to ensure a process of decision-
making which reflected the broad range of public values.  The function of administrative 
law shifted with the inclusion of non-property-based interests in the 1960s and early 
1970s:  “…Increasingly, the function of administrative law is not the protection of private 
autonomy but provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation 
of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision.”66  
With the shift to “a surrogate political process,” Stewart predicted that interest 
groups would use the courts extensively as a legitimate strategy in pursuing their 
interests.  Stewart cautioned that agencies could be rendered ineffective: “The resource 
and delay costs of formal proceedings are incurred by the agency as well as private 
parties and may seriously undermine the effective discharge of agency responsibilities.”67  
The public interest isn’t determined until the last appeal and lawsuit have been filed and 
completed.   The logical outcome of coupling the pluralist approach to public 
involvement with the court system, warned Stewart, is increased litigation to the point 
that agencies can no longer function effectively in achieving their missions.    
Stewart’s prediction of agency incapacitation is the logical outcome of blending  
the pluralistic paradigm with an adversarial adjudicatory process to solve complex value-
driven problems.   Pluralism expects people to pursue their self-interests in a rational 
manner by using the avenues of citizen involvement as part of an interest group’s strategy 
for achieving a desired outcome.68  If involvement in the pre-decision stage isn’t likely to 
yield the desired result, involvement at the post-decision stage through appeals and 
lawsuits offer strategic alternatives.  The rules of competition under a pluralist paradigm 
call for continuation of the conflict until all cost-effective avenues have been exhausted.  
Moreover, the rise of wicked problems further ensures that agencies invest significant 
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resources in developing scientific data and analysis to back up decisions that in the end 
do not rest on science.69  Taken together, the rise of wicked problems intractable to 
scientific solution, and the pluralist logic pushing for strategic litigation, effectively limits 
the likelihood that either the expert or the pluralist paradigms of citizen involvement will 
effectively integrate the public’s changing diverse values into a version of the public 
interest that fits with the needs of the agency for effective decision-making.   
The expert and the pluralist models have dominated citizen involvement since its 
inception.70  Both share a common belief in the rational choice model of human behavior 
and self-interest.  Both assume human behavior to be essentially self-interested and 
unprincipled, and both assume that individual interests are static, unaffected by the 
process of public involvement.71  Both the expert and the pluralist models assume that the 
goal of government decision making is to reflect the public interest, and that the public 
interest is composed of predetermined, static individual interests.72  
Expert and pluralist models differ primarily in what constitutes a legitimate 
determination of the public interest.  For the agency expert, interests are aggregated by 
objective, scientific analysis of citizen input, discounted by the fact that those who chose 
to participate do not necessarily represent the silent majority.73  The pluralist model 
aggregates interests through the competition and bargaining of political interest groups.  
In practice, the expert and the pluralist models are incompatible.  The expert determines 
legitimacy of the public interest through the application of scientific rigor and objective 
rationality, and views pluralist politics as tainting the decision-making process of pure 
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professional objectivity.74  Pluralist interest groups question the legitimacy of unelected 
experts when the experts impose professionally and scientifically justified decisions in 
disregard of political will.75  
The two models work together to set agencies and interest groups up to compete 
against each other.  Agency experts have the upper hand through the public involvement 
data collection and appeals stages because they largely control the way issues are framed 
through formulating alternatives and making decisions.76   Pluralist interest groups then 
challenge unfavorable decisions through the courts.  The underlying adversarial process 
introduced in the APA guarantees that conflict will continue.77  The courts decide 
individual cases while the major source of conflict remains unresolved.78  The 
combination of expert and pluralist models produce “an uneasy marriage of science, 
economics, history, public administration, abstract values, and the rule of law.”79  
Frustration with the inability of agencies to take effective action created the 
conditions for the emergence of a new form of citizen involvement.  De Tocqueville 
observed in the mid 1800s that Americans were quick to form associations when they 
encountered problems that required joint action.  Perhaps this strong inclination for 
people to take matters into their own hands helps explain the rise of a third model for 
citizen involvement in agency decision-making.  Collaborative problem solving efforts to 
achieve effective action in dealing with wicked problems began to spring up among 
citizens in various ways, initially at the grassroots level as people of opposing interests 
took it upon themselves to come together and solve problems for themselves, rather than 
rely on agency processes of citizen participation.   
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One of the first collaborative efforts in land use planning occurred in 1974 in 
Washington state over siting of a flood control dam.80  By the early 1980s, local land use 
issues were using collaborative dispute negotiation all across the country.81  As agencies 
became increasingly hamstrung by appeals and lawsuits, people came together across 
interest group divisions at the local level to formulate solutions together.82  For example, 
watershed groups began to form in the early 1990s and grew quickly to total over 400 in 
the western United States by the year 2000.83  The rapid rise of watershed initiatives has 
been attributed to several factors including the increasing frequency of “gridlock” in 
making decisions, lack of progress in effectively addressing resource concerns on the 
ground, and agencies’ inability to engage the public meaningfully.84   
While natural resource issues provided the impetus in many rural areas, 
practitioners of public administration in urban settings also developed collaborative 
problem solving strategies, using the term “network” to describe these efforts.85 
Generally, participation in networks is voluntary.  There is no central authority; networks 
rely on social capital to function well.86  Empowerment is based on information and the 
ability to get things done.87  Networks are now becoming the preferred tool for policy 
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formulation among these practitioners because networks are better adapted to respond to 
the rapid pace of social change and the complexities of wicked problems.88   
As with any emerging, widespread phenomenon, collaborative problem solving 
evolved initially without a common set of definitions and understandings.  Gray’s 1989 
book Collaboration:  Finding Common Ground for Multi-party Problems is generally 
recognized as the first definitive text to describe the essential elements of collaborative 
problem solving.89  According to Grey, collaboration assumes that people are capable of 
dealing with conflict in principled ways that require envisioning problems from multiple 
perspectives.  Collaboration is “a process through which parties who see different aspects 
of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go 
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”90  Collaboration “transforms 
adversarial interaction into a mutual search for information and for solutions that allow 
those participating to ensure that their interests are represented.”91  Gray identifies five 
components that characterize collaborative interactions:  independent stakeholders; 
solutions that emerge from constructive conflict; joint ownership of decisions; collective 
responsibility for the future; and a process that is emergent.   
In contrast to the adversarial nature of the expert and pluralist models, a 
collaborative model for citizen involvement offers the opportunity for integration of 
scientific expertise and public values in determining the public interest.   Collaborative 
forms of public involvement bring agency personnel and members of the public together 
on an equal footing.92  In order to bring to the table the knowledge, values, and 
experience necessary to the situation, agencies decentralize decisions to the level that 
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minimizes abstraction.93  Dialogue takes place through discussion in small groups whose 
members are chosen to reflect the diversity of interests in the community.  Pre-
determined positions are discarded and underlying interests form the basis of 
discussion.94  Potential conflicts, as well as resource and legal constraints, are recast as 
dimensions of problems to be solved together.95   People meet face-to-face, and in the 
process, gain an understanding of each other’s interests and needs.  From these shared 
perspectives, people construct a solution that integrates social concerns with resource and 
policy constraints.  The solution evolves as all group members express their concerns and 
strive to understand and accommodate others, and goes beyond simple trade-offs because 
of the innovation that comes from creative group interaction.96  
When collaboration works well, group members are supportive and committed to 
the final decision.97  Agency officials are responsible for representing the legal and 
scientific constraints within which the decision must fall and obtaining representation of 
the full diversity of interests involved in the issue to ensure that no interest goes 
unrepresented.98  Decisions are taken to the lowest level necessary to ensure that potential 
solutions are understood in terms of the concrete context in which they would operate. 
The process of dialogue, facilitated to focus on interests and allow all participants to be 
heard and to hear each other in a close environment of face-to-face contact and 
cooperation, insures that the final solution is one that all will support.  As a result, the 
agency and the constituent groups recognize the final decision as the best solution to the 
problem that can be achieved.99  The incentive for appeals and lawsuits is minimized.    
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The fundamental difference between this emerging collaborative problem solving 
approach to citizen involvement and the expert and pluralist models is the theory of 
human nature upon which each is based.  As discussed earlier, both expert and pluralism 
models are based on the rational choice model of human nature in which the calculated, 
instrumental pursuit of self-interest is the only motivation.100   The role of citizens is to 
protect their self-interests through forming groups with other citizens with similar 
interest.101  These interest groups then act on political institutions through various 
avenues of influence102  Both interests and human nature are exogenous to the political 
system103  Engagement in the process of political influence has no effect upon the 
interests each individual holds.104  As a result, interests are static and predictable.  The 
pluralist paradigm presents a mechanical theory of political interaction that focuses on 
institutions as indicators of democracy, such as free, multi-party elections, a free press, 
and an independent judicial system.105  
As outlined above, collaborative problem solving assumes humans can act in non-
competitive ways that respect different values as part of the problem solving process.  As 
such, collaborative problem solving falls into the participatory democracy paradigm of 
political theory.  Participatory democracy is built on a transcendent approach to politics 
that assumes human nature is mutable, capable of being transformed from self-interest to 
an appreciation of the larger community through the process of participation.106  Human 
nature has many dimensions, chief of which is the inborn capacity for reason, from which 
civic characteristics can be nurtured and developed through participation in governance, 
especially at the local level.107  The role of the citizen is to develop the characteristics 
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necessary for participation in democratic society, including the ability to respect others’ 
points of view, engage in civil discourse, and reason together.108  Participation, beyond 
the act of voting, in the process of decision-making is essential to developing the 
character traits necessary to be a responsible citizen in a democracy.109  Individual 
interests are not static, but evolve as the individual’s understanding of the issues grows 
through public discourse.  If pluralism is thought of as somewhat mechanical, 
pariticipatory democracy in contrast can be thought of as organic, grounded in the 
individual’s development of civic character as the source of democracy.110  
Contemporary expressions of participative democracy can be found in the 
revitalization of civic republicanism and the writings of some post modern theorists.  
Civic republicanism centers on three basic concepts, the process of deliberation, civic 
virtue, and the common good.111   According to civic republicanism, public values 
develop through the process of dialogue; they are not static and unchanging.  The process 
of public deliberation allows citizens to exhibit civic virtue, i.e., the desire to understand 
each other’s interests and the interests of the community as a whole.  Through the process 
of public deliberation among citizens with civic virtue, citizens create a vision of the 
common good, a concept of community interests that differs from the simple aggregation 
of individual interests. Moreover, the process of participation has the power to teach civic 
virtue to those citizens who have not experienced it before.    
Similarly, discursive democracy uses the theories of Habermas to propose a 
theory of participative democracy that focuses on equality.112  Public deliberation 
requires two types of equality, equality in the capacity to be represented, and equality in 
the capacity to be listened to. There can be no differentiation in power inherent to the 
expert, the powerful interest group leader, and the common citizen.  No power derives 
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from having multiple numbers of people to represent the same interest.  There is no 
distortion from “domination via the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, 
propaganda, deception, expressions of mere self-interest, threats, imposition of 
ideological conformity” because power lies in the strength of the argument itself.113  In 
deliberative theory, people strive to create consensus through the integration and learning 
that takes place when individuals meet face-to-face with the intent of arriving at a shared 
understanding of a common problem and striving to find solutions together.  The task-
orientation of rational choice is replaced by communicative rationality, a social 
commitment to understand all aspects of the situation and the larger context, free of 
coercion and deception.  Social forces of trust and authenticity, over time, identify and 
prevent abuses such as manipulation and deceit.  These social forces are endogenous to 
the deliberative process and act to limit the domain of discussion without the need for 
arbitrary rules and coercion.  Decisions are made using consensus, but a form of 
consensus that allows agreement on the action to be taken without requiring agreement 
on the reasons for the action.  As with civic republicanism, discursive democracy posits 
that people can be transformed through participation to become more public-spirited. 
The pluralist paradigm assumes that competition between fixed interests generates 
the public interest based on the strength, resources, influence, and power people bring 
into the fray to defend their interests.  The public interest is defined through the 
competitive process between these fixed interests.  The participatory democracy 
paradigm assumes that people are reasonable and develop a sense of their own interest in 
dialogue with each other, through which they also transcend their own interests and 
support the good of the whole.  The public interest is defined as the outcome that emerges 
from this dialogue.  
Practical application of the participatory democracy paradigm in modern public 
administration actually dates back to the writings of Mary Parker Follett in the 1920s.114  
Follett viewed the rise of the expert in public administration as an abdication of citizen 
responsibility and encouraged citizen involvement in local affairs as essential to 
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democratic governance.  When her views on participatory democracy were ignored by 
her Populist-influenced political science and public administration peers, she translated 
her observations on political theory to the work place in her writings in the 1920s and 
1930s.115  Follett argued that the “logic of the situation” should determine who should be 
involved in decision-making, rather than hierarchy or power.116  Problems should be 
taken to the lowest level where they are concrete, not abstract.  Those closest to the 
situation, although they will likely be at the bottom of the organization, also are likely to 
have the most intimate and practical understanding of the situation and therefore must be 
integrally involved in formulating solutions.  Power to solve the problem emerges from 
the discussion, rather than from hierarchy.  Employees and management can work 
together in this fashion because they share a commitment to making things work, and 
because the process of integrating their interests produces an experience that is both 
concrete and genuine.117118  Follett’s thoughts on democratic administration formed the 
foundation for ongoing theory and practice in the field of business administration that 
focused on effectiveness in solving problems.   
Follett’s concepts of genuineness and democratic participation resurfaced in 
business literature in the writing of Rensis Likert in the early 1960s.119  According to 
Likert, no one person had enough information to make an informed decision; therefore 
leaders must encourage cooperative decision-making by genuinely valuing others in 
contributing to the decision-making process.   Likert argued that authenticity in the form 
of supportive relationships was crucial in organizations, especially as a characteristic of 
leadership.  Creating an environment in which all were able to learn from each other 
requires leadership that reinforces authentic respect through being consistent in what one 
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says and does.  Such consistency cannot come from external rules, but must come from 
internalized values that allow leaders to be authentic.120   
Similarly, Chris Argyris argued for authentic organizations that recognized the 
intuitive, feeling component of human behavior as a critical part of what makes 
organizations function effectively.121  Both Likert and Argyris noted that authenticity 
cannot be created overnight by reading a book or participating in a training session.  
Authenticity comes from looking within, examining one’s values and beliefs, and 
working over time to realign both one’s values and beliefs and one’s actions and 
reactions to be consistent with the espoused values one is trying to create.  Such personal 
change requires emotional insight, new cognitive maps, practice in behaving differently, 
in short, a lot of commitment and work. Leadership that lacks authenticity exhibits 
uncertain and inconsistent behavior that undermines others’ trust in the leader’s sincerity 
and commitment to change.122  
 Through the 1970s and 1980s, management theorists produced technique after 
technique intended to help employees become more committed and creative in working 
toward the organization’s mission, including such things as Management by Objective, 
Total Quality Management, and Quality Circles.  In most cases these techniques failed to 
achieve permanent change in the organization.123  These techniques share the assumption 
that people want to succeed and contribute to something larger than themselves.  They 
also espouse elements of empowerment theory, a generic term that evolved from 
participatory democracy in the workplace.  One factor that contributed to the lack of 
success was management; when managers who paid lip service to these beliefs about 
human nature failed to change their own convictions in implementing these techniques, 
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the techniques failed to achieve benefits of improved performance.124  The role of leaders 
in presenting consistent and coherent examples of the values inherent in the techniques 
they are trying to implement is essential to success.  
  In his book Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edger Schein describes the 
relationship between beliefs about human nature and how organizations function.125  
Organizational culture sets the framework within which people in that organization 
ground their behavior.  Organizational culture rests on basic assumptions about reality, 
truth, time and space, and the nature of human nature.126  Beliefs about human nature, 
whether people are inherently good or bad, cooperative or competitive, provide a 
foundation from which other aspects of culture develop.  Cultures seek to develop 
coherently, such that the underlying beliefs about human nature are reflected in all other 
relevant aspects of the culture.    
An organization’s founding leaders are the most critical component of 
organizational culture, because they provide the initial ideals, models and assumptions 
that form the foundation of the culture.127  Leaders embed their own beliefs and 
assumptions into organizations through six primary mechanisms, including:  what they 
pay attention to; how they react to critical events and crises; how they allocate scarce 
resources; what they express through role-modeling; how they allocate rewards and 
status; and how they recruit and retire members.128  People gain their understanding of 
the culture through these behavioral teachings of the leader.  The key in building or 
changing organizational culture is that leadership be consistent in embodying the desired 
values and assumptions through all six of these mechanisms. Secondary mechanisms 
such as the design and structure of the organization, its rituals, stories, and formal 
statements, can serve to reinforce a culture, but cannot create it.   Research on 
organization cultural change has found that consistent leadership is essential to establish 
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and maintain group culture, particularly when the desired culture requires changes in 
expectations the group has experienced in the past.129  
Peter Senge also reinforced the importance of leadership in his 1990 landmark 
work on creating effective learning organizations.130  In order to be an effective leader in 
a learning environment, managers must become aware of the effects of their own actions, 
how their responses affect the system, and where their beliefs come from.  They must 
align their own understanding of human nature to embrace the belief that people have a 
natural need to expand their capabilities and live life as an act of creative work, rather 
than live as a passive reactor.  In 1992, John Kotter and James Haskett investigated the 
organizational cultures of those corporations that were able to become and remain 
economically successful to see what role organizational culture played in their success.131   
They found that the most successful corporations were characterized by strong adaptive 
cultures that depended upon leadership that moved beyond management, and practiced 
leadership that was not arrogant but rather “in the service of others,” focused not on their 
own self-interest, but on the good of the whole.132    
Other writers in the field of management have echoed the need for 
leaders/managers of organizations to internalize basic beliefs about human nature that are 
very different from those espoused in the rational choice model.  James Belasco and 
Ralph Stayer urged managers to move from the command and control paradigm to the 
empowerment paradigm, again stressing the need for managers to change their own 
assumptions about trusting people.133  James Autry and Stephen Mitchell suggest that 
leaders adopt values from the Tao Te Ching, including the practice of approaching all 
people as trustworthy, recognizing that only a very small percentage will reveal 
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themselves to be otherwise.134  Rob LeBow and Randy Spitzer specifically pinpoint 
managers’ ability to let go of control and trust people as the key to creating productive 
organizations.135  If a leader wants the organization to do well, the major task of the 
leader is to change his/her beliefs and have faith in people.  Only when the leader has 
fully embraced faith in people will he/she be able to be an effective agent for 
organizational cultural change.136 Robert Quinn similarly identified eight characteristics 
of transformative leadership, including looking within to examine one’s own beliefs and 
aligning these beliefs with one’s actions, embracing a vision of the common good, and 
leading through moral power.137 
One of the reasons Follett abandoned political science for business administration 
was the ability in business to assess the effectiveness of one’s actions by looking at the 
bottom line.  Some of the more recent writers have provided examples and data that show 
stronger performance in the marketplace after leadership integrated aspects of the 
participatory democracy paradigm into their daily business operations.138 All of these 
writers share a vision of human nature that expects people to be trustworthy, willing to 
learn from each other and to make things work.  All recognize that leadership is essential 
to creating an organizational culture that expects and reinforces this vision of human 
behavior.  All agree that to be effective, leadership must align their own beliefs and 
actions with faith in people and in a transcendent common good.   
This vision of human nature contradicts the rational choice model.  Other 
researchers also began to research human nature and uncovered aspects of cooperation 
that could not be accounted for in competitive rational choice theory.139  Research using 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma to model rational choice assumptions of human behavior found 
that people constructed relationships of cooperation and trust beyond those predicted by 
the rational choice model.140   People opted for cooperation in situations where calculated 
rational choice allowed none.  It appeared that rational choice theory was an insufficient 
base from which to explain human behavior.  Cooperation and trust involve social 
behavior and motivations that are more complex than rational choice theory allows.    
Research into people’s willingness to accept decisions made by authorities confirmed that 
concerns about social identity, the sense of self derived from interactions with others, 
outweighed rational choice calculations as the basis of trust.141  The researchers 
concluded that trust is a social, not an instrumental, construct that is based on the ability 
to demonstrate that one will treat others with dignity and respect.  Research into the 
social construction of identity has shown that neither human nature nor individual self-
interest are static, but rather evolve in interaction with others.142  Moreover, social 
expectations play a powerful role in changing human behavior.143 Although research into 
the positive emotional aspects of trust is very limited, the experience of having one’s trust 
reciprocated generates pleasure.144   
As behavioral science shifts to a more social process orientation in explaining 
human behavior, so too pluralism as the dominant theory in political science must be 
revisited based on its assumption of the rational choice model of human nature.  As 
Waldo noted: 
Any political theory rests upon a metaphysic, a concept of the ultimate nature of 
reality.  Students of public administration, following a line of precedent which 
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begins in the modern period with Hobbes, have simply been willing to accept the 
verdict of science…as to the nature of reality.145  
If assumptions about human nature are not static and exogenous to political systems, then 
expectations of human nature in political institutions play a direct role in shaping what 
aspects of human nature are created and expressed:   
If human nature is seen less as an immutable gift from God than as a consequence 
of the expectations we have for it, political institutions cannot take human nature 
as a given, but must accept responsibility for their involvement in its creation.146  
 
The pluralist paradigm does not recognize human nature as mutable.  The participatory 
democracy paradigm provides a better theoretical framework in which to integrate a 
social process approach to understanding human political behavior.   
 Collaborative problem solving in agency decision-making provides a practical 
application of the participatory democracy paradigm; it incorporates a paradigm shift in 
terms of expected human behavior away from the assumptions of the rational choice 
model.147  Collaboration’s success rests upon its belief that a collaborative approach can 
elicit behavior in which people are reasonable, can see both sides of an issue, and can 
reach agreement.  The core of the criticisms of collaboration’s social gains rests upon the 
disbelief that a collaborative approach can elicit behavior in which people are reasonable, 
can see both sides of an issue, and can reach agreement.  As with other shifts in 
paradigms, critics who are firmly rooted in the old rational choice paradigm are unable to 
envision how a different paradigm could work.148   If collaborative problem solving 
works as it claims to work, then the assumptions of the rational choice model of human 
nature must be false. Whereas rational choice assumes that people are only capable of 
interacting through competitive win-lose dynamics in which people are expected to be 
greedy, selfish and unprincipled, collaboration functions in a win-win environment that 
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encourages mutual respect, trust, and the capacity to understand an opposing viewpoint.   
As the expectations for human behavior differ, so too does the nature and quality of 
interactions, shifting from adversarial and antagonistic to trusting and cooperative.149  
This shift in behaviors makes equitable, mutual, innovative problem-solving possible.   
There are a number of questions that have been raised by the critics of 
collaborative problem solving.  Some critics voice skepticism that collaboration achieves 
the social gains of increased understanding and respect attributed to it.  According to 
these critics, collaborative negotiations cannot alter the basic conflicts that exist in public 
issues, conflicts that ultimately can only be resolved through court action.150  Agreements 
reached can easily become solutions in which parties give up the potential for substantial 
gain under traditional public involvement practices and agree to a  “least common 
denominator” in making decisions.151  Fairness of the process relies heavily upon the 
mediator, and there are no standards or ethics for behavior of mediators to ensure that 
they function in a neutral fashion that allows all interests to be treated equally in the 
discussion.152   One noted critic questioned the paradigm’s assumptions about human 
behavior directly and questioned whether people “are reasonable,” “will see both sides of 
the issue,” and whether “agreement or consensus is possible.”153  
Other criticisms are more logistical in nature.  Collaborative processes have been 
found to take as long or longer than traditional processes of public involvement and 
therefore do not save money.154  The costs of participation in collaborative processes are 
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great in terms of time and commitment, which can also discourage participation by 
certain groups.155   Critics argue that collaboration limits the number of people who are 
directly involved in determining the public interest.156 Although real change takes years 
and is difficult to attribute to any one cause, critics argue that the usefulness of 
collaboration should not be measured in terms of social gains, but rather must improve 
the situation on the ground.157  However, given the complexity of factors typically at 
work on the ground, it is difficult to measure the effects of any agency decisions, whether 
arrived at collaboratively or not.   
For public administrators, collaboration immediately raises the issue of 
accountability. If collaboration is to function, agency officials must be empowered to 
work collaboratively with local interests directly, with the potential of adopting the 
group’s solution as the agency’s decision.  This entails agency officials using their own 
discretion, but the public is distrustful of granting agency officials discretion.158  
Accountability for public officials in the past has focused on money and equity, with the 
intent of finding and punishing errors.159  Accountability in producing results is much 
harder to define and is rarely rewarded with public acclaim.  As a result, agency officials 
function in an environment of public mistrust in which exercising discretion is risky.160  
Collaboration requires agency officials to reach beyond their traditional bureaucratic role 
of being rule-bound and risk-averse. 
In reality, agency officials cannot avoid exercising discretion whether they use 
collaborative problem solving or not; they have to make decisions, and as was discussed 
before, these decisions include significant policy making.161  Moreover, traditional 
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bureaucracies can no longer operate on the basis of rule-bound accountability and meet 
the challenge of being responsive to changing conditions.162  Decentralization of 
decision-making and empowerment of agency officials at the local level to be more 
responsive to local conditions are both essential to allowing large bureaucracies to 
function effectively in the value-laden, fast-paced environment of public service today.163  
Collaboration promises to be an effective way for agencies to respond to community 
values and needs in formulating the public interest.   
Collaboration also raises questions of governance.  Shouldn’t decisions involving 
national interests be made at the national level where national interests can be given equal 
weight, not at the local level?164 Traditional public administration argues that local public 
groups do not have the authority to make decisions that have been properly delegated by 
Congress to agency officials.165  Collaborative problem solving requires a fresh look at 
this issue of governance.  In the domain of land use agencies, there are numerous federal 
laws and regulations to ensure that national interests are met, such as the Environmental 
Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act.  Local decisions are subject to these laws 
and regulations through a process of interagency oversight.  The challenge is to ensure 
that public officials at the local level are flexible, responsive, fair, and acting within the 
scope of their authority while responding to the fast-paced, value-laden environment in 
which the public interest must be found.166 Collaboration has the potential to create 
solutions that both meet national concerns and integrate local values for local agency 
officials.   
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There has been little agreement on methodology and the definition of success in 
the research that has been done on collaboration.167 Collaboration by nature is specific to 
the actors and context in which it takes place, making comparisons difficult.168  What 
does seem clear is that forms of collaborative problem solving can build social capital 
and facilitate agreement among opposing groups.169  As a result, use of collaboration is 
growing and appears to be here to stay.170  It behooves practitioners to understand how 
collaboration and the participatory democracy paradigm fit into the practice of public 
administration, and theorists to understand how they fit into democratic administration 
and governance.   
 
 
Research Setting 
 
 The United States Forest Service is a geographically decentralized federal 
agency in the United States Department of Agriculture that is responsible for the 
management of 155 diverse national forests and 20 national grasslands that cover 190 
million acres in 44 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.171  The Forest Service is 
organized into four levels, beginning at the bottom with Ranger Districts where forest 
management activities occur.  Ranger Districts are grouped together to form a specific 
National Forest.  The National Forests are grouped into nine Regional Offices that in turn 
report to Forest Service Headquarters in Washington, D.C.   The Organic Act that 
established the authority of the Forest Service was passed in 1897, buttressed by the 
Progressive Movement of reform that was sweeping through the United States.   The Act 
charged those managing the public’s forest lands to provide leadership, technical and 
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financial assistance for two broadly stated purposes: “…to protect the quality of air, 
water, soil, open space, and the environment…” and “…to encourage natural resource 
uses that will best meet the needs of the Nation.”172   
 The Forest Service itself was created by Congress in 1907.  The first chief of 
the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, embodied the ideals of progressive public 
administration by combining professional administration and scientific professionalism in 
the pursuit of professional forestry.  One commentator noted that one could hardly find a 
better embodiment of the Progressive ideal for public administration than Gifford Pinchot 
and the Forest Service.173  Like others in the Progressive movement, Pinchot shared a 
strong utilitarian perspective.174  According to Pinchot, the purpose of the Forest Service 
was to serve the needs of the human population, to bring the greatest good to the greatest 
number.  However, Pinchot broke ranks with the Progressives by decentralizing 
administration of the Forest Service and encouraging consultation with local interest 
groups.  Pinchot recognized that national forest lands were too diverse to lend themselves 
to centralized management, so he placed responsibility for management decisions with 
local Forest Service officials.  Moreover, Pinchot believed national forests had to be 
responsive to local communities.   
 The greatest good for the greatest number was expressed in the early days of the 
Forest Service by the needs of the local populations adjacent to national forests for 
lumber, firewood, and grazing lands.  Early on, local Forest Service officials were 
expected to become active participants in the local community by joining local 
organizations of community leaders and getting to know those who relied on the forest 
for their livelihood.175  As a result, local Forest Service officers had extensive informal 
knowledge of local issues and concerns, much more so than other federal agency 
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personnel.176 The public interest was defined locally by Forest Service experts, in 
consultation with local interested publics.   
Pinchot’s reliance upon local forestry professionals using informal consultation 
with local interest groups established the model of expert/consultation for defining the 
public interest.177 The expert model served the agency well from 1907 to the end of the 
Second World War.178  The interest groups with whom the Forest Service informally 
consulted were themselves largely utilitarian in their orientation to the forests.  Public 
controversy over management issues was largely a matter of means, rather than ends, in 
which the professionalism of the forester had final say.  Management decisions generally 
did not pit one use of the forest against another; there were sufficient land and resources 
in the forests to meet all interests without undo conflict.179   Management focused on 
determining the most efficient means to manage the forests, not on determining the goals 
for which they were to be managed.  Local public interest and national agency goals were 
in concert.   
After the Second World War, the role of the Forest Service began to change from 
regulatory enforcement to commodity production.  Congress called upon the Forest 
Service to provide a three-fold increase in timber production to meet the building needs 
of the post-war economy.180  As the Forest Service moved from a regulatory role in 
monitoring grazing to a predominantly producer role in supplying timber to the nation, 
political concerns began to override the expert professionalism of the Forest Service as 
demand for timber production brought political pressure at the local and national level.  
At the same time, new interest groups concerned with recreation and conservation arose 
in the 1950s and demanded that these values be included in agency decision making.181  
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Informal consultation at the local level with traditional commodity interest groups no 
longer reflected the full range of public values.   Moreover, the values represented by the 
new interest groups were not within the scope of the Forest Service’s utilitarian purpose 
of producing commodities including timber and grazing.  The Forest Service responded 
by obtaining new legislation from Congress to include these non-utilitarian uses of the 
forests through the passage of the Multiple-Use, Sustainable Yield Act (MUSY) in 1960.   
While MUSY put responsibility squarely on the Forest Service to incorporate 
broader values in formulating the public interest for management of the national forests, 
the agency’s expert/consultative model was not designed to deal with values.  The Forest 
Service’s approach to formulating the public interest was based on scientific expertise 
and utilitarianism; it functioned to provide objective and efficient means to accomplish 
ends, not to reexamine values that define those ends.  Moreover, the expert/consultative 
model included a strong belief in its own objectivity that served to blind Forest Service 
professionals to the values inherent in scientific rationality and utilitarianism.182  By the 
mid-1960s, problems with values and the perception of objectivity began to surface 
within the ranks of professional foresters.183  Best captured by the phrase, “the myth of 
the omnipotent forester,” one critic phrased the problem as one of distinguishing between 
ends and means in a democratic society:   
 
It is when the professional forester arbitrarily determines those ends (or even 
clumsily tries to do so) that he most seriously violates our classless society and 
our democratic politics…For the “various ends of society,” in our unique society, 
are and will be set only by that society, and not by a professional class of 
foresters…It is when we attempt to determine ends that “pressure groups” become 
the most hostile, challenging our leadership in resource conservation…184   
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Recognition was growing that agency professionals had overstepped the role of the Forest 
Service  in determining the public interest.   
  Clearcutting, the practice of removing all of the timber from the area to be 
harvested, exemplified the inability of the Forest Service to alter decisions in response to 
changing public values.  As pressure to produce timber harvests mounted, the Forest 
Service used clearcutting more extensively.  In 1970, public displeasure with the practice 
drew national attention in the form of a critique of clearcutting in the Bitterroot National 
Forest in southwestern Montana that postulated the concept that the public had a right to 
have its aesthetic values affect Forest Service practices.185  Public displeasure continued 
to mount, culminating in a 1975 court decision concerning the use of clearcutting in the 
Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia that threatened to shut down all timber 
operations of the Forest Service nationwide.186  Rather than allow timber production to 
cease, Congress stepped in and passed the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) in 
1976 that put some restrictions on the use of clearcutting and instituted new regulations 
concerning the involvement of the public in agency decision making.   
NFMA introduced an alterative model for determining the public interest by 
embodying the intent of Congress to adopt pluralist democratic theory and extend the 
model of interest group bargaining from the halls of Congress to the Forest Service.187 
Opening the process of agency decision-making to public involvement was intended to 
guarantee that agency decisions would reflect the wider public interest.188  To ensure that 
it did so, the Forest Service promulgated regulations for both pre-decision public 
involvement and post-decision public oversight of Forest Service decisions.  In the event 
that the Forest Service failed to incorporate the full range of public values in its decisions, 
the public gained legal standing to challenge these decisions through agency appeals and 
lawsuits.  
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Implementing regulations for NFMA created a post-decision appeals process for 
national forest plans built upon the adversarial framework of rights adjudication already 
contained in Forest Service regulations for the settling of property concerns.189  NFMA 
regulations also established procedural requirements for forest planning that were subject 
to judicial review and required all national forests to have authorized forest plans within 
ten years, plans against which individual project decisions could be challenged in court.  
The appeals process and the increased opportunity for judicial review opened up forest 
planning and implementation decisions to public challenge, giving the public a direct role 
in oversight should the public view the agency’s initial decision as arbitrary. 
 At the time NFMA was passed, there was no definitive proof of what effect 
public involvement would have on the process of determining the public interest.190  In 
the mid-1970s, public involvement was hailed as the pluralist solution to agency abuses 
across the board, not just for the Forest Service.191  One scholar wrote at the time that no 
one dared to question the efficacy of public involvement for fear of appearing to be anti-
democratic.192  As a result, public involvement was not closely evaluated, nor even 
defined.   
One observer characterized public involvement as the object of hope to the 
environmental community in addressing the over-cutting that was taking place: 
 …(C )urrent thinking about participatory democracy attaches enormous 
significance to public participation in governmental processes.  This is 
particularly so in the area of environmental concerns where expanded public 
involvement has been increasingly looked to as the “great white hope” (more 
appropriately perhaps the “great green hope”) for saving the environment.  The 
law has pushed strongly in this direction in recent years.  Through judicial 
decision, legislative action, and administrative prescription, public participation 
has become an accepted norm of the planning and decision-making processes of 
administrative government.193 
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The lack of agreement as to what public involvement could and could not accomplish 
allowed it to be looked upon as the “great green hope” from several perspectives. 
Congress intended the public involvement portions of the act to provide guidance to the 
Forest Service on public values at the level of the national forest, recreating the political 
bargaining that occurred in the halls of Congress at the level of national forest planning 
as the method of defining the public interest.194  Interest groups viewed public 
involvement as a decentralization of decision-making and a widening of the interests to 
be included in the pluralist bargaining process.195  The public in general viewed public 
involvement as giving local people and communities an opportunity to come to the table 
and be heard.  The Forest Service viewed public involvement as the opportunity to 
inform the public about its plans and reach out to the silent majority to gain support for 
their expert “multiple use” management of the national forests.196  Formal citizen 
involvement started out with a lack of consensus about its purpose.197 
While the pluralist model for public involvement offered the opportunity for 
integration of broader public values with agency expertise at the pre-decision stage of 
decision-making, this opportunity went largely unrealized as the Forest Service continued 
to use the expert/consultative model as its paradigm for public input.   The agency put 
great effort and resources into mechanisms to analyze and summarize public input; 
however, use of the input in final decisions was left to the discretion of agency 
officials.198  Viewing public input as a statutory requirement rather than a substantive 
component of good decision-making delayed the Forest Service from acknowledging the 
inherently value-laden, and therefore political, nature of the public involvement 
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process.199  The Forest Service missed the significance of NFMA in capturing the 
public’s growing discontent with having public values left out of the decision-making 
process.200 As a result, the Forest Service earned a reputation for not listening to the 
public.201  An assessment done in 1992 noted, “Most national forest managers still fail to 
recognize the purpose of public involvement, believing public participation is primarily 
an exercise in gathering information.”202  The expert/consultative model of the Forest 
Service emphasized scientific expertise as the rationale for determining the public 
interest, failing to recognize the values inherent in this rationale.203 
Increasingly centralized decision making also played a role in the public’s 
displeasure with the Forest Service.  NFMA required that forest plans be completed for 
all the national forests from 1976 to 1986, the very years that timber-harvesting pressure 
was greatest and the discrepancy between centralized planning, and the reality of what 
was happening in the forests, reached its peak.204  As forest plans emerged from the 
planning process, it became apparent that the planning process had not resulted in 
outcomes that satisfied the public’s expectations.  Both professional foresters within the 
agency concerned with timber sustainability and public interest groups concerned with 
environmental protection were overridden by national politics as unrealistically high 
timber harvest levels continued to be set in Washington and imposed upon local 
forests.205  The pre-decision phase was essentially useless in incorporating the wider 
range of public values.  Public involvement post-decision, through NFMA’s widening of 
the appeals process and judicial review, became the logical alternative.   
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When NFMA was passed, no one in the Forest Service foresaw that setting 
scientific rationality as the legal standard for planning set up a situation in which no plan 
could meet the scientific standard of perfection.206  Essentially any plan could be 
challenged on the scientific technicalities of legal compliance.207  The pluralist model 
gave interest groups at both ends of the political spectrum the opportunity to challenge 
the Forest Service’s plans and decisions, and so they did.  From 1983 to 1989 the number 
of appeals more than doubled from 584 to 1298.208  Once forest plans had been put into 
place, timber sales and other specific actions began to be questioned on the basis of 
compliance with these forest plans.  The number of appeals peaked at 2902 in 1993, and 
then averaged 1200 a year from 1995 to 1999.209  The incidence of lawsuits also 
increased with the implementation of NFMA.  From 1907 to 1972, the Forest Service was 
involved in two lawsuits under judicial review through the APA.210  However, by 1990 
that number had jumped significantly, and the Forest Service found itself facing 65 
lawsuits over timber sales.211  The period enforced timber cuts from the top down left a 
heritage of mistrust of the Forest Service among the public that was already distrustful of 
the agency’s ability to respond to public values.   
From the perspective of the pluralist paradigm, the prevalence of appeals and 
lawsuits was evidence that the oversight aspect of the pluralist model was working just as 
it was designed to work.  As pre-decision input failed to result in decisions that reflected 
citizen interests, interest groups used appeals and lawsuits as the vehicle for the 
expression and inclusion of public values in forest management decisions.212  The 
problem was that appeals and litigation put decisions into the hands of lawyers and 
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judges unfamiliar with forest management;  the process takes time and money while 
effective management of forests requires timely and effective action.  The appeals and 
litigation process and effective forest management were incompatible.  As predicted 
administrative theorist Richard Stewart in 1975, the appeals process and the courts 
increasingly became the arbiter of the public values in agency decisions, adding costs and 
delays to the process of determining the public interest to the point that the agency’s 
ability to achieve its mission was threatened.213  In 2002, Forest Service issued a report 
acknowledging that time delays and costs stemming from appeals and lawsuits had 
significantly impacted the ability of the agency to effectively manage the national 
forests.214  As a process to determine the public interest, the combination of 
expert/consultation and pluralist citizen involvement practiced by the Forest Service was 
impractical, eroding the ability of the agency to function.   
Against this backdrop of mistrust, procedural costs and delays, people inside and 
outside of the Forest Service searched for alternatives.  Forest Service officials faced with 
strong opposition to forest plans found that inviting interest groups to meet and negotiate 
could result in revised plans that didn’t trigger appeals and lawsuits.215  Local logging 
communities concerned with both economic viability and environmental health began to 
work out their own solutions, proposing management plans for surrounding forest that 
integrated their interests rather than competing with each other in the courts.216  The 
common thread among these various efforts was the integration of diverse values in 
determining the public interest to be reflected in Forest Service decisions.  The pragmatic 
advantages of these efforts at collaborative problem solving in reducing appeals and 
delays looked promising enough that the Forest Service included collaborative provisions 
in numerous initiatives beginning with stewardship contracting and watershed planning in 
the late 1990s.  The Forest Service also incorporated collaborative language in the 2000 
                                                 
213Stewart. 
 
214USDA Forest Service. 
 
215Shannon 1987; Wondolleck. 
 
216Snow. 
 
  44
NFMA implementing regulations for the second round of forest planning and the 2004 
Healthy Forest Act provisions for community wildfire plans.217   
The organizational culture of the Forest Service has been characterized by the 
expert/consultative model since its founding.218  Collaborative problem solving 
challenges Forest Service officials to bring their scientific expertise to the table with the 
recognition that their role is to serve the public interest, not to dictate it.  Members of the 
public welcome agency expertise when it is presented as information relevant to the 
problem at hand.219 
Collaborative problem solving relies upon the legal structure put into place by the 
pluralist model.  Legal requirements for pre-decision public input have created the space 
for collaborative problem solving among members of the public and agency officials in 
the drafting stage of forest and project planning.  Legal avenues for post-decision 
oversight through appeals and litigation create a double-edged effect on collaboration.  
On the one hand, the threat of filing an appeal or lawsuit acts as an equalizer among those 
involved in collaboration at the pre-decision stage, forcing all parties to recognize and 
respect each other’s interests.  On the other hand, the opportunity to use appeals and 
lawsuits can obviate the need to be collaborative at the pre-decision stage.  While people 
have expressed a preference for face-to-face negotiation in making decisions, time 
constraints and lack of trust that their input will make a difference undermine efforts at 
collaborative problem solving by reinforcing the use of post-decision appeals and 
lawsuits.220  As an inducement to pre-decision involvement, Forest Service regulations 
now limit standing for post-decision appeals to individuals and groups that submitted 
substantive comment during the pre-decision review and comment period.221  However, 
this requirement does not create collaborative problem solving.  How well collaborative 
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problem solving will be broadly integrated into the expert/consultative and pluralist 
models of determining the public interest has yet to be determined.   
As the Forest Service moves into the 21st century, its ability to make decisions 
based on the public interest is vital to its ability to operate.  The agency already has 
difficulty in achieving its mission because of numerous appeals and lawsuits.222  The 
ability to make and implement timely management decisions will be even more crucial in 
the future.  Concerns about improved forest health caused the Forest Service to propose 
adaptive ecosystem management as its new course for the 21st century.223 One of the 
tenets of ecosystem management is the recognition that nature does not respond well to a 
command and control approach to land management.224 Rather, ecosystems are composed 
of intricate networks of relationships between various life forms and the physical 
elements that support those life forms.  People are also life forms in the ecosystem.  Their 
values and interests cannot be removed from the context of the specific human and 
natural world in which they live.   
Collaborative problem solving offers the potential to integrate human values and 
ecological science through the creation of locally specific agreements about the public 
interest, provided that people from various interests agree to participate in the agency’s 
pre-decision collaborative efforts.  However, lack of trust in the Forest Service’s 
commitment to good stewardship has led citizens and interest groups to the strategy of 
challenging Forest Service decisions through appeals and lawsuits.225 Just when forest 
management most needs to be adaptive and capable of quick changes to meet the 
challenges of ecosystem management, the public is least ready to grant the agency 
largesse.  Collaborative problem solving could begin to turn this situation around, if the 
Forest Service is successful in using collaborative processes to define the public interest.  
It remains to be seen whether collaboration will meet the expectations of all the various 
actors involved in forest management issues.  Those who heralded public involvement in 
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the mid-1970s as the democratic cure-all for agency decision-making didn’t realize that 
the term meant very different things to agency officials, interest groups, and the general 
public.  Collaboration could prove to be the same, a banner of democratic participation 
around which to rally as the Forest Service continues to use an expert/consultative model 
for engagement of the public while making decisions driven by national political 
concerns.  
The Organic Act of 1897 charged the Forest Service to provide leadership in 
managing the nation’s forests and grasslands.  Leadership plays a significant role in 
creating the conditions necessary for successful collaborative problem solving.226  The 
participatory democracy paradigm emphasizes building relationships and trust as prime 
considerations, outcomes that are not paramount in the pluralist paradigm that has 
characterized the Forest Service for most of its history.  This study focused on the role of 
leadership in creating four successful collaborative processes between the Forest Service 
and diverse public interests.  These cases provide important clues about the effectiveness 
of the participatory democracy paradigm and its prospects for becoming the dominant 
paradigm-in-use for the Forest Service.
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CHAPTER TWO:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Overview 
 
 
This research examined the theoretical and practical aspects of the following 
questions: 
 
Have efforts in citizen participation of the Forest Service gone beyond pluralism 
in which interests compete to define the public interest? 
If so, how has the public interest been determined?   
 
If new processes for defining the public interest are present in Forest Service 
citizen participation, to what extent do these new processes confirm 
participatory democracy theory? 
 
If the Forest Service is using approaches other than interest group competition to 
determine the public interest in citizen involvement, how do these affect 
subsequent challenges to the resulting decisions? 
 
In practical terms, these questions hinge in part upon people’s expectations and 
beliefs about human behavior, which are foundational to people’s interactions with 
others.  Expectations for human behavior in a group are established by the leadership of 
the group, and reflect the underlying beliefs of the leader(s) about human nature.1 It 
follows that successful collaboration requires leadership that has faith in people’s ability 
to behave in ways that are different from the behaviors of competitive self-interest 
prevalent in traditional expert/pluralist citizen involvement.  Competitive self-interest 
behaviors include advocacy, debate, exclusion of other interests, use of power and 
control, and rigid adherence to pre-determined positions.2  Collaborative behaviors 
                                                 
1Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2nd Edition, (San Francisco, California:  
Jossey-Bass, 1992). 
  
2David D. Crislip,  The Collaborative Leadership Fieldbook:  A Guide for Citizens and Civic 
Leaders, (San Francisco, CA:  Jossey-Bass, 2002). 
 
 
 48
include engagement in dialogue, inclusion of all affected interests, shared power, and 
mutual learning.3   
The transition of the Forest Service from expert/pluralist to collaborative citizen 
involvement offered the opportunity to explore in a political setting the extent to which 
beliefs about human behavior and the public interest affect the outcome of citizen 
involvement in determining the public interest.  This research focused on people’s 
perspectives on their experiences and behavior in collaborative efforts with the Forest 
Service and responded to calls for more qualitative research into collaboration in general, 
and in natural resource policy making in particular.4  It also responded to calls for more 
insight into the character of public administrators engaged in attempts to pioneer 
collaboration.5  The Committee of Scientists’ 1999 recommendations to the Forest 
Service also challenged researchers to identify “principles of success…that lead to 
innovations that improve collaboration.”6    
Complex social phenomena in context-specific situations are ideally suited to a 
qualitative research approach.7  This research employed a qualitative case study method 
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to examine real-life interactions that were too complex for surveys or experimental 
strategies.8  The research used comparative case studies, comparing aspects of two rival 
explanations for human behavior in the context of two sets of paired cases.  This 
approach allowed analytic generalization as applied to theory rather than statistical 
generalization to a universe or population.9  Moreover, the use of two sets of paired cases 
allowed analysis through replicable findings analogous to conducting multiple 
experiments.10  The subjectivity of the researcher was an integral part of the research 
design and brought to the inquiry skills and sensibilities that were useful to the nature of 
the questions being asked.11  A summary of the researcher’s background can be found in 
Appendix A: Researcher Qualifications. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
The research focused on semi-structured interviews with Forest Service and non-
Forest Service participants in selected cases of collaborative group efforts undertaken in 
Region One of the United States Forest Service over the past eight years.  Region One 
was selected because of proximity to the researcher.  Snowball sampling identified 
individuals concerned with collaboration in Region One. The snowball sample included 
eight Forest Service officials including staff at the Regional, Forest, and District level, 
and three experts outside of the Forest Service familiar with collaborative efforts in 
Region One.  These individuals were asked to identify potential candidate cases of what 
they thought to be collaborative group efforts.  The snowball sample continued until no 
new cases were suggested.  Collaborative group efforts were defined to mean situations 
in which a core group of people from within and outside of the Forest Service 
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representing the diversity of interests in the case met repeatedly face-to-face and came to 
agreement.  In addition, the cases were to meet the following criteria:  
1. Case occurred within the recent past.   More specifically, cases occurred at 
least long enough ago to have passed the period in which appeals could be 
filed.  The time range was intended to minimize problems of recall by not 
being too far into the past, while allowing for the case to extend through the 
period of post-decision appeals. 
 
2. Case involved controversy of at least one of the following types: 
 
i. adding roads in roadless area 
ii.       cutting timber adjacent to roadless, wilderness, or other area highly 
valued by particular interests 
iii.       cutting old growth timber 
iv.       impacting habitat of endangered species such as grizzly bear 
v.       access by off-road vehicles to roadless or old-growth timber areas 
 
These controversy criteria were designed to ensure that the cases chosen 
are not trivial, but contain issues that are of real concern to various groups. 
 
3. Collaboration chosen as the method for group interaction.  This criterion was 
designed to ensure that leaders of the group set out from the outset to use 
collaboration, including convening a range of interests, engaging in discussion 
of the issues, and coming to an agreement that satisfied multiple concerns. 
 
4. Agreement was reached at the end of the group effort.  This criterion was 
designed to address the theoretical questions regarding definition of the public 
interest.  By requiring that an agreement be reached, this criterion guaranteed 
that a definition of the public interest was produced by each group. 
 
5. Collaborative meetings extended over a period of at least 9 months.  This 
criterion was designed to identify cases of sufficient duration that the group 
had time to develop and stabilize its culture of interaction. 
 
6. Variation in degree of “success” of the effort.  This criterion was designed to 
identify a range of potential cases, from those perceived to be very successful, 
through moderately successful, to relatively unsuccessful.   
 
7. Case was not politicized.  This criterion excluded cases in which the media 
accentuated the controversy in the case through coverage of the process, and 
is designed to ensure that participants were acting on their own without the 
pressure of meeting politicized expectations of others. 
 
 51
The snowball survey of eleven informants involved both phone and face-to-face 
conversations that took place from the spring of 2005 through the summer of 2006 and 
identified nineteen potential cases.  Follow-up phone calls to individuals more familiar 
with the details of each suggested case eliminated 14 that did not meet the seven criteria 
listed above, leaving five cases from which to choose four for study.   The researcher, in 
consultation with her chief academic advisor, reframed the question to which of the five 
cases to eliminate.  Using Yin’s suggested considerations for multiple case studies, the 
researcher eliminated the game range management case, leaving four cases with potential 
for comparative analysis; two cases involved winter recreation planning and two involved 
stewardship fuel reduction projects.12  
Data collection from interviews and Forest Service records extended from 
December, 2006 through March, 2007.   Selection of interviewees for each case focused 
on individuals identified as being part of the core group that met repeatedly during the 
case, and others involved at key times, as recommended by Forest Service and non-Forest 
Service participants.   The number of Forest Service and non-Forest Service interviewees 
for each case is summarized below in Table 1.  In the Seeley Lake case, the core group 
involved over the duration of the deliberations was very small, consisting of three people.  
Additional interviewees included one Forest Service staffer and two community members 
involved in the discussions at key points to corroborate the reports of the core 
interviewees. 
Table 1:  Interviewee Distribution 
 Seeley Lake 
Winter Recreation 
Plan 
Big Snowies 
Winter Recreation 
Plan 
Lakeface-Lamb 
Fuels Reduction 
Project 
Thompson Falls 
Game Range Fuels 
Reduction Project 
Number of Forest 
Service  
interviewees 
 
           2 
 
            4 
 
            6 
 
             5 
Number of non- 
Forest Service 
interviewees 
 
           4 
 
            6 
 
            9 
 
             5 
Total number of  
interviewees 
           6            10           15             10 
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Of the forty-one interviews, forty were done as semi-structured, face-to-face, one-
on-one interviews with participants in locations convenient to the participants.13  One 
interview was done over the phone because of scheduling conflicts and distance.  
Interviews ranged from one hour to three hours, with most taking about two hours.  
Interview protocol and questions are found in Appendix B:  Protocol for Interviews.   
Interviewees chose between two levels of confidentiality, to use their names and attribute 
quotations to them, or not.  Data and references to data were coded and subsequently 
used in a fashion to protect the confidentiality of those choosing not to reveal their 
names.   
The principal researcher conducted all of the interviews, took notes during the 
interviews, and transcribed the notes thereafter.  The transcriptions had two sections; the 
first section transcribed the interview in the order in which it unfolded, and the second 
section apportioned sections of the transcription from section one to answer the specific 
interview questions.   The second section addressed a problem encountered when the 
order of the interview did not conform to the order of the questions, allowing the 
interviewee to review the researcher’s assignment of content to specific questions.  The 
researcher then sent each interviewee a typed transcription of the interview for review.  
All changes in the transcripts suggested by the interviewee were made according to the 
interviewee’s request.  For all but one of the interviews, corrections and changes were 
minimal, consisting of less than ten lines in transcripts of five to six pages.  Changes were 
of two types, corrections to technical points in Forest Service procedures and rewording 
of phrases to less harsh language.  For one interview, the interviewee made numerous 
changes to both the content and the assignment to specific questions.  In no instances did 
interviewee changes affect the substance of a case.   
The researcher also obtained copies of draft or final environmental impact 
statements and records of decision for all cases, and in some instances, supplemental 
documentation.  These documents contained a history of official Forest Service actions 
including public participation efforts for each case.  The researcher combined information 
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from these documents with information from the transcripts to prepare the case studies 
presented in Chapters Three and Four.  In the process of writing each case study, the 
researcher identified quotations in the transcripts of interviewees who had elected to 
allow use of their names.  The researcher sent the selected quotations of each interviewee 
to each interviewee for review and approval before using the quotations in the case.  
Again, the changes made in the quotations were minimal, and reflected word choices 
rather than changes in content.  Quotations that were not attributed to interviewees by 
name were taken from the approved transcripts, but did not have a second round of 
review and approval.  The researcher then sent out each individual case writeup for 
review by one or more interviewee chosen for their overall knowledge of the case and 
neutrality in terms of content issues.  Changes made in case writeups by these reviewers 
were also minimal, and did not affect the substance of the cases.  
  
 
 
Data Quality and Analysis 
 
The quality of data accuracy and trustworthiness was addressed through five 
methods: selection of four cases for study; comparison of individual accounts with 
written records of the cases provided by Forest Service officials; comparison of 
perspectives from diverse participants in the same case; review of all researcher-
transcribed data by the interviewee from which it was obtained and review of researcher 
interpretation of the cases by key participants as outlined above.14  The research used 
theoretical propositions for case study analysis through pattern-matching.15  Pattern 
matching analysis is a technique that is used to link data to theoretical propositions or 
criteria for interpretation.  In this case, pattern matching focused on patterns of behavior 
and beliefs drawn from two rival theoretical propositions about human behavior in 
political settings to see which propositions occurred in participants’ behavior and 
descriptions of the cases.  Collaboration was used as an operational example of 
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participatory democracy.   The researcher compared data with theoretical propositions 
drawn from Crislip’s collaboration theory, Poisner’s technical/pluralistic and civic 
republican (participatory democracy) citizen involvement models, and Schein’s 
organizational change theory, linked through the logic outlined below.16  These 
propositions established the framework for analysis of the cases.   
 
Theoretical propositions drawn from Crislip included: 
 
1. Collaborative groups are characterized by a culture in which people’s 
behavior has the following characteristics.  Reports of this type of behavior 
would indicate that a collaborative culture is present in the group.   
 
a. People engage each other as potential allies rather than adversaries. 
b. People engage in dialogue about the issue. 
c. People share power rather than seeking to control or dominate the 
group. 
d. People engage in mutual learning. 
 
2. Collaborative culture represents a change from the culture that characterizes 
traditional public consideration of public issues.  The traditional means of 
dealing with public issues elicits behavior with the following characteristics.  
Reports of these types of behaviors would indicate that there is not a 
collaborative culture in the group. 
 
a. People act as advocate for mutually exclusive position. 
b. People engage in debate with the goal of defending their position and 
winning. 
c. People seek to limit access to the debate by those not in agreement 
with their position. 
d. People force their position on others through power and control 
 
3.  If a group can establish and maintain a collaborative culture with behavior as 
characterized in proposition one above, the group will come to a solution that 
all can support.  Collaborative culture is a pre-condition for collaboration.  
 
Theoretical Propositions from Poisner included: 
 
4. The rational choice model of human behavior is based on a view of human 
nature as exclusively self-serving and competitive.  Expert and pluralist 
models of citizen involvement are based on the rational choice model.  
Therefore, the presence of self-serving and strategic behaviors like those 
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outlined in proposition two evidence the presence of expert and pluralist 
citizen involvement.  
 
5. The definition of the public interest in pluralist theory is the aggregation of 
individual self-interests.  Individual self-interests are taken as static, 
unaffected by the process of aggregation.  Evidence that people did not 
change their understanding of the issues and their self-interests would indicate 
that any resulting agreements would be pluralistic examples of the public 
interest. 
 
6. Participatory democracy is based on the view that human nature is social and 
cooperative, and that an individual’s understanding of self-interest and the 
public interest emerge through the process of dialogue.  The presence of 
behaviors like those outlined in proposition one above are indicative of 
participatory democracy.   Evidence that people changed their understandings 
of their own and others’ interests through the process of the group would 
indicate that any resulting agreements involved the participatory democracy 
paradigm in determining the public interest.    
 
Theoretical propositions drawn from Schein included: 
 
7. Basic beliefs and expectations about human behavior underlie group culture.  
Group culture tends to evolve to be coherent with these underlying beliefs and 
expectations about human behavior.  Therefore, groups with expectations that 
human behavior is competitive and self-interested will have difficulty with a 
collaborative approach, because the group culture is pluralist.  Those that have 
expectations of cooperative and mutual interested behavior evidence a 
participatory culture and should achieve a collaborative agreement.  
 
8. The biggest determinant of culture in forming a group is the belief structure of 
the group’s leader(s).  Leaders establish group culture by behaving in ways 
that are coherent with their underlying beliefs about human nature.  Therefore, 
groups will reflect the underlying beliefs and expectations for human behavior 
evidenced by the behavior of their leaders.   
 
Pluralism as a paradigm of political action draws its beliefs about political 
behavior from the rational choice model of human nature which characterizes people as 
greedy, selfish, unprincipled, manipulative, adversarial, antagonistic, competitive, and 
incapable of sitting down face-to-face with those of opposing views and being 
reasonable.17  Political power is formed when individuals who share the same interests 
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come together to form organizations that raise money and use power and influence to 
obtain political outcomes.18  In pluralism, neither human nature nor self interest change 
as a result of participation in the political process.19   
The participatory democracy paradigm draws its conclusions about political 
behavior from the belief that human nature is mutable; this paradigm is founded on a 
model of human nature herein referred to as the “reasonable” model.  People are capable 
of being reasonable, talking directly to each other, understanding each other’s interests, 
appreciating the larger context of the community they share, and working cooperatively 
to address the interests of all involved.  Participation in political decision making that 
involves face-to-face discussions in which the diversity of interests are fairly represented 
fosters the development of mutual respect, trust, cooperation, and the capacity to 
understand opposing viewpoints.  Political power comes from consensus among diverse 
groups to support an agreed-upon solution.   
As pluralist and participatory democracy paradigms rest upon different models of 
human nature, this research used characterizations of group culture to indicate which 
model of human nature was prevalent in each case.  Group culture reflects underlying 
expectations for human behavior.20  Interviewees were asked to choose between two 
contrasting paragraphs to characterize interactions with the Forest Service and each other 
in defining the public interest.  The paragraphs described sets of behaviors typical of 
pluralist and collaborative cultures.21  Descriptions of pluralist and collaborative group 
cultures were drawn from Chrislip’s description of the changing paradigms for public 
                                                                                                                                                 
Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies:  Some Perils of Devolved Collaboration” in  Across the Great 
Divide:  Explorations in Collaborative Conservation and the American West, eds. P. Brick, D. Snow and S. 
Van De Wetering. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2001, 163-171). 
 
18R.A. Dahl. Dahl,. A Preface to Democratic Theory. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 
1956). 
  
19Pateman; Poisner. 
 
20Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass,  
1992). 
 
21Poisner. 
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decision making.22  Collaborative culture in group interactions was characterized with 
this paragraph: 
People evidenced good humor and seemed to respect each other.  Over time they 
became comfortable with each other and talked informally about other things in 
their lives. During group discussions, they actively listened and sought to 
understand others’ concerns for the most part.  No one person dominated. People 
felt free to contribute new ideas and seek out information together.  
 
Pluralist culture in group interactions was characterized with the following paragraph: 
 
People came in knowing exactly what they wanted in terms of the issues.  There 
was some degree of tension, and people didn’t try to understand each other.  
Much of the time was spent in people asserting claims and backing them up with 
their own arguments and statistics.  It seemed that some people had more power 
than others, and didn’t hesitate to use it to manipulate the discussion. 
 
Choice of the first paragraph was taken as evidence of the presence of a collaborative 
political culture.   Choice of the second paragraph was taken as evidence of the presence 
of a pluralist political culture.   
Interviewees were also asked specific questions about their own and others’ 
behavior, their expectations of others, and their expectations about the outcome of the 
process and the project.  Evidence of pluralism included expectations that people pursued 
an outcome in which their interests were completely met.  Evidence of the participatory 
democracy paradigm included reports that interviewees expected and accepted an 
outcome in which the interviewee’s interests were not necessarily completely met.   
Interviewee responses were analyzed for reported behaviors consistent with either the 
pluralist or participatory democracy paradigms as outlined above.  This analysis served as 
the basis for insight into the practices of Forest Service officials in collaboration. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  TWO WINTER RECREATION CASES 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The Multiple Use/Sustained Yield Act (MUSY) of 1960 authorized the Forest 
Service to add recreation officially to its original mandate of protecting resources while 
providing more traditional commodity uses of the forests.   Over the years, recreation 
technology has changed considerably, becoming more motorized and more capable of 
penetrating further into the forests.  The popularity of motorized recreation has also 
increased.  In the area of winter recreation, snowmobile use has changed substantially in 
the past fifteen years.  Recent research indicates that about eight percent of Montana 
households now own snowmobiles and accounted for about 1,020,000 activity days of 
use in 2005-2006.1  For the same period, non-resident snowmobilers contributed an 
additional 155,000 activity days and spent about $171 per day.2  
 Most of the terrain available for snowmobile use in Montana is public Forest 
Service land.  During the 1990s, increased snowmobile use was occurring in back-
country wilderness study and wildlife winter habitat areas.  These areas were previously 
considered too distant for significant snowmobile use and many were classified as non-
motorized in the Forest Plans of the late 1980s.  In the late 1990s, conservation and 
environmental groups’ concerns about the impacts of snowmobiles in these areas alerted 
the Forest Service to the need to re-assess snowmobile use.  Researchers began to 
quantify the effects of snowmobile use on forests and wildlife.  Meanwhile, conflicts 
between motorized and non-motorized uses escalated as the noise and faster pace of 
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snowmobiles impacted non-motorized users such as cross country skiers and snowshoers 
seeking a quiet recreation experience. 
Interest groups concerned with winter use plans for Forest Service lands fall into 
two groups, motorized and non-motorized.   Snowmobilers join local clubs that are in 
turn members of the Montana Snowmobile Association (MSA), a statewide non-profit 
interest group that represents snowmobile concerns and has funds for legal counsel, 
appeals and lawsuits.  MSA also works with the Blue Ribbon Coalition, a national 
advocacy organization for motorized recreational use of public lands based in Idaho.  One 
MSA official estimated that about 15% of snowmobilers belong to clubs statewide.3 
MSA elects its officers from its membership. 
Non-motorized interests are represented by a number of conservation and 
environmental organizations at the local, state and national level.  The non-profit 
Montana Wilderness Association (MWA) has taken the lead among these organizations 
in participating in Forest Service efforts to negotiate with public interest groups.  MWA 
has local chapters, elects its officers from its membership, has paid staff at the sub-state 
regional and state levels, and has funds for legal counsel, appeals and lawsuits.  In terms 
of winter recreation, MWA represents the interests of non-motorized user groups, 
including cross country skiers, snowshoers and trappers, and works with local clubs of 
these interests where they exist.  MWA also represents the interests of wilderness and 
wildlife protection. 
The Forest Service decision-making process allows involvement by interest 
groups at various points.  The process is governed by a number of federal laws that 
regulate both the content of the decision in terms of environmental and wildlife standards 
that must be met, and the process in terms of procedural steps that must be followed.  
Generally, the process begins with a notice of intent (NOI) requesting public comment as 
part of the scoping period.  The scoping period is the initial stage of a potential action in 
which the parameters of the opportunity or problem are identified.  Then the potential 
action is turned over to an interdisciplinary team (ID team) for further research to 
determine if the project has significant environmental impacts.  The project team can do 
an Environmental Assessment (EA) with alternative actions at this point to determine 
                                                 
3Big Snowies Non FS # 5 Transcript.    
 60
whether the project has significant environmental impacts.  An EA offers a range of 
alternatives, including a no-action alternative, and is published and put out for public 
comment.   If the EA is not appealed within 45 days, a finding of no significant impact is 
filed, and the project can proceed.   Appeals of an EA are answered by dropping the 
project, or completing a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).   
Projects that have significant environmental impacts require an EIS, a more 
comprehensive level of analysis including a range of at least three alternative solutions, 
one of which is a no action alternative. The evaluation of effects and alternatives are then 
published as a draft EIS and put out for public comment and review, generally with one 
alternative indicated as preferred.  After a prescribed period of 45 days for comment, the 
Forest Service reviews all of the public and other agency comment, prepares responses to 
the comments, and may alter the preferred alternative as necessary to accommodate the 
concerns.  The final preferred alternative is then announced through a record of decision 
(ROD) which also includes publication of a final EIS and all of the comments and 
response to comments.   Once the ROD has been released, anyone who commented on 
the draft EIS can file an appeal in writing within 45 days.  The Forest Service first 
attempts to resolve appeals at the level that is one step up from the level at which the 
decision was made.  If this doesn’t resolve the issue, the appeal is sent to the next higher 
level for approval or denial.  If an appeal is approved, the project is either dropped or sent 
back to be revised.  If an appeal is denied at the higher level, the appellant can take the 
issue to court.  The higher level reviewer has 60 days in which to respond to an appeal of 
a final decision.    
The two cases discussed below occurred in a context of high tensions and mistrust 
between motorized and non-motorized users.  Years ago, a federal official in Glacier 
National Park in northwestern Montana became so angry with a fellow who was using a 
snowmobile in an illegal fashion, he pulled out his gun and shot the snowmobile multiple 
times.  This futile act of desperation was widely celebrated by non-motorized users.  
About the time the two cases below were taking place, leaders of snowmobile interests in 
the Flathead Valley of northwestern Montana also were negotiating with the Forest 
Service over the same issues.  These leaders received death threats from other 
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snowmobilers and ended up moving out of the area.4  For a variety of reasons, all of the 
leadership of the snowmobile groups interviewed for the Big Snowies case below are no 
longer in leadership positions, and most have dropped out of their local clubs.  Similarly, 
many conservation and environmental groups were also against negotiating with the 
opposition and criticized the individuals and organizations from their ranks that did come 
to the table.  The pressure against sitting down with “the enemy” and attempting to 
negotiate an agreement that recognized the concerns of all users was substantial at the 
time the following two cases occurred. 
 
 
Case One:  Seeley Lake Winter Recreation Plan 
 
The Seeley Lake Ranger District is part of the Lolo National Forest located in 
southwest Montana.  In 1998, a group of conservation and environmental organizations 
concerned about the effects of snowmobile use on the Great Burn area of the Lolo 
National Forest, including the Montana Wilderness Association (MWA), notified the 
Forest Service that this use was illegal, based on the original forest plan Management 
Area 11 (MA 11) designation for the Great Burn.  MA 11 allowed only non-motorized 
recreational activities as part of maintaining eligibility for potential wilderness 
designation.  The Forest Service had not been preventing snowmobile use in these areas, 
and so was violating its own regulations, according to the environmental groups.   Legal 
counsel to the Forest Service agreed, and on January 4, 1999, the Lolo Forest Supervisor 
closed the Great Burn area, and all other MA 11 areas in the Lolo National Forest, 
including Seeley Lake, to motorized recreation. 
 When news of the closures of all MA11 areas in the Lolo Forest hit local 
snowmobile clubs, there was a great sense of outrage.5  Snowmobilers had been using 
many of these areas for years, some prior to the 1986 Forest Plan, and were unaware that 
the areas were classified non-motorized.  Some of the MA 11 areas offered high 
elevation, open bowl recreation with deep snow unavailable elsewhere in the Seeley Lake 
                                                 
4Seeley Lake Non FS # 5Transcript.   
 
5Seeley Lake Non FS # 1Transcript. 
 62
area.   In response to the closures, the Montana Snowmobile Association (MSA) called a 
meeting in Missoula, Montana, later in January, that was attended by hundreds of angry 
snowmobilers.  One of those attending the meeting was the president of the Seeley Lake 
Driftriders snowmobile club, Ron Ogden.   Seeley Lake is an unincorporated community 
with a population of 1,436 that lies north and east of Missoula in a different Ranger 
District from the Great Burn.6  Seeley Lake is the second most visited snowmobile area in 
Montana, after West Yellowstone that serves as the entry point to Yellowstone Park in 
the winter.  The local community of snowmobilers and visiting snowmobilers had been 
using MA11 areas for snowmobiling in the Seeley Lake area for many years.  The closure 
of MA11 lands in the Seeley Lake area not only prohibited club members from using 
areas that had been widely used in the past, but potentially threatened the winter 
economic livelihood of the Seeley Lake community as out-of-state visitors came 
particularly for these high elevation, deep snow bowl areas.7   
 Ron Ogden was not only the president of the Seeley Lake Driftriders snowmobile 
club; he was also the only enforcement officer for the Forest Service for much of the Lolo 
National Forest.  In his job as enforcement officer, Ron’s experience with Missoula 
courts led him to the conclusion that lawsuits rarely solved problems, but rather delayed 
decisions that were likely to be against local community interests in any event.  Nearly 
everyone else at the meeting was convinced that the only way to fight the loss of the 
MA11 lands was to sue the Forest Service.  During the meeting, Ron stood up and argued 
against filing a lawsuit, but the folks at the meeting were not willing to listen.  When the 
rest of the membership voted to sue the Forest Service, Ron insisted that they keep the 
Seeley Lake club out.  He said, “I will go back and check with my membership, but we 
want no part of a lawsuit.  We are going back to see if we can work this out locally and 
come to some agreement.”8 
 If standing up to a room full of angry snowmobilers had been hard, the next part 
was harder still.  Ron understood that the only way the local club would be credible in 
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8Ron Ogden Transcript, 2.   
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any negotiation over changes in the closures was to come from a position of integrity.  
How could other groups trust that the snowmobile club would keep its word in 
negotiations, if they were violating the law at the same time?   Ron went to the Seeley 
Lake Driftriders and convinced them it was in their interests to stay out of the closed 
areas as long as the closure was in effect and to discourage other snowmobilers from 
using the area as well.  His logic was accepted, and the Seeley Lake Driftriders took on 
the task of helping maintain the closure with the expectation that negotiations would 
work and the closure would be temporary.   
 Meanwhile, Seeley Lake District Ranger Tim Love was also concerned about the 
closure.  Tim had been district ranger in Seeley Lake for several years and assistant 
district ranger for several years before that, and had become deeply involved in the 
community.  Tim knew that closure of the MA11 areas was not good for the Seeley Lake 
community, but he also knew that concerns about snowmobiles hurting the high country 
were relevant, given the presence of species such as grizzly bear, lynx, and mountain 
goats in the district that were under the protection of the Endangered Species Act.  Tim 
had also been thinking about getting the various interests together to work out a solution 
locally.  While the leadership of the various groups didn’t know each other, Tim knew 
them all and knew each had the capability of being open-minded and reasonable.  When 
Ron came to him and suggested that they try getting various interests together to work 
out a solution, Tim readily agreed.   
 The next step was approval from the Lolo National Forest Supervisor to initiate a 
planning effort aimed at working out a solution for the Seeley Lake area.  The closure 
order from the Forest Supervisor also “directed the local District Rangers to first analyze 
the impacts for a particular place and then decide if and where to allow snowmobiling.”9  
The Forest Supervisor was aware that Tim knew his district and the people of his district 
well.  Tim’s ability to get things done in a harmonious fashion in the local community 
had already been evident.  The Forest Supervisor trusted that if anyone could come up 
with a solution by working with the different interests, it would be Tim, so gave Tim 
permission to proceed.  On January 19, 1999, Tim issued a Notice of Intent for scoping 
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and public comment to propose an amendment to the Forest Plan for the district that 
would address the question of whether all MA 11 areas in the district should remain 
closed.  Scoping was the first step in identifying and evaluating which, if any, MA 11 
areas could be re-opened to snowmobile use.  
 Although Ron knew that any amendment to the Forest Plan would have to have 
the blessing of the conservation/environmental community to be accepted, he was 
uncertain about which group to work with.  Of all the environmental and conservation 
groups involved in bringing the issue of MA11 to the attention of the Forest Service, 
MWA seemed the most approachable, in part because some MWA members were winter 
outfitters who use snowmobiles.  Ron contacted Jack Rich, a local outfitter and 
snowmobiler who was also a member of the Montana Wilderness Association (MWA), to   
see if a meeting could be arranged. 
Tim had been sending information about the Seeley Lake snowmobile club to 
John Gatchell, an acquaintance who was also the conservation director for MWA.  When 
John got the call about a possible meeting, John already knew a lot about the Seeley Lake 
Snowmobile club.  Under Ron’s leadership, the club was engaged in a number of 
activities to ensure responsible snowmobile use, including education programs in the 
schools, newsletters containing articles and maps outlining allowed areas, volunteer 
policing of trails and areas to discourage violations, and physical signage on the ground 
indicating the boundaries of restricted areas.  John knew that Ron had encouraged his 
club members to honor the closures, and that the club had taken on a voluntary effort to 
patrol the areas to keep their members and other snowmobilers out.  All of this evidenced 
to John that this snowmobile club took its role seriously.   
 Tim’s information sharing paid off.  John agreed to come to Tim’s office and 
meet with Ron, the president of the snowmobile club John had been hearing about.  As 
Ron recalls it, he and John spent the first part of the meeting sparring over past actions in 
an attitude of mistrust.  Then, when they had gotten that out of their systems, they started 
to talk about the MA 11 lands in the Seeley Lake area and what could be done.   Two 
specific areas were discussed that day that formed the core of the eventual agreement.  
One was the closed MA 11 Elsina Bowls area which in actuality had an old road and had 
been logged in the 1950s.  The other area was the west fork of the Clearwater, just over 
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the ridge from Elsina Bowls, that was open to snowmobiles and marked for potential 
logging, but in actuality was an inaccessible area of cliffs that was in pristine condition, a 
perfect candidate for wilderness.  Reclassification of these two pieces of land became the 
core agreement that allowed both sides to move forward with their negotiations.     
 After that day, Tim, Ron, and John provided the leadership that helped to get the 
rest of the agreement forged with the other various players in the decision.  For most of 
the community groups, Tim was the key.   Tim’s integrity and commitment to community 
allowed others to come into the process of discussions knowing that their concerns would 
be treated fairly.  Tim himself had no expectations about the content of the final decision, 
but he had great faith that people would reach an effective solution.  Everyone 
interviewed for the case remarked upon Tim’s integrity, and his positive attitude.  Tim 
put it this way, “I am an optimistic person.  I knew we could find solutions.  We all have 
interests, but we are all people, we just have different values.”10   
Tim helped the various groups understand the limitations of the Forest Service’s 
mandate.  He advised the snowmobile club to identify the key areas that were most 
important to them and to recognize that they couldn’t have all of the MA 11 areas they 
had previously been using.  By reminding the snowmobilers that they were legally barred 
from all of the MA 11 areas, Tim reinforced the perspective that any areas allowed in the 
future were a gain from having none in the present.  As John put it, “Tim just set out his 
constraints, and defined where the decision space was.”11   Then he left it up to the 
groups to work it out, providing information and helpful hints about what to do next in 
terms of the process.   
In his role as president of the local club, Ron provided leadership for the 
snowmobile groups and helped them identify five key areas that were the most important 
to the club.   He also insisted that discussions rather than a lawsuit was the right way to 
go, and that maintaining the integrity of their position by staying out of the closed areas 
in the meantime was crucial to gain back some of the areas.  He helped the members see 
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that not all environmentalists were the enemy.12  After about a year of working together, 
Ron noted that John had “lost his tail and horns, and I actually began to like the guy.”13  
Similarly, John grew to respect and admire Ron.  As John said, “I think you feel an 
allegiance to people who act with integrity, not because of their interests which are 
different from yours, but because of their integrity.  When you talk with people like this, 
you do start to see things in a different light.  We can grow these relationships.”14  Others 
didn’t quite know what to make of the situation when both of them would show up 
together at snowmobile and conservation meetings and defend each other.   
John worked with MWA to help the organization understand that being pro-
wilderness didn’t mean that they had to be anti-snowmobile.  He also met with his 
counterparts in the various environmental groups to help them understand the 
environmental impacts of the proposed agreement, including the addition of 
nonmotorized acreage in the West Fork of the Clearwater River for potential wilderness 
study.   As Ron noted, the three of them worked as a team, giving each other moral 
support when delays and new challenges arose.  Before it was all finished, there was need 
for a lot of moral support.  The closures took place in January of 1999.  It took the Forest 
Service three and one-half years to issue the Record of Decision in July of 2003.   All the 
while, the signature snowmobile areas in the Seeley Lake Ranger District remained 
closed while the local snowmobiler club honored the closure.  As District Ranger, Tim 
had put his reputation with the local community on the line that something could be 
worked out, but he hadn’t initially thought that it would be three and a half winters before 
the solution took effect.    
When asked what hindered the progress of the effort, interviewees specifically 
mentioned the Forest Service.   Two sources of hindrance were noted, the first being the 
unwillingness of Forest Service biologists at several levels of the Forest Service to 
consider allowing snowmobiles in MA11 areas.   Whether from an ideological 
commitment to wilderness or an aversion to snowmobiles, several biologists involved at 
various points in the process essentially refused to entertain the possibility.  The other 
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hindrance came from the project lacking priority among the competing uses for funds in 
the Lolo National Forest.  Tim could not proceed to take the draft local agreement 
through the NEPA planning process, prepare the EIS, and take it through the formal 
public involvement process, without specific funding from the Lolo National Forest 
office. 
The turning point in moving the agreement forward came when various Forest 
Service officials and biologists from the Lolo National Forest and the Regional Office,  
as well as representatives of the snowmobile and environmental groups, took a trip in the 
winter of 2000-2001 via snowmobiles to the Lake Elsina area.  Some of these folk had 
never been on snowmobiles.  Elsina Bowls, an open area of deep snow accessible from 
established snowmobile areas, offered high, scenic views into several wilderness areas 
and was the most heavily used MA 11 area prior to the closure.  The snow and terrain 
were a snowmobiler’s dream, and were one of the reasons people came from all over the 
country to snowmobile in the area.   
Ron and members of the club donated the use of enough snowmobiles to take 
everyone up to the area.  It was a beautiful winter day.  As Ron remembers it, when they 
got to the top of the last ridge, and halted to look out over the open bowls of the Elsina 
area, the Forest Service officials asked him, “So, when are we going to see the Lake 
Elsina area?  Is it off over there (pointing to a forested wilderness area)?”   “No,” said 
Ron, “It is this area you are in right now.”15  It was a clear cut!  Once the officials saw 
that the area had been logged, there was no more disagreement among those who saw it 
firsthand that it wasn’t a good candidate for MA 11 designation.  Moreover, the Forest 
Service officials also saw that the environmental interests and snowmobile interests were 
in agreement and were working with each other.  This helped convince the officials to 
move the project to the top of the priority list for funding.    
In his role as District Ranger, Tim had used a variety of informal one-on-one 
discussions, small group meetings, presentations, and newsletters as ways to research the 
public interest for winter recreation in the Ranger District.  Tim put it this way, “People 
expect the agency to find solutions that bring people together, not drive them apart.  The 
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Forest Service is responsible for coming up with a ‘range of reasonable alternatives.’  
You have to have the groups come together and work out their differences before you can 
know what is reasonable in terms of the issues to all sides.  The Forest Service has a 
responsibility to create realistic expectations.”16  As Ron put it, “We had many meetings.  
Sometimes we gained a lot, sometimes we gained just a little in solving the problem, but 
things were always positive, moving in the right direction.”17  With the research 
completed, and a reasonable proposal defined, the draft agreement was ready to go 
through the formal NEPA planning process.  When the funding finally came through, the 
Ranger District had a reasonable proposal that incorporated diverse concerns ready to go. 
While the motorized and non-motorized interest groups had been able to reconcile 
their differences, there was no guarantee that the proposal would pass the scrutiny of the 
state and federal agencies as part of the environmental review process.  Tim had recently 
brought Scott Tomson on board as a staff biologist with the Ranger District.  Scott knew 
the proposed plan would have to comply with sound science on environmental impacts, 
and was also aware of the need to work with the community.  “This kind of a solution is a 
good and lasting thing that builds good relationships in the community, builds trust in the 
agency.”18  Scott also appreciated the need to help the public understand the interface 
between the science and the regulatory requirements.  As Scott put it, “it is important to 
help folks understand that rules are rules, but you can do it by engaging in a give and 
take, not by making people feel you are beating them over the head.  Instead, you can 
help them see the shared values and options.”19   
Concerns about the wildlife impacts of the project arose one at a time, and Tim 
and his staff dealt with them in a problem-solving approach, bringing in folks from 
various interest groups as needed.  One of the key wildlife concerns was potential 
disruption of grizzly dens in the Elsina Bowls area.  The solution was to include a 
provision to close the area to further snowmobile use annually on April 1, well before the 
bears emerge from their dens.  Another issue was potential impact to lynx habitat; 
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fortunately, Scott had researched the lynx habitat himself and was able to demonstrate 
that the lynx population wasn’t active in the areas opened to snowmobile use, and would 
actually benefit from with the exclusion of snowmobiles from the West Fork area.  
Watchdog agencies don’t care about interest group agreements; they only look at the 
numbers on the bottom line to assess how it will affect the resource.  In this case, 
however, the science behind the proposed alternative met the standards of the National 
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Montana Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks.   
As the wildlife issues emerged, a number of environmental organizations from 
outside of the immediate area also began to question the proposal.  The District Ranger 
invited the leadership of these groups to come in and talk about their concerns.  As Scott 
the district biologist put it, “We didn’t bring them in and say, ‘here’s what we are going 
to do, any questions.’ Instead we set the stage and listened to their concerns, questions, 
etc., which is a subtle but important difference in presentation.”20  MWA was strongly 
behind the proposal and John talked with these groups directly, further reinforcing the 
trustworthiness of the science behind the proposal.  The final hurdle came near the very 
end of the process when the Sierra Club representative brought up one more issue while 
he, John, Scott and Tim were sitting in Tim’s office.  The Forest Service had drafted the 
proposal to allow snowmobiles back into two areas by allowing an exception within the 
MA 11 designation.  The Sierra Club felt this was a dangerous precedent; what would 
keep other districts from making exceptions as well, defeating the purpose of the MA 11 
designation?  Just when things seemed to be at an impasse, the Sierra Club representative 
stepped forward with a solution.  The Forest Service had a seldom-used MA 10 
designation that would allow snowmobile use; the proposal could be implemented by 
changing the classification.   And so it was that the final solution to allowing 
snowmobiles back into Seeley Lake’s closed areas came from a national environmental 
organization that helped initiate the closure in the first place.   
When the planning process was completed, the Forest Service chose as its 
preferred alternative the one that incorporated the local agreements.  The Record of 
Decision came out on July 14, 2003, and no appeals were filed.  This was the first 
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successful agreement between the MWA and snowmobilers.  The agreement remains in 
place today with strong support.  As Ron noted, “I still get thanks every day!”21   
Moreover, the story of community folk working with the Seeley Lake Ranger 
District doesn’t end here.  Encouraged by the success of the winter recreation agreement 
and the strong working relationships already established by the Blackfoot Challenge (a 
twenty-year old collaborative of private and public land owners who share the watershed 
of the Blackfoot River in western Montana), local community leaders came together with 
state and national organizations to create the “Blackfoot Cooperative Landscape 
Stewardship Pilot Project.”   The working group for this project included representatives 
from the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, The Wilderness Society, MWA, the Blackfoot 
Community Project, the local outfitting guide community, Pyramid Lumber (the local 
lumber mill), the local ranching community, the Seeley Lake Ranger District, and the 
Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks Department.  All have agreed to support all of the 
components of the proposed pilot project. 
Part of the project already in place includes expansion of snowmobiling areas in 
several key areas, and the creation of a continuous snowmobile trail from Lincoln to 
Seeley Lake, a distance of about 70 miles.  The pilot project integrates land management 
across public and private land, and uses a management approach that allows for active 
uses such as grazing, logging, and restoration work in the lower elevations, moving to 
conservation areas and wilderness as elevation increases.  Traditional wilderness pack 
trails in the area will be maintained.  Timber supply for the local mill will be sustainable, 
with the receipts from the stewardship project share of the sales going to restoration work 
on the Seeley Lake District, including watershed improvements, road rehabilitation and 
weed eradication.  The pilot also calls for the addition of 87,000 Forest Service acres to 
the adjacent Bob Marshall and Scapegoat Wilderness areas.  All of these activities are 
consistent with Forest Service planning and management regulations.    
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Case Two:  Big Snowies Winter Travel Plan 
 
The Big Snowy Mountains in central Montana is one of six ranges of the northern 
Rocky Mountains in the old Jefferson District of the Lewis and Clark National Forest.   
Other ranges include the Highwoods, Crazies, Little Belts, Castles, and the Little 
Snowies.  These mountains are called “island” ranges because they are not contiguous 
with other mountain ranges, but rather form islands of mountains in the prairies that 
sweep across the northern Great Plains.  While these areas are responsible for nearly all 
of the timber and grazing in the Lewis and Clark National Forest, they also provide both 
winter and summer recreation for the surrounding communities of Great Falls, 
Lewistown, White Sulphur Springs, and Helena as well as to visitors from out of the area.  
Both the Little Belt and the Big Snowy Mountains contain congressionally designated 
Wilderness Study areas.   
The Big Snowies are about half-way between Great Falls (population 56,690) and 
Lewistown (population 5,813), Montana, and are particularly popular with Lewistown 
snowmobilers because of their proximity.22  Travel planning for off-road vehicles became 
a priority for the Lewis and Clark National Forest as a result of a decision in 2001 that 
called for site-specific travel management.  Recognizing this priority, the Lewis and 
Clark National Forest obtained a travel planner in 2001. 
The first area for analysis and revision was the Big Snowies.  After a period of 45 
days of public review, the Lolo National Forest Supervisor issued a Decision Notice on 
the new Travel Plan for summer and winter use on the Big Snowies in January of 2002.  
By March of 2002, eight groups and ten individuals had filed appeals on the proposed 
plan, including the Central Montana Wildlands Association, the Island Range Chapter of 
the Montana Wilderness Association, American Wildlands, Friends of the Bitterroot, the 
Montana Chapter of the Sierra Club, the Blue Ribbon Coalition (a motorized use 
advocacy group), the Montana Trail Vehicle Riders Association, and the Montana 
Snowmobile Association.23  Motorized and non-motorized groups were against the Forest 
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Service plan.  As one of the wilderness representatives put it, the plan made Swiss cheese 
out of the wilderness study area by including scattered sites for snowmobile use.24 As one 
of the snowmobile users put it, “When we saw what was being proposed, we demanded 
meetings in our area; we had a comment period, but it made no difference in the plan.”25 
Another National Forest in Region One had recently resolved a disagreement over 
travel planning that helped set the stage for the Big Snowies. Motorized and non-
motorized groups had recently clashed over Forest Service travel planning on the 
Flathead National Forest in northwest Montana.  In the Flathead case, the district judge 
ordered closure of key snowmobile areas to motorized vehicles as part of a lawsuit filed 
by MWA.  The Flathead National Forest had not implemented a winter use plan for 
Nonmotorized Areas, and attempts by MWA to initiate discussions with local 
snowmobiler interests were rejected by the snowmobiler clubs.   MWA’s lawsuit was 
intended to force the Forest Service to formulate a winter use plan for Nonmotorized 
Areas that would assess current use patterns in non-motorized areas to determine where 
non-motorized restrictions should be enforced, and which could remain open to 
snowmobile use.  Instead, the judge ordered the Flathead National Forest to close all non-
motorized areas. 
The judge suggested that the parties meet and work out a solution.  Eventually, 
the Flathead National Forest was able to bring the snowmobile and the wilderness 
interests together to negotiate an alternative.  Both MWA and MSA were involved in the 
negotiations that resulted in a final agreement that won protection from motorized use for 
potential wilderness areas.  The snowmobilers maintained use of 99 per cent  of the areas 
they had been actively using, the Forest Service didn’t have to implement a complete 
closure to motorized recreation, and the MWA didn’t get blamed for shutting 
snowmobiling down in the Flathead.26 
Officials in the Forest Service Regional office were pleased with the way things 
had worked out in the Flathead, and encouraged the Lewis and Clark National Forest to 
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try a similar approach with the appellants to the Big Snowies Travel Plan.  The Forest 
Service goal was to bring together those who were most affected by the decision and 
encourage them to resolve the hard tradeoffs.  Officials in the Region One and Lewis and 
Clark National Forest knew that the Forest Service could not get the “right” answer by 
themselves. Once the environmental parameters are clear, multiple use offers little further 
direction from the standpoint of scientific management.  As one Forest Service official 
put it, “Multiple use has broad parameters.  The Forest Service can’t get to a ‘right’ 
answer in assessing recreational uses, because recreation is socially and value driven by 
the individuals involved.”27 This was a social issue, not a science issue; it was a matter of 
values.   Another Forest Service official said, “We had great hopes that it would work; if 
those folks could work it out, our job would be much easier.”28 
The Lewis and Clark National Forest officials had heard about the Flathead 
resolution, and it seemed to them that a similar effort would work for the Big Snowies as 
well.  They invited all of the appellants to join in an effort to work out their differences.  
The majority of interest groups and citizens said they were willing to sit and talk.   MWA 
and MSA had just had success in negotiating for the Flathead Forest and were willing to 
try it again.  As Allen Brown, president of MSA put it, "John Gatchel (Conservation 
Director for MWA) and I had known each other for several years.  We had both worked 
together in the past.  We had each spend over $200,000 fighting over land use issues.  
John and I agreed that there had to be a better way to resolve our differences.  We both 
agreed that we didn’t want to go to the 9th Circuit Court again where neither of us were 
happy with the outcome."29  Similarly, a representative from MWA said, “It was worth a 
try, to see what was possible, and avoiding a lawsuit is easier than filing a suit against the 
Forest Service.  A suit could be a big deal, and expensive, and even if you win the 
process, you may not win the outcome you were seeking.  It is not always better to have a 
lawsuit.”30 John Gatchell, conservation director for MWA, said, “People think they will 
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get everything from the legal process, but most of the time you just get more and more 
process.”31  
The first several meetings were very difficult; those who attended were restating 
their positions and establishing their territories.  Both the Forest Service and the non 
Forest Service people were uncomfortable.  The people who were not from the Forest 
Service were not accustomed to taking the lead and talking to each other rather than 
arguing with the Forest Service.  The Forest Service representatives were uncomfortable 
too; there was some reluctance to step back from the role of authority.  In actuality, they 
were not giving up their legal authority by engaging in the negotiations, because the 
ultimate decisions on travel planning rested with the FS officials.   If the parties came to 
an agreement that was acceptable to the Forest Service, the Forest Services could take 
that agreement into the NEPA process as the preferred alternative.  If not, the Forest 
Service would propose its own alternative.   
The timing of the appellant discussions was difficult because the Lewis and Clark 
National Forest was in a period of rapid turnover in the position of forest supervisor; 
there was a lack of consistent leadership at the top during most of the discussion period.  
The Lewis and Clark Forest provided staff who supplied information and maps and kept 
track of what happened in the meetings, but did not do active facilitation of the 
negotiations.   As discussions progressed, it became clear that Forest Service leadership 
was not needed because of the strong desire of the group to talk openly to each other, not 
one-sidedly to the Forest Service.  At several meetings the Forest Service staff hardly 
spoke.32  The citizens and interest group representatives were very committed to the 
process.  As Robyn Strathy noted,  “One key thing is that we had the same players from 
the groups all the time, the same individuals.  They made yeoman efforts to be there.  
This is a lot to ask of people, it takes a real commitment.”33 
Forest Service staff functioned as a neutral 3rd party in the negotations. Most of 
the meetings were held at the Lewis and Clark Forest office in Great Falls.  There were 
two Forest Service officials, Robin Strathy and Dick Schwecke, who met with the group 
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consistently through the discussions, took notes and provided them to the participants.  
These officials kept track of the specifics and captured details on maps as the discussions 
went on.  The Forest Service and other advisors also made sure that the group knew 
where the environmental concerns were.  The Forest Service had already completed 
wildlife and wilderness research for the Big Snowies Travel Plan as part of the original 
travel planning effort.  Work on the other mountain ranges had not begun, so Forest 
Service and Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks wildlife people came in and covered the 
key aspects of the wildlife uses.  Wildlife and other resource information established the 
parameters within which any agreements had to fall.  As Robin Strathy put it, “In this 
case, the FS was at the table, but we didn’t want to inject ourselves too strongly.  We had 
already put some sideboards on the draft plan.  And we had leadership in the group that 
recognized that.”34  Forest Service representatives were neutral about the mix of uses that 
could emerge from the negotiations as long as the mix fell within its parameters.   
John Gatchell of MWA and Allen Brown from MSA were the two key players 
that made the negotiations work.  They represented the opposing views and they provided 
leadership in the negotiations.  Alan had a background in labor negotiations, so the 
process was familiar to him.  However, it was John and Alan’s relationship that really 
made the difference.  The recent experience of completing negotiations on the Flathead 
winter travel plan allowed them to trust each other, and to understand each other’s 
communication style.  There was a strong sense of integrity between the two; they knew 
how to negotiate with each other.  Allen Rowley, who came in at the end of the 
discussions as the Deputy Forest Supervisor, described it this way: “John and Alan had 
respect for each other’s different opinions that was obvious and well-demonstrated.  They 
knew how to disagree amicably.”35  John helped to get the discussions started by setting a 
tone that was respectful and amicable.   
Early on, MWA set out a list of parameters that defined the terms under which 
they would negotiate.  The key parameter from MWA’s perspective was designation of 
large blocks of land for motorized and non-motorized use, to be easier for enforcement, 
better for the user groups, and better for wilderness protection.  The summer group would 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 4. 
 
35Allen Rowley Transcript, 4. 
 76
not accept this.   The rest of the group agreed with MWA’s proposed parameters.   
Another concern that was shared by the motorized and non-motorized groups was that the 
Big Snowies were too small to do a lot of compromise; including the other island 
mountain ranges as part of the negotiation was essential to allow for give and take.  The 
group decided to expand to include the other mountain ranges in the Jefferson division 
and focus solely on winter use as a starting point.   Negotiation of summer uses would be 
taken up once agreement had been reached among the winter users, so the summer 
interest groups agreed to re-enter the negotiations at a later date.  The Forest Service also 
brought in the need to work within science based parameters for wildlife and winter range 
areas, and a proposed timeline.  These were the “ground rules” of the negotiations, 
similar to what had been used in the Flathead negotiations.  The “Appeal Resolution 
Agreement” was drafted and signed in May, 2002; most parties agreed to engage in 
dialogue over the Snowies and adjacent “island” ranges of the Lewis and Clark National 
Forest within a specific time frame.36  One group, the Central Montana Wildlands 
Association, did not participate in the discussion, refused to join the negotiations, and 
pursued its appeal through the usual Forest Service process to Region One level. 
In order to make progress, motorized and non-motorized participants needed to 
get past the stage of posturing by restating their ideological positions, but neither side 
wanted to go first.  Finally Alan Brown went over to a map and indicated a piece of 
ground that the snowmobilers wanted, and that was the turning point.  The group got 
maps from the Forest Service and made overlays of the areas of critical importance.  Each 
group marked on the overlays what was important to them, then met and compared the 
maps.  There was quite a bit of difference in terms of the areas that were important to 
each, so the amount of overlap was manageable.  The group then focused on the areas of 
dispute.  The meetings were bumpy; one would go well, and the next would lose ground.  
Sometimes great animosity surfaced, but the group got through it.   The group met 13 
times and made a field trip to one heavily contested area over about a year and a half.37 
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John Gatchell and Alan Brown provided leadership when strong feelings 
threatened to disrupt the discussion.   One or the other would call for a caucus of their 
respective interest groups.  Both reinforced the expectation among their group’s members 
that give and take was essential; the reality of the situation was that one side could not 
have it all.  As the discussion focused on different mountain ranges, each brought in or 
consulted with user groups familiar with the area.  This on-the-ground knowledge was 
essential in resolving the immediate issues in areas of mutual use.  John noted, “The Big 
Snowies are a good example of the vital importance of on-the-ground knowledge.  Our 
members snowshoed into the Snowies to field check what areas received snowmobile 
use. We always met ahead of the meetings, so that we understood the ground at stake and 
knew what our members would support.  We had leadership between meetings, to discuss 
best options and try to get participants to be real, to look for practical and workable 
solutions.  Like negotiating, everybody gets to represent their interests with vigor –
leadership is necessary to consider wider and long term responsibilities.”38  In one case, 
spokesmen from snowmobile and nonmotorized user groups were able to work out a 
compromise at the level of individual trees along a shared trail after a field trip to explore 
options for the area.  Between meetings, MWA and MSA representatives would take 
proposals back to their membership for discussion and review.  For MSA, there was a 
tension between keeping the discussion smaller to meet time constraints for agreement, 
and reaching out to the entire membership to be sure everyone knew what was being 
discussed.39  
The meetings were frustrating for the Forest Service officials at times, because  
progress on the content of the negotiations seemed very slow.  Some of the forest 
Supervisors tried to prod the negotiations along.  It seemed the parties would never 
agree.40 A question would be raised at one meeting and left hanging for the next.  It took 
several meetings to resolve some issues and there were areas where the group couldn’t 
agree.  A field trip to the O’Brien Creek area helped both cross country skiers and 
snowmobile users appreciate the safety concerns of the other, allowing them to agree to 
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share use of the contested trail as an interim step until separate trails can be constructed.  
In the end, the group left a few things for the Forest Service to decide through the NEPA 
process.   At the end, Robyn Strathy reported the group said, “We are willing to let the 
rest of the public decide this.  Don’t let this small part in which there wasn’t agreement 
sabotage all the good work we’ve done.”41 
The group agreed on a draft agreement on winter recreation in January, 2004, for 
four of the ranges in the Jefferson district, including the Big Snowies, the Little Belts, the 
Castles, and the northern portion of the Crazy Mountains, and turned the draft over to the 
legal counsels of MWA, MSA, and the Forest Service to come up with a formal 
document for the agreement.   In the agreement, the Forest Service committed to using 
the draft agreement as the basis for an amendment revising the Lewis and Clark National 
Forest Jefferson Division Travel Plan concerning winter recreation.  The Forest Service 
was to use the agreed-upon plans as one of the alternatives in the NEPA travel planning 
process for each of the other mountain ranges.  The agreement also required the Forest 
Service to put into place interim implementation of the groups’ provisions concerning the 
shared use areas in the Little Belt and Big Snowy Mountains and called for continued 
negotiations on the details of the boundaries between some of the use areas in the Little 
Belts.  The agreement included requirements for the user groups as well.  Snowmobile 
clubs agreed to help enforce closures through signage and education of their members 
and other snowmobile users.  All signatories agreed to support the Forest Service publicly 
in implementing the amendment and encourage their membership to do likewise. 
Moreover, signatories agreed to “seek intervention and otherwise participate to the extent 
allowed by law…to support any decision of the Lewis and Clark National Forest to so 
revise the Forest Travel Plan.”42   
The final agreement was ready to be signed at a press conference on April 27, 
2004.  However, by then a great deal of tension had arisen in the snowmobile community.  
The day before the scheduled signing, one of the local snowmobile clubs informed the 
Forest Service that they didn’t want to sign the agreement.  The group requested that the 
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Forest Service revise the document to indicate that use of the word “we” refer only to the 
Forest Service, MWA and MSA, and to remove any references to the Castle Mountains  
and the Crazy Mountains.43  The Forest Service did as they requested, and changed the 
document so that those who did agree could continue.   The final agreement was signed 
the next day by the Island Range Chapter of the MWA, MSA, MWA, Lewis and Clark 
National Forest, Great Falls Cross-Country Ski Club, Great Falls Snowmobile Club, and 
the Little Belt Snowmobile Club.  The agreement retained the provisions for the Big 
Snowies and the Little Belt Mountains as the package of tradeoffs and compromises that 
spanned both ranges. 
The Central Montana Wildlands Association, the one group that had refused to 
participate in the appellants discussions, filed a lawsuit in August 2005 challenging the 
(amended) final decision for the Big Snowies Travel Plan.  The nature of its complaint 
was that the Forest Service was not protecting the wilderness character of the Montana 
Wilderness Study Act area that is in the Big Snowies.  The case was litigated in Missoula 
District Court.  True to their word, both MSA and MWA intervened in the case on behalf 
of the Forest Service.  John Gatchell noted, “When the winter agreement for the Big 
Snowies was challenged, MWA came in and supported the USFS (United States Forest 
Service) Decision in the courts.  The Montana Snowmobile Association also supported 
the agreement in court – just as we had promised to do in the 2004 Agreement.  In this 
instance, the challenge came from an environmental group that chose not to come to the 
table.  We got flack – newspaper columns – from some environmental groups for 
defending the final USFS decision based on our negotiated winter settlement.”44  In 
August 2006, the US District Court ruled strongly in favor of Forest Service and Big 
Snowies Travel Plan.  Observers of the judge’s decision agree that it was influenced by 
the fact that MSA and MWA participated in creating the amendment, and backed it 
strongly enough to file on behalf of the Forest Service.45  The plaintiff subsequently 
appealed to the 9th Circuit Court.  However, given the strength of the judge’s ruling, the 
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Forest Service went ahead and implemented the interim winter travel plan amendment for 
the Big Snowies.   
There are differing views as to why the snowmobile club pulled out of the 
agreement at the last moment.   Some members of the club felt they had not been 
included in the negotiations and didn’t approve of the proposed use plans for their areas.  
They said they were not represented in the negotiations, that they didn’t know what was 
being proposed.  The club had changed its leadership; some of the newer members 
weren’t involved in the club during the negotiations.  Subsequent to signing the Winter 
Recreation Agreement, leadership in other local clubs and in MSA also changed.  The 
attitude of the Great Falls club changed with the addition of several new members who 
adamantly opposed closures.   Its membership no longer supports the decision to sign the 
agreement.46   
Other interviewees believed that claims of not knowing what was being proposed 
were stretched and that what was driving the snowmobile club’s actions was the belief 
that its members should have the right to use all of the Forest Service land.   As happened 
with the Great Falls club, a handful of strong anti-closure advocates joined local clubs 
and MSA and rallied support for their cause.  It was easier to get snowmobile club 
members to support fighting against closures than it was to convince them they were 
better off negotiating.47  At the heart of the matter was a fundamental difference in 
perspectives between the original and the new leadership.  The new leadership was 
focused on how things were before the issue of non-motorized closures came up and 
viewed anything less as a loss to be fought at all costs.  The original leadership 
appreciated the fact that the courts and the Forest Service were increasingly enforcing 
widespread closures that took major areas away from motorized use.  Rather than 
defending the “right” to keep everything open and losing most areas, the original 
leadership thought they would gain more by negotiating with other users for the most 
important areas.  The original leadership was cognizant of the fact that within the 
parameters of the law, the Forest Service was charged with the task of managing for 
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multiple use.  No one use or interest was likely to dominate.  As one non-motorized 
advocate put it, “People who don’t participate feel like they are waiting for a knight in 
shining armor to ride in and win everything they want, like all for wilderness, or all for 
snowmobiles.  This is not going to happen again very soon.”48  
In terms of content, the agreement for the Big Snowies achieved a better balance 
of motorized and non-motorized use than had been in the Forest Service proposed plan.  
The Forest Service plan had islands of motorized use in some of the higher snowy bowls 
in the central areas of the mountains.  The amended final decision provided better 
protection for potential wilderness by eliminating motorized use throughout the central 
core of the mountain range.   The amount of areas open to snowmobiling in the amended 
plan was greater and allowed for the addition of marked trails where none had been 
allowed before.  In expanding the areas open to snowmobiles, the group compromised on 
resource aspects to allow agreement on the social aspects by opening up an area of winter 
game range to snowmobile use.  Winter use for the Little Belts was improved as well 
through resolution of some pre-existing conflicts between skiers and snowmobilers that 
was implemented on an interim basis.  As one snowmobiler put it, “We reached a good 
agreement with the cross country ski folks, an agreement that is livable, and helped with 
the cross country skiers, especially on the areas of joint use.  This has helped to reduce 
friction on the shared trail.”49 
All interviewees felt the process was worthwhile.  Dick Schwecke, travel planner 
for the Lewis and Clark National Forest, noted, “It felt great not to be in the middle.  
There were some jibes, but this was more civilized.   Some days were humorous, some 
days not. This was better, much better than our other public involvement.  Folks needed 
to see and appreciate the other point of view.  When the Forest Service presents it, it 
looks like we are promoting one side or the other.  This way it is direct between the 
parties.”50  Mark Good of the Island Chapter of MWA found the process challenging but 
positive. “There were more possibilities here, to get beyond the debating.  It was 
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challenging to be proposing solutions.  The meetings were more stressful than fun.  I got 
a better understanding of people, got to see the other side of people, like Alan Brown.  I 
disliked him when we first met, but I came to appreciate him.  He was trying to be fair.  
He’s a smart guy; I have respect for him as a person.”51  One of the snowmobile group 
representatives noted, “Now I spend time talking with the cross country skiers, I offered 
to help with their trail grooming.  Now we can solve problems through our ongoing 
relationship.  Before, I didn’t know who they were.”52  Robin Strathy of the Forest 
Service put it this way, “Wow, this is great!  This can work, seeing the enthusiasm 
growing, seeing possibilities.  This was a big change for me.  It was a pleasurable 
experience.  Having had one that works makes it easier to think about others.  I would be 
pleased to do this again.”53  Clint Dahlhausen, representative of the Lewistown area 
snowmobile club in the negotiations, noted, “The process, the negotiation, it helps each 
side understand where the other is coming from.  This is the beginning of let’s work 
together rather than fight… People need to be able to recreate in different ways – this is 
the main reason that things came out the way they did on the Big Snowies.”54 And he 
went on to say, “I feel that what happened here changed the direction of the Forest 
Service.  When the Big Snowies travel plan came out, no one had been involved.  Before, 
the Forest Service would take comments and write back.   Now they are more apt to listen 
to people in person.”55   
 The Deputy Supervisor of Lewis and Clark National Forest went on to convene 
the summer recreation groups to carry on with the second part of the negotiation.   The 
groups met six or seven times, and then, for a number of reasons, agreed that the 
negotiation process wasn’t working and disbanded the negotiation effort.  One 
complicating factor was that some 15 groups were involved in the summer use, making 
negotiations logistically more challenging than in the smaller winter group.  Neither John 
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Gatchell nor Alan Brown was involved in the summer group.  The Forest Service hired a 
very qualified mediator, but the groups were not willing to engage in a give and take.  
Although no agreement was reached, the effort gave the Forest Service a great deal of 
insight into what was important to each.  Allen Rowley followed up on the meetings by 
going around to the groups one-on-one:  “I share what groups tell me with the other 
groups – people couldn’t believe that the other side said what they said.  I said that this 
was not disingenuous; I hope that my comments helped to change some minds.  But it is 
not the same as face-to-face learning about each other.”56  With or without agreement, 
reaching out and talking with different interest groups benefits the Forest Service.  Allen 
put it this way, “The gold standard for this type of working together is to have a solution 
that is agreed to and is durable;  the silver standard is that you know what it is about a 
solution people don’t like and why.  It is a mark of success to understand why an 
agreement can’t be reached.  You won’t be surprised when it isn’t supported, and you’ll 
know why it isn’t.”57 
 
 
Comparison of Seeley Lake and Big Snowies Winter Recreation Cases 
 
 Both of these cases contained face-to-face negotiations with a core group of 
representatives from the major interest groups involved in the issue that was sanctioned 
by the Forest Service.  Both cases produced agreements that were subsequently used by 
the Forest Service in determining the balance of uses for public land.  However, looking 
beyond this level of generalizations, there are a number of contextual differences and 
similarities that offer insight into the process of achieving multi-interest agreements. 
 Both cases were prompted by legal actions of the Forest Service and both were 
viewed as alternatives to filing lawsuits.   However, in the Seeley Lake case, discussions 
were entered into voluntarily by the parties based on their perceptions (in the absence of 
experience) that they could work together to come to an agreement.  Personal integrity 
and the ability of leaders to extend that integrity to the actions of group members were 
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major factors that allowed the discussions to proceed.  The leader of the snowmobile club 
came from the local level and played an active role in keeping members informed and 
supportive of both the content and the purpose of the negotiations.  A high level of 
commitment to the community characterized the motivations of participants. The District 
Ranger knew the other participants in the negotiations well, knew they had strong 
leadership abilities with their constituents, and believed they would be fair and 
reasonable with each other.  While he was neutral in terms of the content of the 
negotiations, the District Ranger exercised leadership throughout by clearly outlining and 
enforcing the “decision space” parameters that the Forest Service expected to be met, 
including the expectation that each use would have limits in order to accommodate the 
others.  Part of the decision space he reiterated was the starting point for snowmobile use.  
Legally, the Forest Service had prohibited snowmobile use in all of the areas under 
discussion; the purpose of the discussion was to gain some of the areas back.  Discussions 
were informal.  The final agreement in this case has never been appealed.   
In the Big Snowies case, the negotiating interests were appellants to a legal action 
taken by the Lewis and Clark National Forest in releasing the final record of decision for 
the Big Snowies.  While appellants had the choice of participating or not in the 
negotiations, the Forest Service made it clear that this was the preferred method for 
resolution of the appeals.  Once the leadership of MWA and MSA agreed to participate, 
the others essentially had to participate as well if they wanted their concerns represented.  
As a result, not all of the participants viewed the negotiations as voluntary, although one 
appellant chose not to participate.  Personal integrity was a major factor that allowed the 
discussions to proceed, in this case because of the relationship and trust between the 
leaders of MSA and MWA.  Leadership for the snowmobile interests came from the state 
level and involved local club leadership as local areas became the focus of the 
negotiations. Communication with local club members was less thorough than in the 
Seeley Lake case, both in terms of the content and purpose of the negotiations.  Most 
participants didn’t live in the immediate vicinity of the areas under discussion so there 
was little shared sense of commitment to the community.   Due to changes in personnel, 
the Forest Service representatives did not exercise leadership, but played a facilitative 
role in providing information and recording specifics as agreements were made.  While 
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the parameters for the decision were defined in the ROD, the Forest Service did little to 
reiterate limitations on snowmobile use stemming from statutory protection of wilderness 
or accommodation of multiple uses.  The final agreement was litigated by the one 
appellant that had chosen not to participate in the negotiations.  Both MSA and MWA 
filed interventions on behalf of the Forest Service at the district court level that appeared 
to be instrumental in the judge’s decision in favor of the Forest Service. The appellant 
subsequently has pursued the case to the circuit court.   
In both cases, moving beyond posturing to discussing particular pieces of ground 
allowed the groups to reach agreement.  In both cases, the groups identified their most 
important areas of use and discovered that they had no conflicts with each other over 
most of these areas, thereby reducing the scope of the potential conflict.  This process 
allowed them to focus in on the areas in which there were conflicts after securing the bulk 
of the important areas.  On-the-ground knowledge played a key role in constructing 
solutions that made the agreements possible.  In the Seeley Lake case, the snowmobile 
club president’s knowledge of the West Fork of the Clearwater, gained from his days as a 
dog-sled runner and from friends who were packers and trappers, brought to light the 
opportunity to reclassify this area for potential wilderness as an off-set against the 
reclassification of Elcina Bowls to allow snowmobiles.  Similarly, in both cases field 
trips to contested areas helped resolve differences and allow the groups to come to 
agreement.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  TWO FUEL REDUCTION STEWARDSHIP CASES 
 
Introduction to Fuel Reduction Stewardship Projects 
 
 For most of its history, the Forest Service has been suppressing forest fires as part 
of its overall management efforts.  More recently, advances in the study of fire have 
revealed that fire plays an important role in forest ecology, reducing understory growth 
and promoting timely replacement of short-lived tree species.  As understanding of fire 
ecology grows, it’s becoming apparent that many forest areas preserved from both 
logging and wildfire have reached unnatural levels of vegetative density.  Old 
photographs from the early part of the 20th century indicate tree stands were far more 
open and park-like than the same type of areas today.  Accumulation of dead and live 
undergrowth contributes to fuel loading, a term that describes the amount of readily 
combustible material in the forest.  When fuel loads are unnaturally high, the potential for 
intense forest fires increases.    
 While the problem of fuel loading exists in many areas, it is most problematic at 
the fringes of the forest where people live and build year-round homes, summer cabins, 
resorts, and other structures.  These areas, known as the wildland/urban interface, get 
priority in fighting fires to prevent the loss of lives and property.  These are also the areas 
that people seek to occupy because of the proximity to the forests.  Aesthetically, people 
have come to appreciate the forest characteristics prevalent in recent years, not realizing 
these characteristics are the product of man’s intervention rather than the unfettered work 
of Mother Nature.   
 As forest managers became more aware of fire ecology and forest health, the 
public became more sensitive to timber harvesting and forest conservation.  
Controversies over such things as spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest led to 
substantial reductions in timber harvest levels.  In response, the stated management 
 87
emphasis of the Forest Service shifted from timber production to healthy forest 
restoration.  However, interest groups concerned with forest health remained skeptical of 
the reasoning and motives behind proposed timber cutting projects.  One Forest Service 
manager summed it up this way, “For years, the Forest Service was oriented to producing 
a target number of board feet per year.  The perception of values has changed.  Now 
we’ve said that our goal is to maintain the forest, to let the land tell us what it can and 
cannot do.  This is an issue of trust development with the public.”1   
The shift to forest restoration generated economic effects as well.  As timber sales 
declined, rural communities dependent upon local logging and lumber mills found their 
economies drying up.  Not only were jobs disappearing, but payments to local 
governments and schools from timber harvested on Forest Service land also declined.  
Meanwhile, Forest Service districts struggled to accomplish forest restoration and facility 
maintenance with categorical budgets designed to support timber production.  Not only 
were there very limited funds available for service contracts to do such things as stream 
restoration, trail maintenance and facility replacement, but what funds there were often 
were cut to pay the escalating costs of fighting the nation’s forest fires.    
 In the mid-1990s, the Forest Service began to experiment with stewardship 
contracting, a new concept that offered districts the opportunity to keep the revenue from 
timber harvesting and thinning projects at the district level by using the funds generated 
from timber sales to purchase service contracts.  Jokingly nicknamed “timber for toilets” 
because they generated funds for facility maintenance that included new toilets, 
stewardship projects were to be planned in close cooperation with local communities to 
ensure that the project components reflected local priorities.2  Moreover, the methods 
used for cutting timber were to reflect longer-term resource stewardship and forest health 
concerns by focusing on the end result rather than detailing how to do it.  None of the 
                                                 
1Thompson Falls FS # 4 Transcript, page 2.  He went on to give this example of the difference 
between a focus on timber harvest versus letting the land tell you what it could do.  There was a timber sale 
done years ago on a piece of Ponderosa pine ground that was also prime elk winter range.  The sale was 
done because the piece wasn’t needed to meet the amount of winter range allocated for the area.   The 
Forest Service used to send crews up to this piece every year to replant the hillside, because the elk kept 
eating the seedlings.  Forest Service staff jokingly gave the area the nickname “Arlington” because all the 
little planted trees with their white protectors made it look like a cemetery.   
 
2Thompson Falls FS # 4 Transcript, 3. 
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funds from stewardship projects went directly to local governments and schools, but 
preference in awarding contracts could be given to local businesses to help create and 
sustain local economies.  Moreover, none of the funds could be used to support the staff 
and operating costs of the ranger district.  All of the staff costs in planning and 
administering stewardship projects were to be absorbed in the ranger district’s existing 
budget.    
Ranger districts planned and approved experimental stewardship projects, 
precursors to permanent stewardship contracting legislation, using National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA) and National Environmental Projection Act (NEPA) 
procedures which allowed involvement by interest groups at various points (see 
discussion in Chapter Three, pages 59-60).   Experimental stewardship contracts required 
an additional level of citizen participation in the form of implementation monitoring 
committees.  These committees were made up of citizen representatives of diverse 
interest groups and stakeholders charged with the task of reviewing on-the-ground 
implementation of the project.  Their primary role was to report back to Congress as to 
whether the local projects were meeting their targets for timber sales and using the funds 
appropriately to complete the service components of the projects.  Monitoring 
committees also offered the opportunity to educate local citizens about the day-to-day 
workings of the Forest Service at the ranger district level.    
 The following two cases of fuel reduction projects were initiated as part of the 
experimental phase of stewardship contracting prior to passage of legislation that allowed 
its widespread use.  Both occurred in small, timber-based communities with struggling 
economies and focused on the wildland/urban interface in areas also very visible to the 
public at large.    
 
Case Three:  Lakeface-Lamb Project, Priest River, Idaho 
 
 The Lakeface-Lamb project derives its name from its location, a swath of national 
forest land about ten miles long and four miles wide along the west shore of Priest Lake.   
In addition to facing the lake, the area also includes a stream and unincorporated 
community, both called Lamb Creek.  Priest Lake is a pristine lake in northwest Idaho 
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that stretches about 20 miles up a mountain valley on the west side of the Selkirk 
Mountains.  The lake is accessible by roads that dead end at the north end of the valley 
near the Canadian border.   Nearby communities include the unincorporated area of Priest 
Lake at the southern end of the lake, Priest River (population 1,754) about 25 miles south 
of Priest Lake, and Newport/Old Town (population 2,111),  about 35 miles south and 
west.3  Spokane, Washington (population 195,629) is about 85 miles to the southwest and 
Sandpoint, Idaho (population 6,435) is 47 miles to the southeast.4  Priest Lake also has 
several resorts that draw in people from both the region and the nation. 
 The Priest Lake Ranger District is located within the project area, on the highway 
that runs up the west side of Priest Lake.  After the 1994 season of multiple forest fires in 
northern Idaho, the Ranger District put the populated areas along Priest Lake at the top of 
their priority list for fuel reduction.  The area had a severe forest fire in 1926 that burned 
over much of the area. Since then, wildfires had been successfully suppressed in the area 
and very little logging occurred along that portion of the lake.  After the 1926 fire, shade 
tolerant species such as hemlock, grand fir and cedar formed a dense understory beneath 
the taller ponderosa pine, larch, Douglas-fir and white pine.  In some areas, the 
undergrowth was so thick that it was very difficult to walk through the forest.  At the 
time, the area had several campgrounds, and over 100 homes and 30 commercial sites, 
with new subdivisions planned to add another 130 home sites.    
 Ranger District staff began working on an Environmental Assessment (EA) in the 
fall of 1994.  In September of 1995, the project planner sent out 700 post cards to area 
residents and others who had expressed interest in being informed about activities 
affecting the district.  One side of the post card was an old photo of the west shore shortly 
after the 1926 fire.   The other side talked about the Forest Service intention to reduce fire 
potential through a fuel reduction project.  Instead of encouraging public understanding 
of the need for the project, the post card ignited a fire storm of resistance from people 
who felt the Forest Service was using scare tactics.  Trust between the Ranger District 
and local communities had been eroded earlier by public reaction to a timber sale, and the 
post card response further indicated that the Forest Service did not have a good 
                                                 
3U.S. Census Website: http://quickfacts.census.gov/cgi-bin/qfd/demolink?30,  March 31, 2007.  
  
4Ibid.  
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relationship with local communities when it came to cutting trees.  A scaled-back Forest 
Service proposal for a very small fuel reduction project along the roadsides also was met 
with strong objection from the community.   
 Kent Dunstan, newly arrived District Ranger, and David “Norgy” Asleson, the 
forest NEPA planner, knew they had a problem of public trust.  The issue was how to get 
the public to understand that fuels reduction treatment would not look anything like the 
negative image of the earlier timber sale that was prominent in the public eye.  People 
didn’t want to see the forest burn, but they didn’t want to see it change either.  Property 
owners didn’t want the Forest Service to jeopardize their high property values. The 
primary concern, aesthetics, was very subjective.  Kent and Norgy hit upon a solution; 
the best way to replace the negative image was with a positive image.  Ranger District 
staff located and treated three demonstration sites highly visible to the public that typified 
different forest conditions that would be included in the project.  For the next several 
years, Ranger District staff gave numerous field trips and public presentations explaining 
the need for the project and showing the actual examples of the proposed treatment.  
Norgy put it this way, “If you don’t have trust, you are destined for less than success.  
That’s why we had all the public involvement…That was a major focus of the Lakeface-
Lamb project.”5     
Meanwhile, folks in the nearby communities were feeling the economic pinch 
from the decline in timber sales from Forest Service lands.  The Priest Lake Ranger 
District is part of the inland Pacific Northwest area targeted for close scrutiny of old 
growth timber sales by the controversy over habitat for spotted owls.   As Mike Schaff, 
then president of the Priest River Chamber of Commerce put it, “We had multiple mill 
closures; it was tough to make a living.”6  One of those concerned about the lack of 
activity was Craig Savidge, a professional forester who previously worked in the Priest 
Lake district for Louisiana Pacific timber company.  Craig had heard of a new concept 
called “stewardship contracting” and had been part of an effort to do a stewardship 
project in the Priest River district in the early 1990s.  Although Congress approved a 
                                                 
5David Asleson Transcript, 2. 
 
6Mike Schaff Transcript, 1.   
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project at that time, the project had old growth timber and didn’t make it through the 
courts to be implemented.  Stewardship contracting appealed to Craig because it focused 
on forest restoration, a subject that Craig had been concerned about as a professional 
forester observing the decline of the public forests through the timber management 
practices of the 1980s.  When Congress authorized 28 experimental stewardship projects 
nation-wide as part of the appropriations bill in 1998, Craig was willing to try again:  
“Things here were worse, in terms of shut down of the economy, timber work, health of 
forests.  I decided to push stewardship from the outside.”7 
 As District Ranger, Kent also appreciated the need for timber activity to support 
the local economy at the same time improving forest health.  Kent had spent his career in 
the Forest Service and was eager to support a project that would be a model of forest 
practices.  As the forest planner, Norgy too was enthusiastic about the opportunity to use 
a stewardship approach.  They chose the Lakeface-Lamb project as perfect for 
stewardship contracting; fuel reduction went hand in hand with forest restoration.  The 
project embodied forest health to support economic health.  Lakeface-Lamb also focused 
on the wildland/urban interface that required a high level of local interaction with the 
public.  The community involvement provisions of stewardship contracting provided a 
vehicle through which local residents could be an integral part of the project.    
In the Forest Service tradition for district rangers, Kent was an active member in 
several local organizations.  He had also reached out to the community concerning a 
recent grizzly bear recovery effort and had recently won a Forest Service Region One 
award for public involvement.  Norgy had lived in the area for fourteen years while 
working at the Ranger District and was also a respected member of the community.  Both 
were known for their integrity and fairness.  Craig Savidge had lived in the area for many 
years and was widely regarded as an excellent independent forester who was open-
minded and fair to both timber and environmental concerns.  When they decided to form 
a citizen-based committee to initiate more involvement from the community, they had no 
difficulty in securing respected community leaders to represent the Chambers of 
Commerce of Priest Lake, Priest River, and Newport/Oldtown, as well as the local 
environmental group, the local timber industry, and the Priest River Development 
                                                 
7Craig Savidge Transcript, 1.   
 92
Corporation.  As Mike Schaff put it, “Kent and Craig got it started.  They are very 
persistent fellows.”8  Another member of the Stewardship Committee put it this way, 
“Craig believed that there was common ground; it wasn’t a sales pitch, it was what he 
believed, and he helped others to see and believe it too.”9   This initial group of people 
became the Priest-Ponderay Forest Stewardship Committee, later shortened to the 
Stewardship Committee.   
 The Priest Lake Ranger District had to compete at the national level to win one of 
the stewardship slots.  It quickly became apparent that drafting a competitive stewardship 
proposal offered the opportunity to bring the whole community together to design a 
vision for the future.  In the past, the local communities had benefited from a share of the 
proceeds from timber sales on public forest lands because these lands constituted a 
significant portion of the county, limiting its tax property base.  When timber sales 
declined, these proceeds that supported local government and schools, as well as local 
timber jobs, essentially disappeared.  Congress had passed a law to continue providing 
payments at a much higher level to timber-based small towns, but the law was temporary, 
meant to give these communities support for a limited time while they diversified their 
economies.   How would the Priest Lake area prepare to move into the twenty-first 
century?  How did the timber industry and the Forest Service figure into that picture?   
 The Stewardship Committee applied for and won a Phase One planning grant to 
complete a strategic plan from the Ford Foundation aimed at revitalizing rural 
communities.  Timely completion of the plan qualified the community to compete for a 
much larger Phase Two project grant.  The Stewardship Committee set to work, and soon 
had about 70 people from the area involved in a number of committees planning for 
various community aspects including finance, education, economic development, forest 
restoration, and public outreach/community affairs.  As one participant put it, “There was 
lots of panic at the beginning; the future of the community was at stake.  There was lots 
of energy, lots of folk to go through the strategic planning effort.  It was a lot of hard 
                                                 
8Mike Schaff Transcript, 3.   
 
9Lakeface-Lamb Non FS # 1 Transcript, 1. 
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work.”10  Support for Lakeface-Lamb became broad-based as local folks from the 
business and environmental communities sat down together to envision the future of the 
community.  Mark Sprengel of the Selkirk Conservation Alliance, the local 
environmental group, noted “I have a background as a logger, I know that local folk 
would feel better if the work they were doing was helping to restore the forests, and not 
destroy them.”11  Mike Schaff put it this way, “We have to help ourselves, not rely on the 
payments from the government to replace the timber harvest income that is no more.  We 
had some time to prepare to be on our own and this was our way of meeting the 
challenge.”12  Their efforts were rewarded when Lakeface-Lamb was chosen by the 
Forest Service as a potential stewardship project in May of 1999. 
Somewhere in the process of strategic planning for the community’s future, 
another idea took root; why not form a non-profit to bid on the Lakeface-Lamb project, 
and ensure that the project truly modeled stewardship of the forests and provided local 
employment?  As one of the timber industry representatives put it, “Outside loggers were 
messing up the woods; we didn’t want to be lumped in with them.  The closer to home 
you work, the better you do.  You don’t just care about the money; you care about how 
you do the work.  We wanted to be involved in a showcase of the right way to do 
logging, with stewardship focused on the end results.  This was an opportunity to polish 
the techniques, to accomplish what the FS had told the public.”13  A representative from a 
local Chamber of Commerce noted, “This was an opportunity to show that the 
community was really smart about managing timber for sustainability, to show that we 
have the experience and knowledge, that we knew how it could be done, and to create 
jobs for the community.  We knew that the Forest Service would put it out for bids and 
that the contract would have likely gone to the coast; we wanted to have the work done 
locally.”14 
                                                 
10Lakeface-Lamb Non FS # 9 Transcript, 3.  
 
11Mark Sprengel Transcript, page 1.   
 
12Mike Schaff Transcript, page 3.   
 
13Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 1 Transcript, 2. 
 
14Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 2 Transcript, 1. 
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 Although the group submitted a proposal, Priest River did not win a Phase Two 
Ford Foundation grant, in part because the stewardship contract had not yet been 
awarded.  The Stewardship Committee had been counting on grant funds to post the bond 
required to bid on the stewardship contract.  Then, the Forest Service released the final 
Lakeface-Lamb Environmental Assessment with a Decision Notice in July of 1999.   
Several local individuals filed appeals on the grounds that the Environmental Assessment 
didn’t do a thorough analysis of cumulative effects.  The Regional office concurred, and 
instructed the district to do a full EIS.  The stewardship project went back to the Ranger 
District for more research and review, a process that could take years.  With two strikes 
against the project, the various community planning committees disbanded; folks who 
had been energized and enthusiastic about the planning process gave up.  The story could 
very well have ended at this point, except for the Stewardship Committee.  As Mike 
Schaff, then a member of the Stewardship committee, noted, “We decided that we were 
going to make this work, we were convinced.  But we had to scale back our dreams.  We 
got the wind knocked out of our sails.”15   As another member put it, “We are all 
stubborn, determined, ornery people.  Once we decided it was going to work, there was 
no going back.  The project was going to happen.”16  
While Forest Service staff at the Ranger District worked at the lengthy process of 
putting together the complete analysis required in a full EIS, the Stewardship Committee 
continued meeting to find a way to come up with the bond money.  One option was to 
work with a local lumber mill to put up the bond, but this was viewed as potentially 
giving up too much control.  There was only one other option left, the Priest River 
Development Corporation (PRDC), a local volunteer non-profit that had been formed 
when a group of local citizens put up their own funds to create an industrial park.  The 
job creation aspect of the stewardship project fit within the mission of the PRDC, and 
PRDC had the assets to cover the bond.  The Stewardship Committee was prepared to 
take full responsibility for carrying out the project; the PRDC need only provide the 
financing.  Two of the Stewardship Committee members also served on the PRDC board.  
As one said, “The Stewardship Committee had worked so well together, we took the 
                                                 
15Mike Schaff Transacript, 2.   
 
16Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 7 Transcript, 2. 
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proposal back to the PRDC board and convinced them that this was the thing to do.  The 
Panhandle Bank was also ready to help; we had great partnerships in the community.  So, 
we decided to bid on the contract…”17  Although the amount of the bond required tying 
up nearly all of their assets, the PRCD board agreed to provide the financing for the bond.   
Forest Service officials Kent and Norgy worked closely with the members of the 
Stewardship Committee to fine-tune the stewardship project to be sure it met local needs 
and would garner local support.  On the community side, Craig Savidge provided 
extensive suggestions on the restoration aspects of the project using his background as a 
professional forester.  Kent and Norgy also sat down with the Stewardship Committee 
member from the local environmental group to be sure the forest restoration portions of 
the project were compatible with local environmental concerns.  There were articles in 
the newspapers that served the area, including those in Spokane.  The Ranger District 
issued the draft EIS on Lakeface-Lamb in April of 2000, and the Record of Decision was 
signed in December of 2000.  No local groups appealed the decision.  However, five out-
of-state environmental groups filed a formal appeal on February 19, 2001, essentially 
contesting the same issues that had been raised through appeals at the Environmental 
Assessment stage of review and thoroughly addressed in the EIS.  On March 19, 2001, 
the Forest Service denied the appeals.  Noting that the project had widespread local 
support including the local environmental group, the appellants did not pursue litigation.  
Lakeface-Lamb was clear to proceed through the contract drafting and Request for 
Proposal stages.   
The Stewardship Committee submitted an application under the umbrella of the 
PRDC and won the contract.  Lakeface-Lamb was an ambitious project that involved 
many facets such as timber removal, fuels treatments in the wildland/urban interface, 
road maintenance, trail work, recreation facilities, tree planting and pruning, road 
removal and signage.  It provided a wide range of opportunities for local employment 
potential. As one member put it, “We saw this as a way to bring dollars into the local 
economy.  It was unique, exciting, a chance to employ local people and guarantee some 
jobs for the community.  It was a local community project with more of a business side to 
                                                 
17Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 2 Transcript, 2. 
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it.”18   Community support for the Stewardship Committee was intense.   When it came 
time to provide the bond, every member of the PRDC board signed the note, pledging 
their personal assets as additional collateral.  Craig Savidge was hired to be the contract 
manager.  Liz Johnson-Gephardt, a local land owner with strong environmental 
connections, was hired to be the project coordinator and spokesperson.  The Stewardship 
Committee continued as volunteers, as they had been all along.     
Fulfilling the contract was not easy.  The National Forest office and the Ranger 
District had little experience with stewardship contracting and no experience in working 
with a non-profit contractor.  Likewise, some members of the Stewardship Committee 
knew very little about working with the Forest Service.  As Liz, project coordinator for 
the Stewardship Committee put it, “There were lots of bumps at the beginning.  We had 
to draw lines in the sand; everybody had moments of concerns about the project.  Why 
did we take this on?  I lost sleep over it, but there were no quitters here!”19 As project 
manager, Craig Savidge brought critical management skills and knowledge about 
contract mechanisms, Forest Service jargon, what could and could not be done.  Craig 
described his role as being “like the clutch plate between the engine and the transmission.  
I had to be sure that the subcontractors and the PRDC got along smoothly, and fulfilled 
the Forest Service and PDRC expectations.”20 Other Stewardship Committee members 
brought other skills and viewpoints.  One member put it this way, “No one person 
dominated the group. We talked things through with different people with different 
expertise taking the lead when appropriate.  It wouldn’t do to be too bull-headed, because 
the diversity of the group acted to help check and balance our actions.”21   Another noted, 
“I could see that we had the intelligence among the group.  Also, the egos didn’t get in 
the way.  There was lots of expertise around the table.  We talked things out, and 
generally left feeling that we’d made the right decision.”22  Still another member said, 
                                                 
18Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 3, 1. 
 
19Liz Johnson Gephardt Transcript, 3. 
 
20Craig Savidge Transcript, 5. 
 
21Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 2,   
 
22Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 7 Transcript, 4. 
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“Everybody came together, and it worked out well so that we built up trust with the 
PRDC board, and they put the control of the project into the Stewardship Committee’s 
hands.  The Stewardship committee used both consensus and voting.  We had dissenting 
votes from time to time, but we always talked things through, didn’t have big egos, just 
lively discussions based on the diversity of the values in the group.”23 
The contract posed some unique challenges, in part because it was among the first 
stewardship contracts written anywhere in the country, and in part because of the wide 
scope of service activities included.  Fortunately, the Forest Service Contract Officer Fred 
Fischer had a background in both timber and procurement contracting, as well as having 
worked in setting up timber sales in the woods.  Fred also understood the business needs 
from the contractor’s perspective.  As a result, he had no problem with making changes 
to make the contract fit the project as it was implemented on the ground.  
As an experimental contract, Lakeface-Lamb had more flexibility than the usual 
contract.  Although the project involved timber cutting, the original contract officer wrote 
it up to be a service contract with an embedded timber sale component.  This turned out 
to be crucial in allowing modifications during implementation; service contracts are more 
flexible than timber sale contracts.  In addition, Forest Service allowed some change from 
the usual because the purpose of the pilot stewardship project was to be experimental and 
try different things.  As Fred noted, “The contract was written as an indefinite quantity 
service contract to include timber harvest.  We still have the opportunity to write 
modifications to meet the intent of the planned work and NEPA.  I have no problems 
shifting gears and negotiating a change if what was described in the contract is not 
meeting the intent.”24  Fred went on to note that the requested modifications were almost 
always about the resource, about the end goal and how best to get there.  Fred attributes 
this to the contractor being a nonprofit community group.  “They wanted their local 
subcontractors to make a reasonable profit on the services being performed, but meeting 
                                                 
23Lakeface-Lamb Non FS Transcript # 3, 2. 
 
24Fred Fischer Transcript, 3. 
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the needs of the forest restoration was just as important to them as to the Forest 
Service.”25 
At first many Forest Service officials weren’t sure about stewardship contracting 
or about working with a non-profit that was part of the local community.  “We had many 
nay-sayers inside the Forest Service.  We were pushing the envelope with this project.”26 
Norgy, as project liaison in the Ranger District,  and Kathy Murphy, who took over as 
District Ranger after Kent retired, set a tone for the project that was positive and 
enthusiastic.  “We had enthusiasm for the project, knew it was going to work…We ran 
into lots of hurdles early on, but approached them with a can-do attitude, and we thought 
outside the box…We were persistent and confident.”27 Although the leadership was 
enthusiastic and committed to the project, many ranger district staff were resentful, and 
didn’t want the project to work.28  There were fears that the project would take up too 
much administrative time without providing any financial support for the ranger district’s 
budget.  One observer estimated that at the beginning, ranger district and national forest 
staff involved in the project were split about 50% percent for, and 50% percent against 
the project.29  Over time, this changed to about 80% for and 20% against.30   
Resistance within the Forest Service shifted as staff began to recognize the 
dedication of the community folk involved in the roles of prime contractor and sub-
contractors.  Matt Butler, Forest Service fuels manager for the project, noted, “The 
community group that came together and energized the community really made a 
difference.  Their focus and willingness to include several aspects of the community 
made me realize that things can get done on the ground without getting beat up by the 
public...that desire to ‘roll up the sleeves’ and work together with the Forest Service on 
the issues at hand was different.  It made me realize that the community wanted to work 
                                                 
25Ibid., 3. 
  
26David Asleson Transcript,4.  
 
27Kathy Murphy Transcript, 2.   
 
28Lakeface-Lamb FS # 4 Transcript, 2. 
 
29Lakeface-Lamb Non FS # 5, 2.   
  
30Ibid.  
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together to make this project work.”31  Fred noted, “It was a pleasant surprise that the 
contractor as well as community members wanted to be very collaborative.  These are 
real community people; they had been involved in the issues because it was their area.  
They can communicate on an even level with the Forest Service because they know the 
concerns of the local community, the historical issues.  They are, in this case, close to the 
land and its management issues…they take a very ‘hands-on’ approach to managing their 
own ‘backyard,’ and they have a great interest in understanding the technical reasons for 
management decisions.”32 Karen Brockus, Forest Service contracting officer 
representative for the project, noted, “When we are into the implementation of the 
project, we have to fill in the details.  So, we meet and talk and take more time to iron out 
the details, on pieces like the river access, warming hut, recreational projects.  Because 
we are ironing out these details with local people as contractors, there is a higher degree 
of ownership of the projects by the local folks.  They make recommendations, we 
respond.  We consider those recommendations, and then proceed based on the desired 
outcome.  The end product may often be better, because they care about the community 
and are committed to high quality work.”33 
An example of this give and take was choosing which trees to remove to achieve 
the fuel reduction goal while maintaining a high level of visual integrity.  Stewardship 
contracting allowed the Ranger District to rely on end result descriptions of what the 
forest should look like when the cutting was finished, rather than having the Forest 
Service mark individual trees for cutting.  This focus on the end result allowed for more 
flexibility on the ground as the cutting on each unit was implemented.  On one unit, the 
Forest Service crew had gone in and marked the trees.  When the timber cutting 
contractor arrived, he knew that it wasn’t right.  A different contractor would have just 
cut the trees anyway, but this contractor had the community and quality of the project 
foremost in his mind, so he went back to the Forest Service timber officer and convinced 
the officer that he could do a better job of selecting trees.  The timber officer agreed, and 
the cut was changed.  The project got a much better end result, because of this kind of 
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give and take.  As one of the subcontractors said, “I was interested in forest health, not 
just natural clumping.  The red tape to make changes was do-able, but it still took a lot of 
red tape.  I’d never worked with the Forest Service at this level before; it was great to 
work together this way versus the usual contract where you follow the letter of the 
contract, no matter what it does on the land.”34 
 What characterized the working relationship between the community groups and 
the Forest Service was their shared commitment to making the project work by 
maintaining a positive, problem-solving attitude.  As the District Ranger Kathy Murphy 
put it, “We approached every problem as an opportunity, with a very strong positive 
attitude that we could figure out a solution.  We were able to respond to the problems, 
and not feel criticized.  This went up through the organization, although it took those 
higher up a while to realize that what they thought of as complaints from the contractor 
didn’t necessitate a ‘react’ mode because we were in a ‘problem-solving’ mode.”35  Dave 
Cobb, who took over the implementation of the project when Norgy retired, noted, “The 
project helped the Forest Service figure out where the proper balance was between 
aggressive pursuit of fire hazard removal, and the values of the community.  We needed 
to reduce the risk, but see that we didn’t destroy what people really liked about the area in 
the process…The Forest Service couldn’t define it without the community.  We can’t find 
the middle by sitting in the office.”36 
 This problem solving approach extended to the residents within the project area 
and others in the community through the Monitoring Committee.  Enabling legislation for 
the stewardship projects included a requirement that a citizen group be recruited and 
given the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the stewardship activities.  
Norgy recognized this as one of the most important aspects of stewardship contracting, 
the opportunity to build trust between the Forest Service and local residents by having 
open communication and feedback about implementation.   
The Lakeface-Lamb Monitoring Committee began with about 20 people from the 
community, divided into several different subgroups that specialized in different areas of 
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the project such as water quality, timber harvesting, and weed control.  The role of a 
monitoring committee member was to ask questions, express concerns from the 
community about what was being done and compare the on-the-ground implementation 
with both the contract and the EIS, then carry answers and information from the Forest 
Service back to the community.  Dave Cobb, liaison from the Forest Service for the 
Monitoring Committee, described his role this way, “I take their concerns back to the 
Forest Service and the PRDC as primary contractor.  Where possible, I correct the 
problems.  Where not possible, I try to explain from the Forest Service side what can and 
can’t be done.  This includes explaining misunderstandings about what is really 
happening, especially when rumors get started.”37  District planner Norgy Asleson noted, 
“The Monitoring Committee helped to build trust.  The project was originally quite 
controversial.  Because the area is so ‘wet,’ people perceived the fire risk as minimal.  
The Monitoring Committee helped to build a base of understanding, by talking to friends 
and neighbors.”38  A local citizen who served on the Monitoring Committee noted, 
“There was a level of mistrust of the Forest Service in the first three or four meetings, but 
that went away when we realized they were listening and responding to our concerns.”39  
Liz Johnson-Gephardt, coordinator for the Stewardship Committee, noted, “The 
Monitoring Committee was an excellent community participation model.  This is what 
changed Priest Lake residents’ opinion of Lakeface-Lamb.  We provided education for 
adults as to what was being done and why.  This helped to ease their distrust, helped them 
to understand it.”40 
 Lakeface-Lamb was one of the original demonstration stewardship projects in the 
country.  When the PRDC and Stewardship Committee took on the implementation of the 
contract as a nonprofit, it became unique.  As the project achieved some successful 
outcomes, Lakeface-Lamb began to attract attention well beyond the Priest Lake area.  
Regional and national leaders from the Forest Service came to see for themselves how it 
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was working.  The top official in the Bureau of Land Management came for a tour and 
left very impressed and eager to try the idea in her agency.  The demand for information 
was so high that the Forest Service decided to produce a video.  Scripting and shooting 
the video gave those involved the opportunity to stop and reflect upon what they had 
accomplished and to solidify their understanding of how each one contributed to overall 
picture.  As one Ranger District staff noted, “We realized we had to make it work, we 
couldn’t fail.  The focus shifted to how we were going to do it right.  The working 
together part was amazing.  The contracting part was very difficult.”41    
 As of this writing in March of 2007, implementation of Lakeface-Lamb is not 
complete.  Ranger District staff estimate that it will probably be completed next year, 
ahead of schedule.42  In terms of treatment for fuels reduction, the project treated more 
acres for less cost than anticipated by the Forest Service.  Other aspects of the project 
were more problematic.  One question that remains unanswered is whether the type of 
fuels treatment used in much of the project area will reduce fire potential for the future, 
especially as increased light promotes new growth fuel loading on the forest floor and 
additional treatment is needed.43  Another question concerns the fragility of the forests as 
global climate change progresses.  As Mark Sprengel of the Selkirk Conservation 
Alliance noted, “Multiple use needs to be secondary, with the emphasis on ecosystem 
restoration and forest health.  The Forest Service tries to be all things to all people, but it 
can’t do that anymore.  They need to adapt to the changing situation, with global 
warming causing the forests to be more fragile.  The project failed in its overarching 
objectives.  What they did was an improvement over what they had been doing, but it was 
not addressing the root cause of the problem.”44  The potential for changes in the way the 
Forest Service handles contracts also remains to be seen.  One of the goals of the project 
was to demonstrate effective on-the-ground treatment for forest health which required 
more flexible contract practices.  On the one hand, community interviewees are not 
seeing much transfer from the Lakeface-Lamb project to other projects in the Ranger 
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District.45 On the other hand, the flexibility allowed for the Lakeface-Lamb project no 
longer exists in many respects because of subsequent changes in the stewardship 
contracting authorization.  It remains to be seen how much flexibility is left, and whether 
the Ranger District will take full advantage of that flexibility to transfer more of the 
lessons from Lakeface-Lamb to on-the-ground treatment of the forest.   
Both the PRDC and the Stewardship Committee gained from the project.  As a 
business venture, the PRDC did not have profit as one of its goals in taking on the 
Lakeface-Lamb project.  As Martin Negle, former president of the PRDC and member of 
the Stewardship Committee put it, “We would be content if we at least came out even; 
that was the goal.  At one point the revenue stopped coming in, but the costs kept coming.  
We had to set up a buffer, a fund of about $50,000 to carry us through the cash flow 
shortage; it came pretty close to being used up.  We had assets of PRDC that we could 
borrow against.  We needed the project to work.  What is amazing is that we did it 
without a lot of grants, but rather with our personalities and perseverance.”46  When the 
timber market went up, the Stewardship Committee found itself with a margin of profit.  
More amazing still, the Stewardship Committee was able to set aside enough profit to 
cover the bond, release PRDC’s assets, and establish a free-standing organization to carry 
on.  As of mid-January, 2007, the Priest Community Forest Connection (PCFC), a new 
nonprofit made up of many of the same folks who were on the Stewardship Committee, 
was given official approval from the Forest Service to take over the Lakeface-Lamb 
contract.   
 The work of accomplishing the duties of primary contractor for a complex 
stewardship project while also operating as a viable business as a fledgling nonprofit was 
not easy.  One the one hand, intense involvement of citizens through the Stewardship 
Committee and local subcontractors focused greater attention on the quality of the 
outcome than would have been the case in a for-profit firm.  On the other hand, concerns 
about the bottom line were more problematic.  One of the casualties was the relationship 
between the Stewardship Committee and Craig Savidge, the project manager.  When their 
working relationship became strained, Craig resigned and members of the Stewardship 
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Committee filled in until a new project manager was hired.  Another aspect of the project 
that hasn’t meet community expectations was the degree of community outreach.  The 
original strategic plan envisioned an ongoing effort of community involvement in 
revitalization ranging from broad-based local employment in stewardship sub-contracting 
to creation of a technical school with a forestry curriculum in addition to forestry classes 
in the local high schools.  It was unrealistic to expect everything would be done perfectly 
within the scope of one project.  Subcontracting did not always go smoothly, in part 
because some of the work like tree planting didn’t attract local workers.  The project did 
succeed in creating a forestry class in the high school.  As Mike Schaff put it, “The more 
they learn, the better the chance to succeed in the future.  Not everything was perfect, but, 
overall, I think it was successful.”47 Now that the PCFC has weathered most of its first 
stewardship contract, it is focusing more attention on outreach and communication with 
the community.   As one continuing member in the new Priest Community Forest 
Connection noted, “I don’t feel that we’ve met all the goals we thought we’d meet.  We 
don’t have the high school kids involved the way I’d like, but that doesn’t happen 
overnight.  It would be great to have the school heated by wood waste.  This hasn’t 
happened yet either, but again, I realize that that takes longer.  I’m willing to sit on the 
board for another 5 years to make it happen.”48  
From the perspective of the Ranger District interviewees, Lakeface-Lamb as a 
pilot project proved to be a good experience.  The fuel reduction treatments were so well 
received by the community that private landowners began to hire project subcontractors 
to treat private land as well.  The complexity of the project allowed the Ranger District to 
test which kinds of service activities are suited to a stewardship approach, and which are 
not.  Most importantly, Lakeface-Lamb helped built trust with the community.  Norgy 
noted, “It was rewarding to see the change in people’s attitudes as we worked together 
through the project, to have people talk about it in other places, in good terms, like in bars 
and restaurants.  There was a change in how folks felt about Lakeface-Lamb and about 
the Forest Service itself.  They had a chance to learn about our struggles, with the EIS, 
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contract, internal barriers.  They became some of our biggest advocates.”49 As Dave 
Cobb, who replaced Norgy in implementing the timber cutting and Monitoring 
Committee portions of the project put it, “The Forest Service could be seen as the big 
bully who does whatever he wants, or we can be a part of the community.  This project 
broke down the big bully appearance.  It was a success, not because of the number of 
acres of treatment, but because of the relationships to the community.”50  Kathy noted, 
“Working with the PRDC gave us a better understanding of the challenges facing the 
prime and subcontractors for the timber and service components.”51  And, she noted, “We 
have a good working relationship with the community now, we can formulate a vision for 
new projects, put our cards on the table, and talk openly.  We will have more stewardship 
contracting; there will be more opportunities.”52   
  
 
Case Four:  Thompson Falls Game Range Fuel Reduction Stewardship Project 
 
 Thompson Falls is a rural community of 1,321 people in the Clark Fork River 
valley in western Montana, tucked into the southern foothills of the Cabinet Mountains 
between the Cabinet and the Bitterroot Mountains.  Historically, the economy of 
Thompson Falls was heavily reliant upon timber, although cutbacks in timber harvesting 
on Forest Service lands in the 1980s and 1990s resulted a lessening of timber activity in 
the area and the closure of one of the town’s two mills.  Timber harvesting on private 
lands has maintained a lower level of economic support.  Most recently, the Thompson 
Falls area has been growing from an influx of residents, primarily from western 
Washington and Oregon, seeking to escape the traffic and density of more populated 
areas.  As demand for housing grows, new developments are just beginning to expand 
into the wildland/urban interface.    
                                                 
49David Asleson Transcript, 7. 
 
50Dave Cobb Transcript, 2.   
 
51Kathy Murphy Transcript, 1. 
 
52Ibid., 3. 
 106
 The Game Range Fuel Reduction Project takes its name from an expanse of 
formerly private land that was purchased by the Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks 
Department (MFWP) in the 1970s to preserve winter range for big game.  After the active 
fire season of 1994, officials in both the Thompson Falls Ranger District and MFWP 
moved the fire potential on the Game Range, and on the Forest Service lands that abuts 
the Game Range upslope, to the top of their priority list for fuel treatment.  These 
southerly facing slopes are warmer in winter and therefore retain less snow cover, making 
them attractive feeding grounds for big game.  However, these slopes are also drier in the 
summer, and more prone to fire.   
 The last high intensity fire occurred in the Game Range project area in 1910.  
Subsequent fire suppression efforts interrupted the historic five to thirty year frequency of 
lower intensity fires on these slopes, allowing encroachment of immature Douglas fir into 
stands of Ponderosa pine, larch, and mature Douglas fir.  Not only had the resulting tree 
density contributed to fuel buildup and loss of Ponderosa stands, but it was also choking 
out vegetation critical for winter forage.  Scientists working with fire ecology have 
studied these types of dry stands in the southwest and have a fairly clear understanding of 
how to treat fuel buildup.  However, fuel reduction treatment of these south-facing slopes 
posed substantial challenges.  All of the areas to be treated were within one to four miles 
northeast of Thompson Falls and were highly visible to the community.  The project area 
also included inventoried roadless areas, a section of the Mount Silcox wilderness study 
area, and designated grizzly bear habitat.  Portions of the area abutted private ranch and 
timber land.  Moreover, most of the slopes were very steep, posing additional logistical 
challenges to removal of the understory vegetation.  All of these challenges had 
discouraged treating or harvesting the areas in the past. 
In 1996, Thompson Falls District Ranger Dick Smith drafted Frank Yurczyk to 
head up an interdisciplinary (ID) team of specialists to complete an analysis of the forest 
management area in which the Game Range project was located.  Given the project’s 
close involvement with the state game range area, the Ranger District invited area 
biologist Bruce Sterling of MFWP to be a full member of the ID team.  This was very 
unusual.  “Usually we don’t put people from our agency on another agency’s ID team, 
nor does the Forest Service pull people from the outside to be on their ID teams. Elk 
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wander, so we have an interest in what the Forest Service does.  This was a good project 
that would benefit the elk and deer winter range.”53  The analysis was completed in 1997.  
Dick and forest planner Larry Svalberg realized that the project involved sensitive issues 
that would raise concerns with different sectors of the public, so they set about extensive 
informal and formal outreach efforts to meet with various interests.  On June 10, 1997, 
the Ranger District held a Community Open House in Thompson Falls to present the 
findings of the analysis.  The community was generally favorable to the need for fuel 
reduction and improvement of the winter range, but raised a number of concerns 
regarding the implementation of the project.  The ID team took these concerns into 
account in the next phase of more detailed planning for the project.  Bruce Sterling 
attended the meeting:  “This is a logging community, so people weren’t upset about the 
project.”54 
 One of the outreach efforts that helped to build public understanding of the 
project was a study of historic fire frequency that Rick Carlson, fire planner of the Ranger 
District, did over one summer.  The study relied upon a survey of fire scars in existing 
timber, a labor-intensive project.  Rick hired local young people home from college for 
the summer to conduct the survey, and got coverage in the local newspaper.  Young 
people from the local community who were hired as fire fighters for the summer 
conducted the survey when not involved in fire suppression.  Involvement of the sons and 
daughters of local residents ensured that the community paid attention to the study’s 
findings.  Rick noted, “Newspaper coverage helped people to become more cognizant of 
fire, that there hasn’t been a large fire in the valley since 1910.  People weren’t as scared 
of fire in Thompson Falls as in other areas of Montana.”55 
 One of the concerns in planning the project was how to pay for the fuel reduction 
treatment.  Under the terms of a normal timber sale, project revenues had to pay for the 
costs of the treatment, and this project was going to be more costly than normal.  Another 
concern raised by environmental groups was building roads in roadless and wilderness 
study areas to facilitate timber harvest; adding roads would remove these areas from 
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potential designation as wilderness.   As a result, Ranger District timber planner Frank 
Yurczyk proposed to use helicopter logging that would not jeopardize potential 
wilderness status, but was more expensive.  Detailed analysis of the distances over which 
helicopter logging was profitable dictated where landing sites for downloading logs could 
be located and how far up the slopes thinning could be done.  Many of the landing sites 
were located on private land.  Frank spent many hours meeting one-on-one with the 
fifteen private landowners adjacent to the project area to obtain access for the helicopter 
landing sites and to explain the activity that would take place over their lands.  As one of 
the local landowners put it, “Frank stopped in at the house, several times, and talked 
about how much timber would be taken, how some would be taken out by tractor, most 
by helicopter.  We thought most of the folks would be ok with the project…We were 
getting two good things at once, reducing the fire danger and money coming in from the 
logging.”56 
 On July 2, 1998, the Thompson Falls District sent out the draft Environmental 
Assessment with an invitation for a field tour to be held on July 11.  Five people attended 
the tour.  However, District Ranger Dick Smith and planner Larry Savlberg did not rely 
on this turnout.  Larry had taken training on how to work with the public and recognized 
that this project would benefit from application of that training:  “I took Hans and Anna 
Marie Bleiker’s Informed Public Consent class some years ago through the Forest 
Service.  The key point is that you have all kinds of public, and you need to spend time 
with all of them.”57  Dick and Larry met with many individuals and small groups over the 
planning period, taking folks on tours and explaining the project and how it was designed 
to meet various concerns.  For example, environmental and conservation groups needed 
to be reassured that the helicopter logging did not affect the status of the project for 
potential wilderness.  Noxious weeds were another concern raised by members of the 
community, including Jerry Shively, a local outfitter and guide: “My biggest concern is 
to have a healthy forest and to control the noxious weeds.  Weeds are the key.  The Forest 
Service is trying, they require you to have weed-free hay in the back country…They 
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sprayed a small part of the trail, but that won’t do.  I’m afraid this is going to end up 
being all weeds.”58  There were a number of community concerns the Forest Service 
needed to deal with.  As Larry said, “We realized we needed to pay more attention to 
involving the public.  We did this through informal meetings, field trips, combinations of 
one-on-one and group meetings.  We spent time on the ground with environmental 
groups.  Working with the public wasn’t as structured as it is now.  We had a core group 
who were more willing to be involved who gave us more meaningful feedback.”59  
 One of the people they invited in to review the project was Mark Sheets, a local 
conservationist who was also involved in the Cabinet Resource Group (an environmental 
organization) and the Montana Wilderness Association.  Mark was well known to the 
local Ranger District as a knowledgeable source of comments on forest health and 
worked on contracts with the Forest Service in a variety of capacities including fire 
lookout, brush crew, and forest fighter.  Mark was particularly concerned about winter 
range.  “I hunt the Game Range, and wrote in my concerns to the Forest Service.  The 
grasses were disappearing and the brush was getting decadent and losing its value for 
wildlife.”60  Another person Larry and Dick recruited for review and advice was Cesar 
Hernandez, the region representative for the Montana Wilderness Association (MWA).  
Larry noted, “I dragged him into this one and took him out on a ground tour of the project 
areas.  Cesar could be a voice for reason, he understands the other side.  I knew him from 
other projects, knew he wasn’t the rabid environmentalist that others thought he was.  I 
knew he had been a timber fellow.”61  Both Mark and Cesar concluded that the project 
offered a net gain to environmental and conservation goals.   
 The project might have gone forward at this point as a commercial timber sale, 
but events at the national level called a halt when the Clinton administration issued its 
Roadless directive.  The project was put on hold while the Roadless Area Conservation 
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Rule was developed.62  Dick Smith left, another district ranger came and went, and Lisa 
Krueger took over as District Ranger when the project began to move forward again.  By 
this time, the Forest Service was experimenting with stewardship contracting and the 
Regional Office was offering a cash incentive for administrative costs to encourage 
ranger districts to try stewardship contract projects.  As District Ranger, Lisa had other 
problems to address in addition to fire potential in the Game Range project.  One of these 
problems was a popular forest access road that ran up the West Fork of the Thompson 
Falls River.  The road bed is ancient Lake Missoula sediment, which is unstable.  One 
part of the road, called Honeymoon Slide, is particularly prone to crumbling and 
landslides.  The road had been taken out by a landslide and was going to require 
substantial repair work.  However, the Ranger District didn’t have sufficient funds for 
road repair.  Stewardship contracting provided the answer, and the Game Range provided 
the project.  Larry put together a power point presentation and he and Rick presented it to 
the Regional Office; the Game Range was approved as a stewardship project.   
 By the time the planning team took the Game Range project off the shelf for the 
next step, the Regional Office had decided to require full EIS preparation on most 
projects.  The Game Range was the first EIS to be done on the Thompson Falls Ranger 
District.  Frank augmented the interdisciplinary planning team with specialists in 
silvaculture and visual landscape design.  When the Forest Service released the draft EIS 
on October 19, 2001, the Game Range project had incorporated the concerns of the 
community.  Larry noted, “My fears at the beginning were that people would come in 
with desires that would go against our recommendations, or that they would have desires 
so great that we couldn’t meet them.  What I found was that we didn’t get people coming 
in with undue expectations. We were able to meet them, and we were able to do some 
non-traditional things that we historically wouldn’t have done.”63   
Visual quality was the highest priority concern of the local community; meeting 
this concern required a delicate balance of thinning and visual landscape planning.  Bruce 
attended one of the public meetings on the draft EIS in Thompson Falls:  “The visual 
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aspect was a really big issue.  The Forest Service had a computer program to show what 
it would look like.  They laid out all the maps, the cuter units, and what they would do.  
They spent an inordinate amount of time on the visuals, and did a pretty good job of it.  
The community was very comfortable with it.  It was a very productive meeting.”64 
 For the project planners, shifting from a conventional timber sale to a stewardship 
contract didn’t have much effect on the project; they viewed it as a contracting tool.  
However, for the environmental interests, stewardship contracting raised a serious 
question.  One of the provisions of NFMA designed to curb abuses in harvesting timber 
required each tree to be marked by the Forest Service prior to cutting, removing decision 
making from the contracted sawyer in harvesting and thinning.  Stewardship contracting 
allowed the Forest Service to use “designation by prescription,” describing the end result 
of what the forest should look like rather than identifying every tree.  The decision of 
which trees to cut was left to the sawyer.  How seriously this question weighed among 
members of environmental groups depended, in part, upon how much trust the group had 
in the ability of the Thompson Falls Ranger District to implement the contract effectively.  
Mark Sheets and Cesar Hernandez had both worked in the woods as loggers.  For them, 
designation by prescription was not an issue. Cesar said, “I am very familiar with felling 
trees…The prescriptions for the contractors was really a no-brainer if you’ve done it 
before.  I think 80% of the folks who work in the woods take pride in their work.”65  For 
others, however, it was a leap of faith they were not ready to make.    
The Game Range Record of Decision came out in August of 2002.  No local 
groups opposed it.  To the contrary, local landowners supported the reduction of fire 
potential on the lands adjacent to their own.  The local conservation group supported the 
project, as did the MWA, for its projected improvement of winter game range and 
restoration of historic forest conditions to the roadless areas under treatment while 
maintaining the potential for wilderness designation.  The project illustrated effective 
public involvement in terms of outreach, education, and project design; however, several 
environmental groups from outside of the area appealed the decision.  The appeals were 
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settled at the Ranger District level except for one, from the Ecology Center, who had 
earlier refused all invitations to come to Thomson Falls to tour the proposed project and 
refused again to come discuss the appeal in person.  Both Mark and Cesar came in and sat 
with the Ranger District staff to discuss the appeal on a conference call with the Ecology 
Center.  Mark was not surprised at the appeal: “I figured it would get appealed because of 
the designation by prescription rather than marking each tree, and also because the 
project was taking place in a roadless area.”66    
When the Ecology Center decided to pursue the appeal at the Regional level, both 
the Cabinet Resources Coalition and the MWA filed administrative interventions on 
behalf of the Forest Service to support the project.  The Regional appeal officer denied 
the appeal.  Cesar also was not surprised by the appeal:  “I knew the project, and had 
followed it.  I recommended to MWA that we do an administrative intervention on behalf 
of the Forest Service, and MWA agreed.  If the Ecology Center had decided to take it to 
court when the Regional Office denied their appeal, I would have recommended that 
MWA file on behalf of the Forest Service in the suit as well.  MWA has procedures and 
doesn’t get involved in legal battles lightly, but we were confident that the project was 
right to do.”67  The Ecology Center did not take its appeal to court, in part because of 
strong opposition to its actions from other environmental groups.   
Shifting to a stewardship contract for the Game Range project allowed the Forest 
Service to make some changes in its usual procedures.  One change was giving bid 
preference to local contractors.  The contract was awarded to a firm in St. Regis, about 60 
miles from Thompson Falls, which was the nearest contractor able to do helicopter 
logging.  Another advantage was designation by prescription for the thinning.  Rather 
than marking every tree, which is logistically difficult on steep slopes, the Forest Service 
marked one part of each area to give an idea of what the area should look like.  This 
lowered the costs of administering the timber harvest significantly.  
Stewardship contracting also helped to win the support of the local community 
because of the requirement for a citizen monitoring committee.  The Game Range project 
was approved during the experimental period of stewardship contracting when 
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monitoring committees were important components of the stewardship contracting 
process charged with the responsibility of making sure the Forest Service was 
implementing the project correctly.  Selection of committee members was done by the 
District Ranger Kathy Murphy, with approval from the Forest Supervisor.  Kathy pulled 
together representatives of a variety of interests in the community to form the monitoring 
committee, including conservation and environmental groups, landowners adjacent to the 
project, local timber businesses, the county commissioners, and the local office of the 
Montana Department of Natural Resources whose representative chaired the committee.   
Both Mark Sheets and Cesar Hernandez agreed to be members representing conservation 
and environmental interests.   
After the Forest Service had made the final project decision, the Monitoring 
Committee met prior to issuing the Record of Decision and had several training sessions 
at the Ranger District office on their role and responsibilities as members.  Most of the 
folks on the Monitoring Committee knew each other beforehand.  The functions of the 
Monitoring Committee are largely twofold; serve as a watchdog over the implementation 
of the project to be sure that it complied with the original intent, and serve as a 
communication link between the Forest Service and the community to enhance 
understanding of the implementation as it progressed.  Mark Sheets, who is also on the 
City Council, described his experience this way:  “People in the community do have 
questions; community members ask me what’s happening.  I help to dispel rumors.  I can 
explain things to them because I am a credible source, not a Forest Service person.”68  At 
one point, Mark also intervened on a proposed treatment that would have thinned the area 
beyond the level called for in the EIS.  “The Forest Service was going to cut Unit 8 back 
to the seed tree level, which would have been more than the thinning they described in 
the project.  When I threatened to write a minority report, they changed the treatment for 
the area and went back to just thinning.”69  
For the most part, the Monitoring Committee has not met very often nor been 
very involved in the project to date, for a number of reasons.  Most members serve as 
volunteers, which makes it difficult to find a time to get the committee together, 
                                                 
68Mark Sheets Transcript, 5. 
 
69Mark Sheets Transcript, 1.   
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particularly as the Ranger District office is located in Plains, about thirty miles away.  
Once the training phase was over, the meeting schedule was infrequent because the 
project had not made sufficient progress to warrant a field trip; field trips worked better 
than meeting in the Plains office.  Then, both the District Ranger who recruited the 
committee and the Department of Natural Resources representative who chaired the 
Monitoring Committee left the area.  Moreover, the decisions affecting the project to date 
have all been made by the Ranger District, involving the Monitoring Committee after the 
fact.  All of these factors weakened the ability of the Monitoring Committee to serve its 
full potential.  
Despite this reduced level of citizen monitoring, public confidence and trust in the 
capacity of the Ranger District to carry out the project remains strong.  This confidence 
was put to the test in the spring of 2006, when the first controlled burn of several treated 
cutting units unexpectedly reached a much higher intensity than intended.  The fire 
impacted about 120 acres in the view shed, exactly the type of mistake that lingers in the 
public’s attention because it is so visible.  Remarkably, interviewees reported that the 
community registered a low level of upset over the incident, in part because the Ranger 
District immediately acknowledged the error in a newspaper article that also outlined the 
steps it was taking to prevent a reoccurrence.  The problem was not with the original 
prescription for the thinning, but with the quantity of slash left on the unit.  The Forest 
Service was going to address this by “flying out the tops,” i.e., removing the unused tops 
of the trees by helicopter to another location for disposal.  Bruce Sterling noted, “There 
was a problem with the piece they burned last spring.  When you deal with the 
environment, it is not an exact science.  Things just get away from you.   The hill will 
survive; some of the trees will make it.”70  One interviewee mentioned that an outfitter 
friend of his had been up there and noted that the elk were already using the area for 
winter range.71  The Monitoring Committee made a trip to the burn site, although Cesar, 
the MWA representative, was the only one who made the meeting.  As he put it, “There 
was one little incident.  We took a trip to the burn site.  It was very educational.  The 
                                                 
70Bruce Sterling Transcript, 3.   
 
71Thompson Falls NFS # 1 Transcript, 4. 
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Forest Service admitted they had screwed up, and had already modified what they were 
going to do.  The Forest Service was up-front, on the ground, talked about it.  It was only 
120 acres.”72  As one of the Forest Service managers who has lived in Thomson Falls for 
over twenty years put it, “I think the Forest Service has a pretty high level of trust with 
the Thompson Falls community.”73 
Overall, people view the project as successful at this point.  One mark of success 
is that landowners further up the valley are now requesting that the Forest Service treat 
the slopes adjacent to their private land too.  Another aspect of success is the increased 
effort, relative to the past, on the part of the Forest Service to keep the community 
involved through the Monitoring Committee.74  Ongoing success depends upon how well 
the burn treatments are handled in the future; the community appears willing to allow one 
mistake as long as it is not repeated.  Bruce Sterling noted, “I think it looks good to me.  I 
think they left enough cover to act as a snow intercept in other areas so the absence of the 
canopy won’t be a problem in the burn area.  We manage for elk needs over the entire 
area, not just one unit.  The burn area is not a big issue.”75  An adjacent landowner noted, 
“As landowners, we felt good about the communications; they took pains to let us know 
about everything…They (the Forest Service) did a fine job of logging, everything was 
well done; they did it in the winter. You can see everything now, it looked fine.”76  As 
another representative from the adjacent private land noted, “The fuels reduction was 
needed.  It was going to get done one way or another, either by design or by fire.  New 
people don’t realize how fast fire can get out of hand.  This really needed to get done, but 
they didn’t go far enough.”77   
Moving into the future, the Ranger District has a good working relationship with 
the community of interests affecting the Forest Service in Thompson Falls, with the 
                                                 
72Cesar Hernandez Transcript, 4.   
 
73Thompson Falls FS # 5 Transcript, 2. 
 
74Thompson Falls Non FS # 1 Transcript, 4. 
 
75Bruce Sterling Transcript, 4. 
   
76Thompson Falls Non FS # 3, 5.   
  
77Thompson Falls Non FS # 4 Transcript, 2. 
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exception of the Ecology Center (now the Wild West Institute).78  However, this 
environmental group is beginning to be more open to discussion on Forest Service 
projects in the planning stages.79  The new District Ranger Randy Hojem sent out an 
invitation in March of 2007 with suggested dates for an April field trip with the 
Monitoring Committee and has initiated other outreach efforts.  As Cesar noted, “Randy 
is very willing to reach out.  I’ve never had a District Ranger travel with me to Missoula 
to visit with the folks at the Ecology Center, now the Wild West Center, like he did on 
another project.”80  For his part, Randy is ready to work with a community-initiated 
collaborative group that would take the lead in bringing people together to provide 
recommendations to the Forest Service to meet the goals of fuel reduction, ecological 
restoration, and forest product provision for local sustainability, while staying out of 
court.81  
 
Comparison of Lakeface-Lamb and Game Range Stewardship Fuel Reduction Cases 
 
 Both the Lakeface-Lamb and Game Range cases centered on local rural 
communities affected by the loss of revenues from timber sales.  Both involved fuel 
reduction treatment in areas of major visual importance to these communities and 
succeeded in changing public opinion to the point that private landowners sought 
treatment for their own lands as well as requesting more treatment areas from the Forest 
Service.  In both cases, Forest Service leadership in the planning stages of the project 
used innovative means to build public understanding and acceptance for the need to 
reduce the density of the forests.  Both cases were experimental stewardship projects in 
forest restoration that involved monitoring committees of interested citizens.  In both 
cases, the final EIS/ROD met the concerns of the local communities including the local 
environmental group, but was appealed by environmental groups from outside of the 
area.  In both cases, the appeals were denied.  Looking beyond this level of 
                                                 
78Thompson Falls FS Transcript # 4.   
 
79Thompson Falls NFS # 5, 3. 
 
80Cesar Hernandez Transcript, 3.   
 
81Randy Hojem Transcript, 4. 
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generalizations, there are a number of contextual differences that offer insight into the 
process of working with local communities in designing and implementing stewardship 
contracts for forest restoration. 
 The differences in the cases arose from the levels of trust in the local Ranger 
District present in the communities at the start of the projects and the dynamism of the 
community leadership that in turn influenced the degree of community involvement that 
followed.  In the Lakeface-Lamb case, the local Ranger District had a very low level of 
trust with the community at the beginning of the project in terms of timber harvest.  The 
District Ranger and principle planner viewed rebuilding a trust relationship with the 
community as a major goal throughout the project.  Lakeface-Lamb began as a fire 
hazard reduction project with a credibility problem.  The community initiated the idea of 
doing a stewardship project which transformed Lakeface-Lamb into a vehicle for 
extensive community outreach and involvement.  As a result, the community engaged in 
a comprehensive visioning process that added expectations to Lakeface-Lamb to provide 
job creation for the local economy and model effective forest restoration techniques.  The 
community leadership was equal to the task of fulfilling its end of the vision, and the 
Forest Service folk rose to challenge as well, in effect creating a partnership between the 
Ranger District and local community leaders that extended deeply into implementation of 
Lakeface-Lamb after the community leaders were awarded the position of prime 
contractor.  Equally important, the Monitoring Committee played a central role in 
building trust with local landowners through the implementation phase.  It would be hard 
to imagine a project with more community involvement.   
In contrast, the Thompson Falls Ranger District began the project with a much 
higher level of trust with the local community.  The District Ranger and project planner 
had an educational challenge in explaining the need for the project, but their credibility in 
the area of timber harvest was higher.  Moreover, the community was largely a timber 
town, so there was no need for extensive outreach to the community as a whole.  The 
planner identified the various interest groups and individuals interested in the project, and 
met with them primarily one-on-one.  When the final EIS came out, the Game Range 
project had done a good job of addressing all of the local concerns and offered the 
benefits of reduced fire potential and enhanced winter range for elk and deer.  
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Stewardship contracted was added near the end of the project planning phase as a more 
efficient contracting tool to provide other Ranger District benefits as well.  There was no 
added emphasis on forest restoration when the Game Range project became a 
stewardship project.  The Monitoring Group was added as required by the stewardship 
contract regulations, but for a variety of reasons had not been very active as of March of 
2007.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Beyond Pluralism 
 
This research examined the theoretical and practical aspects of the following 
questions: 
 
Have efforts in citizen participation of the Forest Service gone beyond pluralism 
in which interests compete to define the public interest? 
If so, how has the public interest been determined?   
 
If new processes for defining the public interest are present in Forest Service 
citizen participation, to what extent do these new processes confirm 
participatory democracy theory? 
 
If the Forest Service is using approaches other than interest group competition to 
determine the public interest in citizen involvement, how were they related 
to subsequent challenges to the resulting decisions? 
 
The four cases in this research focused on defining the public interest in the 
context of the United States Forest Service acting as an administrative agency charged 
with the responsibility of implementing its mission at the project level.   Two higher 
levels of the public interest formed a framework within which the cases occurred; the 
national public interest was defined by the laws established by Congress and the National 
Forest Plan defined the public interest at the level of the specific national forest.  The four 
projects further refined and defined the public interest at the project level, within the 
existing overlays of the public interest from the higher levels and taking into account 
scientific research on wildlife and environmental impacts for the specific project.  In 
point of fact, all four cases used actual overlays on maps to identify legal and scientific 
constraints.  Many interviewees described the role of the Forest Service as “defining the 
decision space” or “establishing the sideboards” for each project, i.e., the area within 
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which flexibility existed to define project level public interest.  Put another way, the role 
of the Forest Service was to identify and contain the area within which the public’s 
values at the project level could determine the outcome.  Once defined, most Forest 
Service decision-making interviewees reported indifference to the outcome in terms of 
content, as long as it fell within this area, and focused instead on the process of defining 
the public interest. 
Unlike the other higher levels of public interest, the project level was very 
specific and concrete; it called for on-the-ground knowledge as the basis for discussion 
rather than abstract concepts and theories.  Nearly all of the interviewees within and 
outside of the Forest Service stressed the importance of on-the-ground knowledge in 
creating the potential for differing sides to come to agreement.  One Forest Service 
official put it this way, “You get people on the ground and 90% of the conflict 
disappears.”1  Non-Forest Service interviewees were adamant in asserting that local 
people with on the ground knowledge should play a dominant role in determining the 
public interest at the project level, precisely because of their intimate knowledge of the 
land.    
 The level of trust in the Forest Service, in terms of motive in proposing the action, 
credibility in providing information, and ability to implement the proposal as agreed, was 
particularly notable in these cases.  Trust entered into these discussions because it formed 
the context in which the definition of the public interest took place.  Public trust was 
enhanced when the Forest Service did an effective job of defining and incorporating the 
public interest into the preferred alternative prior to releasing the Record of Decision.  As 
one district ranger put it, “The public expects the Forest Service to come up with 
reasonable alternatives that don’t tear the community apart.”  Historically, the 
administrative appeal process, while widely viewed as an important part of defining the 
public interest procedurally, undermined public trust in the ability of the Forest Service to 
formulate the public interest when the appeals came from local community interests 
rather than distant advocacy organizations at the extremes.  When the Forest Service 
relied upon appeals and litigation to define the public interest, it cast local interest groups 
into an adversarial competition characterized by behaviors from the pluralistic paradigm.  
                                                 
1Game Range FS #1 Transcript, 4. 
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Many of the non Forest Service interviewees in these cases were adverse to the use of 
appeals and lawsuits, not because of cost or the likelihood of winning, but because of the 
deleterious effects adversarial processes had on the community.  Several individuals were 
willing to give up what was most important to their personal self-interest to spare the 
community from the ravages of a lawsuit.2  
The  Forest Service officials interviewed for all four of these cases agreed that 
determination of the public interest needed effective interaction with the public.  To 
confirm that non-Forest Service participants also recognized the public interest dimension 
of these cases, non-Forest Service interviewees were asked whether they viewed their 
involvement with the Forest Service as defining the public interest for the specific project 
being considered.  All 24 non-Forest Service interviewees agreed that their efforts 
involved an attempt to define the public interest for the Forest Service in their respective 
cases.  
This research examined two alternative political theories as reference points to 
describe and explain the interactions of the participants in defining the public interest, 
pluralism and participatory democracy.  Research questions translated pluralism and 
participatory democracy into characteristic political behaviors, then noted the presence or 
absence of these behaviors.  Pluralism in the context of Forest Service public 
involvement characterized rational political behavior as posturing, making exaggerated 
claims for one’s case directly to Forest Service officials, making no attempt to listen to or 
understand others, holding out for all of what one wants, and using appeals, litigation, 
and using direct Congressional intervention if the decision does not meet expectations 
and the group has the resources to pursue it.3  Participatory democracy in the context of 
the Forest Service characterized political behavior as diverse interest groups coming 
together to listen to each other’s concerns and work out solutions that respect the interests 
of all through  group efforts that built trust, mutual respect, cooperation, understanding of 
other viewpoints, and agreement.  
                                                 
2Seeley Lake NFS # 2; Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 4 Transcript. 
 
3Julia M.  Wondolleck, Public Lands Conflict and Resolution:  Managing National Forest 
Disputes, ( New York: Plenum Press, 1988).  
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What processes did the Forest Service use to determine the public interest in these 
cases?  Initially, analysis for this question relied in part upon terms already in use to 
characterize public involvement.  One of these terms, collaboration, used in the early 
stages of the research to identify potential cases, turned out to be problematic as a term to 
describe a process for determining the public interest.  Case interviews revealed that there 
was a wide range of definitions of the word collaboration in use inside the Forest Service.  
For example, although recommended by several officials as a laudable example of 
collaboration, the Thompson Falls Game Range case only minimally fit the parameters 
for this research.  In analyzing the data, the researcher chose not to use the term 
“collaboration” to define a process for determining the public interest.  The Forest 
Service has been using the word collaboration to describe its efforts to involve the public 
since the 1990s but has not given a specific definition of the term.  For some Forest 
Service interviewees, collaboration was essentially synonymous with the expert model of 
public participation outlined in Chapter One.  For others, including most non-Forest 
Service participants, collaboration included a dimension of agency/citizen co-creation of 
proposed actions through joint problem solving.  This discrepancy was significant; some 
interviewees reported skepticism of Forest Service use of the word collaboration.  
Textbook definitions of collaboration also differed from each other.   
Rather than create a definition of collaboration, this research analyzed each case 
in terms of specific characteristics prevalent in the literature of collaboration and 
participatory democracy theory.  Analysis of cases using a list of characteristics allows 
other researches the option of classifying the cases to fit their own definitions of 
collaboration.  The characteristics used for analysis are listed below: 
 
1. predominant group culture,  reported by interviewees in choosing 
between pluralist or collaborative group culture as outlined in Chapter 
Two:  Methodology.   
 
2. interest representation, to indicate the range of interests involved by the 
Forest Service in each case.     
 
3. nature of participation, in terms of being voluntary or required because 
of the legal context of the case.  
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4. nature of dialogue in terms of one-on-one communication with Forest 
Service officials, or multiple interests talking directly to each other  
 
5. sources of leadership, including Forest Service personnel and 
community and interest group leaders.  
 
6. formulation of proposed solution, in terms of who was directly involved 
in problem solving and creating the proposed solution 
 
7. purview of the solution, in terms of whether the Forest Service could 
implement the solution alone, or needed active involvement of those 
outside of the Forest Service.  
 
8. quality of the solution, as compared to the solution the Forest Service 
would have drafted without the efforts of non-Forest Service people.   
 
9. quality of the process, in terms of its effect on public trust in the Forest 
Service, and its effect on the cohesion of the community and 
community leadership in transferring the process to other community 
issues.    
 
10. support for the final decision, as indicated by interviewees.   
 
11. method used to define the public interest, in terms of whether the 
process met the definition of participatory democracy as formulated by 
civic republican theory, or used another process. 
 
12. character of the appeals process, in terms of whether the solution was 
appealed, and if so, by whom and how the appeal process was affected 
by the agreement reached among the interests involved. 
 
13. litigation, in terms of whether the solution was litigated, and if so, how 
the litigation was affected by the agreement reached among the interests 
involved.  
 
This research focused on the question of whether these cases moved beyond 
pluralism in determining the public interest.  If the Forest Service moved beyond 
pluralism, did the process fit the definition of participatory democracy as envisioned by 
civic republican theory?  For purposes of this research, participatory democracy was 
defined using the criteria listed above.  To be classified as participatory democracy, the 
process for determining the public interest required a collaborative culture among those 
representing all of the primary interests in the case, who came together voluntarily and 
engaged in dialogue with each other and with the Forest Service in the direct formulation 
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of solutions that went beyond the purview of the Forest Service and involved leadership 
from non-Forest Service interests and community groups.  The resulting solutions were 
supported by all of those involved and were better in content than the solutions originally 
present.  The process of formulating the solutions strengthened both public trust in the 
Forest Service and community capacity to work together on other issues in the future.   
 This research also focused on the question of whether the processes used to 
determine the public interest affected subsequent challenges to the resulting decisions in 
the form of appeals and litigation.  There is a symbiotic relationship between citizen and 
interest group recourse to appeals and lawsuits, and the process of determining the public 
interest through citizen and interest group deliberation and involvement in formulating 
the proposed decisions.  One of the criteria for effective problem solving is the 
engagement of various interests as peers.  The potential for citizens and interest groups to 
file appeals and pursue litigation after the Forest Service makes a decision helps to 
establish a peer relationship among various interests and the Forest Service before the 
decision is made, because any one of the interests involved could delay or stop the 
decision later if its concerns are not addressed.  Although research shows that people 
believe in involvement up-front as the best way for the Forest Service to make good 
decisions, many interest groups are leery of spending scarce resources in pre-decision 
deliberations in the absence of proof that their concerns will be adequately factored into 
the resulting decision.4  For these groups, appeals and litigation appear more effective in 
influencing the outcome and work against involvement in pre-decision deliberations.   
The presence of appeals in these cases offered the opportunity to assess the strength of 
support behind the agreements reached in these cases.  None of the interests that 
participated in the collaborative efforts in these cases appealed or litigated the decisions.  
While appeals and litigation typically generate adversarial and competitive dynamics that 
draw people into a pluralist paradigm, in these cases they generated opportunities for 
community and interest groups to rally behind the Forest Service as allies.   
                                                 
4Steven E. Daniels and Gregg B. Walker, “Collaborative Learning:  Improving Public Deliberation 
in Ecosystem-Based Management” Environmental Impact Assessment Review no. 16 (1996):  71-102; Rene 
H.Germain, Donald W. Floyd, and Stephen V. Stehman, “Public Perceptions of the USDA Forest Service 
‘Public Participation’ Process” Forest Policy and Economics, 3 (2001) 3-4: 113-124. 
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The following sections analyze the evidence in each case using the criteria 
outlined above to determine whether the process of defining the public interest went 
beyond pluralism and, if so, how the public interest was defined, including an assessment 
of whether the resulting process met the researcher’s definition of participatory 
democracy.  In addition, the sections analyze the effect of the process in each case on 
subsequent appeals and litigation. 
 
 
Thompson Falls Game Range and Lakeface-Lamb Stewardship Fuel Reduction Cases 
 
 In terms of content, both of these projects were essentially the same.  Both were 
initiated by Ranger Districts responding to changing national policy from commodity-
oriented logging to logging for the sake of forest health.  Both project areas had high 
visual impact to the public, which was why neither had been logged before.  In both 
cases, the Forest Service used extensive and innovative public education and outreach on 
the subject of fire ecology prior to defining the public interest.  The decision space for the 
fuel reduction component in each case focused on the amount of clearing and thinning to 
be done.  As one Forest Service official put it, “We needed to reduce the risk, but see that 
we didn’t destroy what people really liked about the area in the process.  This middle 
ground, between no reduction and extreme reduction, that was the public interest in this 
case, and the Forest Service couldn’t define it without the community.  We can’t find the 
middle by sitting in the office; we had to get values from the public.”5  Finding the 
middle ground not only affected the potential to move forward with the Forest Service 
project, it also had the potential to influence private landowners as well.   Fire reduction 
is more effective if all fire hazard land in the area is treated, leaving no patchwork of 
untreated areas.  While treatment of private lands is generally beyond the purview of the 
Forest Service, modeling effective treatment could encourage private landowners to 
reduce fire potential on their land as well.   
                                                 
5Lakeface-Lamb FS # 2, 3.   
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 The Game Range and Lakeface-Lamb were very different in terms of public trust.  
While the Thompson Falls Ranger District had a relatively high level of trust with the 
local community, the Priest River Ranger District knew it had a problem with public 
trust, especially in the area of logging practices.  The communities themselves differed in 
terms of community leadership.  While both of these cases took place in small, rural 
communities, Priest River had more active community leadership.  Differences in trust 
levels and community leadership contributed to different approaches to defining the 
public interest.   
The Thompson Falls Ranger District staff used a more informal process of one-
on-one involvement in determining the public interest based on the concept of informed 
consent.6  Informed consent calls for education and outreach to gain agreement on the 
nature of the problem, the appropriateness of the Forest Service as the agency to address 
the problem, and the appropriateness of the solution prior to making a final decision.  
Ranger District staff provided the leadership and reached out to the full spectrum in 
interests involved in the issue.   Public contact with the Forest Service was voluntary.  
The only times people of differing viewpoints met together on the Game Range project 
were at public meetings and field trips where discussion was primarily between the 
Forest Service and participants.   Ranger District staff also arrived at agreements with 
specific interests concerning the implementation of the project.  One-on-one discussions 
between the Forest Service and city manager of Thompson Falls led to the agreement not 
to treat the creek drainage that supplied the city’s water supply although it was within the 
project area.  A representative of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
that owned the game range adjacent to the project area participated as an equal member 
of the Forest Service project planning team.  Game range land was used as staging areas 
for logging.  One-on-one discussions with individual landowners adjacent to the project 
area led to agreements on use of private land for helicopter staging and refueling areas.  
All of these activities focused on the timber and fuel reduction portion of the stewardship 
project.  The service project component was determined by the Ranger District and 
handled through a separate EIS process.  While the community supported the project, 
interviewees reported little in the way of community vision with respect to the project.  
                                                 
6Game Range FS #1 Transcript. 
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The Game Range project moved beyond pluralism in defining the public interest, 
but the process did not fit the definition of participatory democracy used in this research; 
groups of diverse interests were not involved in formulating emergent solutions and 
lacked the kind of engagement to foster a better understanding of each other.  The process 
used to define the public interest in the Game Range case was informed consent. 
Informed consent relies upon effective public education and reasoned argument to 
influence the individual’s understanding of self-interest relative to the project at hand.  In 
doing so, informed consent assumes the same underlying model of human nature that 
participatory democracy holds to be true, that human nature and self- interest are mutable 
and can be changed through reasoned argument.  However, discussions were largely one-
on-one between the Forest Service and specific interests, after which the Forest Service 
took the information back to the planners and decided how to incorporate it.  This was 
true of the Monitoring Committee as well, which to date has been characterized by 
communications between the members and the Forest Service rather than among each 
other, and by an absence of active consultation by the Forest Service with committee 
members.7  In the Game Range case, informed consent used the reasonable model as its 
underlying construct of human nature, but retained aspects of the expert approach in that 
Forests Service experts constructed a preferred alternative that accurately captured the 
public interest for the project as evidenced by support for the project among the diverse 
interviewees.   Interviewees did report improved relationships and understanding between 
themselves and the Forest Service.  In moving beyond the pluralist paradigm, the Ranger 
District reinforced people’s trust in the Forest Service.  This trust was put to the test by an 
accidental high intensity burn on a portion of the project area; the community, including 
environmental organizations, were willing to accept this as a mistake and were not 
unduly upset.  The informed consent process did not encourage the development of 
leadership in community groups nor strengthen the community’s capacity to work 
together.  
The Priest Lake Ranger District began to build public understanding of the public 
interest by creating three small treatment demonstration sites in highly visible public 
areas.  Definition of the public interest moved beyond the Forest Service and into the 
                                                 
7Game Range NFS Transcript  #1,  #3, and FS # 3.   
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community when Lakeface-Lamb became a candidate for a pilot stewardship project 
initiated by the leadership of the local community and then was swept into a voluntary 
visioning process designed to meet the requirements of a Ford Foundation Community 
Planning Grant.  Project planning became part of the visioning process, and brought 
together a wide range of interests from the surrounding communities, including industry, 
business, education, environmental groups, and the Forest Service.  Not only were 
diverse members of the community deeply involved in the details of planning the 
preferred alternative for Lakeface-Lamb, they also worked with Ranger District staff in 
identifying the proposed service components to meet local goals for recreational facility 
improvements and diverse job creation.  Four interviewees reported gained understanding 
and respect for people of differing interests as a result of the planning effort.8  The 
resulting project was strongly supported by the community, and implementation of the 
project was shared between the Forest Service and the community non-profit.   
Lakeface-Lamb also moved beyond the pluralist paradigm with participatory 
culture as the predominant choice characterizing group interactions.  The Lakeface-Lamb 
preferred alternative emerged from a planning process involving diverse interests that 
focused on the future of the community.  Reported behaviors included increased 
understanding of opposing views and the development of friendships across interest lines, 
as well as agreement from diverse interests on proposed solutions.  Implementation 
required both the Forest Service and the community.  The resulting project was enhanced 
beyond the original Forest Service plan in terms of quality forest restoration and in terms 
of targeting the service component to publically recognized projects.  Involvement of 
local leadership led to the formation of a new non-profit that has the potential of 
extending the vision of the community into the future.  The Lakeface-Lamb project met 
the research definition of participatory democracy.  Definition of the public interest was 
extended into the implementation of the project through the creation of a Monitoring 
Committee, and by award of the prime contract to a local non-profit organization deeply 
involved in the original planning process.  As one member of the nonprofit put it, “The 
public interest was defined every day on the ground, in terms of changes in the 
                                                 
8Lakeface-Lamb Transcripts NFS # 9, NFS #7, FS #4, FS  #1. 
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contract…the subcontractor for fuel removal would see things on the ground that could 
not be anticipated and was able to get the flexibility to make the project better.”9  The 
shared vision of the Forest Service, the prime contractor, and local subcontractors that 
emerged from the planning process made implementation of the project an ongoing 
interpretation of the public interest..     
Both the Game Range and the Lakeface-Lamb cases moved beyond pluralism 
with diverse local interests and interests outside of the community that were willing to 
meet with Forest Service officials and look at the projects on the ground.  Interviewees in 
both cases overwhelmingly chose participatory culture to characterize interactions with 
the Forest Service and each other, eight of ten in the Game Range, and 14 of 15 in 
Lakeface-Lamb.  Lakeface-Lamb was an example of participatory democracy as it 
evidenced all of the characteristics as defined in this research.  The Game Range project 
did not have the full range of characteristics to be participatory democracy; informed 
consent did not generate dialogue between interests, did not involve citizen and interest 
groups in active problem solving in formulating the preferred alternative, and the process 
did not foster an awareness of community or shared goals or enhance the ability of the 
community to work together on other issues in the future.   
Both projects were drawn into the pluralist paradigm when the Records of 
Decision were appealed by outside environmental groups that did not participate in 
meetings in the process of defining the public interest.  However, in both cases 
environmental organizations that were involved in meetings at the local level voluntarily 
stepped into the appeal process on behalf of the Forest Service, informally in Lakeface- 
Lamb by the Selkirk Conservation Alliance, and formally with administrative 
interventions in the Game Range project by the Cabinet Resource Group and the 
Montana Wilderness Association.  In both cases, the Forest Service Region One appeal 
official denied the appeals in part because of the involvement of these environmental 
groups in the process of defining the public interest and because of their active support of 
the Forest Service decision.  Moreover, the appellants decided against litigation in part 
because of the strong support for the decisions of these environmental organizations.   
 
                                                 
9Lakeface-Lamb NFS # 3 Transcript, 2.   
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Big Snowies and Seeley Lake Winter Recreation Cases 
 
As with the previous two cases, both of these projects were similar in terms of 
content.  Both were initiated to define the public interest as the result of Forest Service 
decisions affecting motorized recreation in potential wilderness areas that should not 
have allowed motorized use according to the Forest Plan.  The decision space for the 
public interest in each case focused on the balance of motorized and nonmotorized uses 
for winter recreation, a question of public values Forest Service officials recognized that 
they could not determine alone.   Moreover, the final decision could not be implemented 
by the Forest Service alone either.   Both snowmobile clubs and cross country ski clubs 
provided the lion’s share of enforcement of use agreements by maintaining groomed 
trails, providing signage marking allowed and prohibited areas of use, educating their 
members and encouraging them to abide by the rules.  The Forest Service lacked the staff 
to effectively patrol and enforce winter use agreements; buy-in from user groups was 
essential for any decision to be effective on the ground.  As with the previous cases, 
levels of public trust in the Forest Service between Seeley Lake and the Big Snowies 
were very different. 
Determination of the public interest for the Big Snowies was conducted at the 
level of the Lewis and Clark National Forest rather than at the Ranger District level.  It 
involved an extensive geographic area that included both rural and urban user groups, an 
area that did not have a sense of shared community.  Forest Service officials invited only 
those interest groups and individuals who appealed the Big Snowies Record of Decision 
to participate; the fact that the appellants came from both motorized and nonmotorized 
local users groups reinforced the perception that Forest Service staff didn’t address public 
concerns in formulating the preferred alternative.  The citizens and interest group 
representatives entered the discussions fresh from the pluralist-oriented appeals process 
with little trust in the Forest Service.  Moreover, acceptance of the invitation to 
participate was not entirely voluntary; the Forest Service indicated that this was their 
preferred vehicle to deal with the appeals and that a decision was going to be made based 
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on the discussions.  The group had no positive vision for the Big Snowies other than to 
avoid further legal proceedings; they were operating from the shared convictions that 
lawsuits were too expensive and that they could do better at defining the public interest 
themselves rather than being at the mercy of the Forest Service or the courts.     
The Big Snowies case achieved agreement defining the public interest for winter 
recreation on two mountain ranges.  The Forest Service provided little guidance, 
essentially leaving it up to the negotiating group to stay within legal and scientific 
parameters.  That the group was able to achieve agreement was the result of two factors; 
recent successful negotiations of similar issues for motorized use on the Flathead 
National Forest that served as a model for this group and the leadership provided by the 
spokesmen for the Montana Snowmobile Club and the Montana Wilderness Association, 
both of whom had also been involved in the Flathead negotiations.  In order to succeed, 
these leaders moved the group from the pluralist paradigm to a predominantly 
participatory culture.   
Seven of the interviewees selected participatory culture to characterize their 
interactions, while the remaining three selected a mix of both pluralist and participatory 
cultures.  A number of them noted that the discussions began with a pluralist culture, but 
moved to a participatory culture after the first several meetings.  The non Forest Service 
participants in the negotiations created the final agreement between themselves, with 
minor involvement of the Forest Service.  Interviewees from both the motorized and non-
motorized groups reported changing their attitudes about giving up part of their area as 
their respective leaders made it clear to them that multiple use meant that no group would 
get all of what it wanted.  Both motorized and non-motorized interviewees reported 
actions by the other side that evidenced a commitment to fair treatment, taking the other 
side into account.  Similarly, several interviewees reported increased respect for 
individuals from opposing groups as the meetings progressed.  This was not universal; 
one interviewee from each group reported continued mistrust and lack of understanding 
of the other side.  All interviewees reported support of the final agreement at the time it 
was made.  The final agreement included responsibilities for all parties in implementing 
the decision and left a few of the contested areas up to the Forest Service to decide.  
While it evidenced many characteristics of participatory democracy, the Big Snowies did 
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not meet the definition used here because participation in the group was not entirely 
voluntary and there was no positive vision or fostering of a sense of community in the 
process.  Rather, these actions and behaviors defined another process for determining the 
public interest that went beyond pluralism; the Big Snowies process can best be described 
as  “stakeholder negotiations.”10  Stakeholder negotiations are typified by bargaining in 
which interest groups seek to understand opposing interests and engage in tradeoffs 
designed to achieve gains for all by identifying priorities and minimizing conflicts.   
Several aspects of the Big Snowies case also fit within the pluralist paradigm.  On 
the motorized side of the issue, several snowmobile clubs involved in the negotiations 
subsequently were taken over by new leadership.  These new leaders were opposed to 
closing any areas to snowmobiles and began to raise funds to support appeals and 
litigation to ensure that all areas remained open to snowmobile use.  These leaders also 
opposed participation in future negotiations with other interests on access to Forest 
Service lands.  On the non-motorized side,  one appellant, an environmental group from a 
nearby area, refused to participate in the initial negotiations and subsequently filed a 
lawsuit seeking to prohibit all motorized use in the Big Snowies.  Evidence also indicated 
that fundamental philosophy played a role in determining how far a collaborative culture 
could go.  One interviewee continued to view the wilderness advocates with suspicion 
because of a utilitarian sense of the word “use.”11  This individual believed strongly that 
Forest Service lands should be used, not set aside for preservation, and was unable to 
understand and accept wilderness as legitimate.   
While some snowmobile and wilderness groups interacted with the Forest Service 
within the pluralist paradigm, other groups evidenced strong commitment to good faith 
and trust characteristic of collaborative relationships.  Both MSA and MWA kept their 
word as signatories of the final Big Snowies agreement and filed interventions as allies of 
the Forest Service in the legal proceedings involved in the litigation by the environmental 
group.  The litigation went to district court in which the judge ruled in favor of the Forest 
Service.  Observers of the case believe the interventions of MWA and MSA positively 
influenced the judge’s decision.  The environmental group appealed the case to the circuit 
                                                 
10Big Snowies NFS # 5 Transcript.   
 
11Big Snowies NFS # 4 and # 6. 
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court.  While the circuit court judge has yet to make a decision, the Forest Service has 
implemented the decision based on the strength of the lower court ruling.      
The Seeley Lake winter recreation case was based in a small, rural community 
that was also the location of the local Ranger District.  The idea of working out a solution 
among the various user groups and the Forest Service was initiated by the local motorized 
user group.  Agreement to join the discussion was voluntary.  The interviewees involved 
from the community, including the District Ranger, placed a high value on community 
cohesion.  While the reason they initiated the discussion was to bypass the court system 
to find a solution, the reason they thought they could work it out was their strong 
commitment to the community.  Once it was clear that the user groups were willing to 
give it a try, the Ranger District obtained approval from the Forest Supervisor to initiate a 
process to determine the public interest and amend the Forest Plan in terms of winter 
recreation for the Ranger District.   
The Seeley Lake Ranger District already had a strong participatory culture in 
place with the local community and continued to build trust relationships with the MA 11 
decisions.  All interviewees characterized interactions as a participatory culture after the 
first few meetings.  As part of defining the decision space, the District Ranger made sure 
that user groups understood that no group could have everything they wanted; he 
encouraged interest groups to identify their most important areas.  The groups 
approached discussions with high integrity and created a solution that all could strongly 
support.  Leaders of the local snowmobile club and MWA reported that they developed a 
strong relationship of respect, friendship and trust with each other.  Every interviewee 
reported greater understanding of opposing views as a result of the process.  In the spirit 
of mutual assistance, an environmental leader offered the solution to the last problem 
standing in the way of permitting motorized use.   The agreement depended upon active 
enforcement of snowmobile restrictions by the local club, a responsibility the club 
supported and was performing well.  Most tellingly, the resulting Forest Plan amendment 
has never been appealed or litigated, and the interests involved have moved on to 
formulate more collaborative projects.  Seeley Lake was an example of both participatory 
democracy and collaboration.   
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Summary of Analysis 
 
  This research used a list of characteristics to analyze the presence of participatory 
democracy in four cases of defining the public interest at the site-specific level in the 
United States Forest Service.  The table below summarizes this analysis.  Two of the four 
cases, Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake, evidenced all the characteristics of participatory 
democracy, confirming that the civic republican theory of participatory democracy 
accurately described the process for determining the public interest in these cases.  The 
other two cases, Game Range and Big Snowies, contained some characteristics that went 
beyond pluralism but did not use processes to identify the public interest that meet the 
definition of participatory democracy used in this research.  Rather, these two cases used 
other processes to define the public interest.  The Thompson Falls Game Range case used 
informed consent that relied upon the same basic model of human nature as participatory 
democracy.  However, informed consent relies on agency expertise without direct citizen 
and interest group involvement in formulating the preferred alternative which prevents 
the process from fostering either an understanding of community values or democratic 
citizenship.  The Big Snowies case also moved beyond pluralism by using many of the 
characteristics of participatory democracy in a process of stakeholder negotiations to 
directly formulate a definition of the public interest.  However, participation in these 
negotiations was not entirely voluntary, nor did the negotiations foster or contain a sense 
of community.   
 These four cases, all of which occurred within the legal framework for defining 
the public interest extant at the time, made another conclusion very clear; although the 
Forest Service’s framework for public involvement traditionally has reinforced 
adversarial and pluralistic behavior, it does not dictate it.  In all four of these cases, the 
Forest Service went beyond the pluralist paradigm in formulating the public interest.  All 
cases reflected the presence of a predominantly collaborative culture in the interactions 
involved in defining the public interest.  All of the cases reflected a shift in paradigm  
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Table 2: Characteristics of Cases 
Characteristic  Game Range  Lakeface-
Lamb 
Big Snowies Seeley Lake 
Moved beyond pluralism Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Predominant  model of 
human nature 
Reasonable Reasonable Reasonable Reasonable 
Predominant group 
culture 
collaborative collaborative collaborative collaborative 
Interest representation all primary 
concerns  
Full spectrum 
of community     
All primary 
concerns   
All primary 
concerns      
Participation      Voluntary voluntary appeal 
resolution   
voluntary 
Dialogue one-on-one 
with Forest 
Service 
multiple 
interests 
multiple 
interests 
multiple 
interests 
Source of leadership Forest Service Forest Service 
and community 
leaders 
Interest group 
leaders 
Forest Service 
and community 
leaders 
formulation of proposed 
solution 
Forest Service 
alone 
Forest Service 
and community 
leaders 
Community 
leaders 
 Forest Service 
and community 
leaders 
Solution beyond purview 
of the Forest Service 
     yes         yes        yes       yes 
Method used to find 
public interest 
Informed 
consent 
Participatory 
democracy 
Stakeholder 
negotiations 
Participatory 
democracy 
Solution:  Quality of 
Content 
Incorporated 
most concerns 
Better than 
Forest Service  
alone 
Better than 
Forest Service 
alone 
Better than 
Forest Service 
alone 
Solution:  Quality of 
process 
Enhanced trust 
in Forest 
Service 
Enhanced trust 
in Forest 
Service, 
strengthened 
community 
leadership 
enhanced trust 
between some 
individuals; 
lost support of 
some 
constituents 
Enhanced trust 
in Forest 
Service, 
strengthened 
community 
leadership; led 
to other 
agreements 
Support for final solution all interviewees all interviewees all interviewees 
at time of 
decision 
all interviewees 
Appeals of final solution Appealed by  
non-local 
interest group 
that refused to 
participate 
Appealed by 
non-local 
interest groups 
that didn’t 
participate  
Appealed by  
local interest 
group that 
refused to 
participate 
No appeals 
Litigation None, due in 
part to support 
of local peer 
group 
None, due in 
part to support 
of local peer 
group 
Yes, by local 
interest group  
that refused to 
participate 
No litigation 
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assumptions about human nature away from the pluralist/rational choice model toward 
the participatory democracy model of reasonable human nature that allows for learning 
and change. In all four cases, leaders expected the interests involved at the local on-the-
ground level to be reasonable; this expectation was always met within the core groups 
involved in these cases.   
Three distinct processes for determining the public interest that are not based in 
the pluralist paradigm emerged from this analysis; informed consent, stakeholder 
negotiation, and participatory democracy.  All three processes moved into a participatory 
democracy paradigm insofar as they were based on the reasonable model of human 
nature and were characterized as predominantly collaborative in terms of group culture 
and interactions.  All three processes increased public trust of the Forest Service.  While 
the Forest Service retained control over the proposed solution in all three processes, the 
degree of control over the process of defining the solution varied.  With informed 
consent, as found in the Game Range case, Forest Service officials retained the greatest 
degree of control of the process.  Forest Service officials worked with interest groups 
one-on-one and took concerns back to Forest Service planners who then incorporated 
those concerns into the preferred alternative.  In the Big Snowies stakeholder negotiation, 
and in the Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake participatory democracy processes, Forest 
Service officials established parameters within which the decision had to fit, then 
engaged local interests directly with each other in formulating the preferred alternative.   
The impact of these processes on subsequent appeals and litigation is striking.  
None of the interest groups and individuals involved in these face-to-face processes 
subsequently appealed the final decisions.  To the contrary, groups actively involved in 
the processes subsequently stood by the Forest Service decisions and supported the Forest 
Service against appeals and litigation from interest groups that did not participate in the 
processes.  Support from those involved in these processes presented strong evidence of 
effective interest representation in the decisions that in turn created grounds for denial of 
appeals from groups who themselves did not participate but whose interests were 
represented by peer organizations.  Both Region One appeals officers and district court 
judges ruled in favor of the Forest Service, given evidence of the range of interests 
involved in the process and the content of the decisions.   
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In practical terms, collaborative processes in these cases reduced the number of 
appeals and shortened the time between decision and implementation.  The Seeley Lake 
Case had no appeals or litigation to delay implementation of the final decision.  The Big 
Snowies decision was taken to district court by an environmental group from a nearby 
town that refused to participate in the negotiations.  The Forest Service won, in part 
because of interventions filed on its behalf by both the MSA and the MWA.  Although 
the case was pursued to the next level circuit court, the Lewis and Clark National Forest 
went ahead and implemented the decision on the Big Snowies based on the strength of 
the district judge’s decision.  The Lewis and Clark National Forest also implemented 
portions of the agreement on snowmobile and cross country use on the Little Belt 
Mountains on an interim basis pending the release of a draft travel plan.  Both Lakeface-
Lamb and the Game Range were appealed by environmental groups outside of the area, 
but the appeals in each case were denied and the appellant declined to pursue litigation, in 
part because of widespread community support, especially that of environmental 
organizations that participated in project outreach activities.12
                                                 
12It’s interesting to note that one Missoula-based environmental organization was responsible for 
appeals in two of these cases.  In both instances, the group filed appeals without any on-the-ground contact 
with the projects.  A local judge subsequently informed the group that its credibility was questionable 
because it refused to look at projects on the ground.  Thompson Falls NFS # 5 Transcript.   
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSIONS 
  
 
If human nature is seen less as an immutable gift from God than as a consequence of the 
expectations we have for it, political institutions cannot take human nature as a given, but 
must accept responsibility for their involvement in its creation. 
 
    J. G. March and J.P. Olsen, Democratic Governance 
 
 
Implications for Political Theory and Public Administration  
 
When Waldo created the term “democratic administration” in the early 1950s to 
describe the legitimate role of citizens in agency decision making, that role was limited to 
potential injury to property rights where the facts of the case were specific and known.1  
Subsequently, the Forest Service used its existing adjudicatory administrative process as 
the structure for citizen participation in agency policy decisions, combining the pluralism 
of interest group politics with the adversarial culture of the legal system.2  The 
combination of the pluralist paradigm for political action with judicial adjudication 
shifted the role of the courts to that of guarantor that all interests were fairly represented 
in the decisions and led to delays in the decision making process.3  The Forest Service 
responded by diverting resources into documentation and legal actions and away from 
accomplishing its mission on the ground, so much so that its ability to accomplish its 
                                                 
1Dwight Waldo, “Development of Theory of Democratic Administration” The American Political 
Science Review 46 (1952) 81:103. 
 
2Richard Stewart, “Reformation of American Administrative Law” Harvard Law Review 1975: 
1669-1813; Julia M. Wondolleck,  Public Lands Conflict and Resolution:  Managing National Forest 
Disputes, (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).  
 
3Stewart.  
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mission was jeopardized.4  This research examined four cases in which Forest Service 
officials used collaborative processes, drawn from a participatory democracy paradigm 
instead of the traditional pluralism paradigm, with local citizens and interest groups to 
define the public interest for specific local-level decisions.  Interviewee perceptions of 
interactions with the Forest Service and with each other verified that the process of 
democratic administration in each of these four cases moved out of the pluralist paradigm 
into processes of interaction with citizens and interest groups based on a reasonable, 
rather than a rational choice, model of human nature   The outcomes also moved out of 
the pluralist and into a participatory democracy paradigm; in all four cases, public trust in 
the Forest Service was strengthened and opposing interests supported the final decision.   
Participatory democracy as applied to defining the public interest in agency 
decision making can be summarized as interest representation in a problem solving 
process characterized by trust and openness among the participants.  One of the key 
distinctions between participatory democracy interest representation and pluralist interest 
group representation is that the former focuses on the content of the interest, while the 
latter focuses on the political strength of the interest group.  In a problem solving 
situation, political strength does not contribute to a better understanding of the problem; it 
relies on might rather than right and useful information.  In contrast, interest 
representation places emphasis on information in terms of the impacts and concerns that 
arise in a specific situation from the perspective of a particular set of values and uses.  
This information is central to engaging in effective problem solving.  However, it is not 
necessary to have large numbers of people involved to present this information as long as 
the full range of the content is presented to the group.  To the contrary, having a smaller 
number of people directly involved in the problem solving effort facilitates finding 
effective solutions.  Collaborative processes are examples of interest representation.   
How well did these four cases address criticisms that have been raised in the 
literature about collaborative processes?  Most of these criticisms are misguided insofar 
as they arise within the pluralist paradigm and have no salience within the participatory 
                                                 
 
4 USDA Forest Service, The Process Predicament: How Statutory, Regulatory, and Administrative 
Factors Affect National Forest Management  (Washington, D.C:  2002). 
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democracy paradigm.5  The most elemental criticism of collaboration from a pluralist 
perspective is disbelief in people’s ability to interact in a political setting with anything 
other than rational choice behaviors.  The preponderance of reported behaviors in all four 
of these cases did not fit the rational choice model, clearly demonstrating that people do 
have the ability to interact politically without rational choice behavior.  People were able 
to sit down with each other, discuss the issues face-to-face in a reasonable fashion, 
develop understanding and trust, and formulate solutions that all supported.  These 
behaviors confirmed that the process of determining the public interest in these cases was 
operating in a participatory democracy paradigm.  
The fact that these cases shifted from a pluralist to a participatory democracy 
paradigm calls into question the other pluralist-based criticisms of collaboration as well.  
A discussion of how pluralist concerns played out in these cases is instructive in 
understanding the differences in the paradigms.  Pluralism measures power and success 
in terms of numbers.  One criticism of collaboration is that few people participate.  The 
number of people involved in the core group in these cases was small by design; as noted 
above, interest representation does not rely on political strength as represented by 
numbers, but rather relies on representation of content.  In the Game Range and 
Lakeface-Lamb cases, Forest Service leadership reached out to the full range of interests 
and relied on effective spokesmen for the various interests for more detailed discussions 
and suggestions.  In both the Seeley Lake and Big Snowies cases, leaders of interest 
groups formed the core group for interest representation.  These leaders brought in others 
with detailed on-the-ground knowledge as more information was needed; they did not 
bring in others for the sake of exhibiting political strength.  Forest Service leadership in 
Seeley Lake specifically noted that working with smaller numbers of people in the core 
group was essential to finding a workable solution.  Working with a smaller number of 
people, in the range of five to eight, is in keeping with effective problem solving theory. 
Another concern raised from a pluralist perspective is the issue of governance; 
shouldn’t decisions affecting public land be made at the national level?  Interest 
representation’s focus on content rather than political strength obviates the need to 
                                                 
5Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962). 
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involve people in the core group to represent national interests if those interests are  
represented in the constraints that define the problem.  In these cases, the public interest 
at the regional and national level were already incorporated into the process in the form 
of national policy and regulations and the National Forest plan specific to each area.  
These cases demonstrated two stages in the process where regional and national concerns 
were dominant in the local decision-making process.  Before engaging in interest 
representation involvement, Forest Service personnel defined the decision space within 
which local concerns could hold sway by translating national and regional policy and 
regulations into “sideboards” for each case, i.e., legal parameters within which the 
decision had to fall.  Local groups only could recommend a solution that fell within these 
constraints.  The second stage in which regional and national concerns played a major 
role was during public review of the preferred alternative as part of the EIS process.  
Once the Forest Service issued the core group’s solution as the preferred alternative, 
watchdog state and federal agencies reviewed the proposed alternative to make sure that 
it fit national, regional, and state regulations.  The interests at the national and regional 
level were very much present and involved in these cases, in ways that were transparent 
to the public.  Again, the difference in paradigms here was key; it was effective inclusion 
of the information as part of the problem-solving process that determined the outcome, 
not the number of people involved.  Forest Service personnel ensured that national and 
regional interests were included in the beginning by establishing and maintaining the 
decision space.  Watchdog agencies ensured that national, regional and state interests 
were reflected in the preferred alternative and subsequent final decision through the EIS 
process.   
Plualist critics of collaboration also raise questions concerning the accountability 
of local Forest Service officials.  Pluralism relies on rules to enforce accountability, 
anticipating that local Forest Service officials will be self-serving if rules are not in place 
to constrain behavior and prevent local officials from exceeding their authority.  Given 
the expectation that external rules dictate behavior, officials are rule-bound and risk 
adverse.  Participatory democracy relies on the capability of Forest Service officials to 
understand the intent of the rules and rely on their internal sense of integrity to determine 
their actions, allowing them to be less rule-bond, less risk adverse, and more focused on 
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achieving end results.  These cases provided examples of accountability in a participatory 
democracy paradigm.  Forest Service officials did not engage in interest representation 
discussions until after they had defined the decision space of local discretion.  However, 
once the decision space had been defined, officials in the Lakeface-Lamb, Big Snowies 
and Seeley Lake cases stepped back from the content of the discussions and allowed a 
solution to emerge from the interactions of the interests involved.  However, by doing so 
these officials were not giving up their authority to make the final decision.  In all of 
these cases the Forest Service personnel retained legal authority on whether to use the 
group’s solution as the preferred alternative.  Moreover, once Forest Service officials 
selected the preferred alternative, the alternative did not automatically become the final 
solution.   In all cases, the preferred alternative subsequently went through the usual 
process of wider public review and was subject to change based on the comments and 
concerns of the public, following the same process as any other preferred alternative.     
Another accountability concern is that local Forest Service officials will act 
arbitrarily within the area of local discretion.  This raises the question of lateral 
accountability, i.e., how can local Forest Service officials be accountable to the 
communities they serve.  From a pluralist perspective, formulation of a solution by 
interest groups means that the strongest interest wins and imposes its solution on the 
weaker interests. This pluralist scenario raises concerns about accountability if this one-
sided solution is then imposed as the decision of local Forest Service officials as well.  
Participatory democracy does not produce solutions in which the strongest interest wins 
and other interests lose because the solution is not based on political strength.  
Collaborative problem-solving requires that all interests be taken into account; the force 
that ensures this happens is that the solution must be supported by all the interests.  
Collaborative processes produce win-win, effective solutions when all of the interests are 
fairly represented and the interests bring on-the-ground knowledge to the discussion.  In 
three of these cases, collaborative processes were used to research and formulate 
preferred alternatives.   
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As has been pointed out in the literature, whether they want to or not, local 
officials have to make some decision.6  An alternative question is which is less arbitrary, 
a decision made by an official with little on-the-ground knowledge of the area and the 
specific interests of the community, or a decision that reflects a high level of local 
knowledge by an official who has engaged in a collaborative process of interest 
representation?  As one District Ranger pointed out, engaging in interest representation 
discussions with the community was his form of research to identify reasonable 
alternatives within his discretionary decision space.  “The EIS regulations call for a range 
of reasonable alternatives.  Once you know the issues and have had the groups come 
together and work out their differences, you can then propose reasonable alternatives 
because you know what is reasonable in terms of the issues to all sides.  This is a way of 
talking to people and doing research on the issues.”7   By having all of the relevant 
interests represented in the discussions, he ensured that his research was responsive to all 
of the relevant concerns.  By reinforcing the decision space, including the fact that no one 
interest could dominate, he ensured that the discussions led to a preferred alternative that 
met Forest Service standards of accountability for multiple use.  His effective use of 
collaborative interest representation led to a decision that has never been appealed or 
sued, a significant indicator that citizens and interest groups felt that their concerns were 
fairly reflected and did not view his decision as arbitrary.  
In the pluralist paradigm, decisions are final when all avenues of influence 
available to a particular interest group have been exhausted.  When resources permit, 
these avenues include the courts.  The currency for the decision is based on influence,  
resources, and abstract legal principles, not on-the-ground content.  One of pluralism’s 
criticisms of collaborative processes stems from the belief that people are unable to 
resolve conflicts directly and therefore must rely on a third party.  Since the Forest 
Service is viewed has having vested interests, that third party role falls to the courts.  
These cases demonstrated that just the opposite was true; people didn’t trust the courts to 
                                                 
6Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, Second 
Edition, (New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1979); R.D. Behn,  Rethinking Democratic 
Accountability, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001). 
 
7Seeley Lake FS # 1 Transcript, 2.   
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resolve the problem.  As one interviewee phrased it, “In lawsuits, nobody wins.”8  There 
were two reasons people took this position.  One reason was based on experience with 
enough lawsuits that people recognized the outcomes were rarely as favorable to their 
interests has they had hoped.  More often, the outcome was an arbitrary decision that 
resulted in deleterious on-the-ground impacts.  The other reason interviewees gave for 
avoiding the courts was an aversion to adversarial processes.  By pitting one interest 
against another, adversarial processes destroy relationships of trust upon which a sense of 
community is built.  These interviewees, who were present in all four of the cases, 
recognized that community cohesion was more important than fighting to win.  
Moreover, because these cases were grounded in a collaborative, participatory democracy 
paradigm, the outcomes in all of the cases reduced local conflicts.  Snowmobile and cross 
country users resolved much of the long-standing conflicts in the heavily used area of the 
Little Belts in the Big Snowies case.  Seeley Lake snowmobile interests remain pleased 
with the amount of acreage reopened for their use without ill will toward the wilderness 
community.  Landowners adjacent to Forest Service lands in both the Lakeface-Lamb 
and Thompson Falls cases actively sought more fuels reduction rather than continuing to 
resist Forest Service attempts to change the landscape.   
A related concern about final outcomes is the pluralist criticism that collaborative 
processes generate compromises that are least common denominator decisions, i.e.,  
interest groups give up any opportunity of additional gain and have to settle for the bare  
minimum.  Since pluralist interactions normally extend to appeals and lawsuits if the 
solution isn’t favorable, pluralist logic encourages people to watch out for their own 
interests and keep their options open.  In theory, collaborative problem solving processes 
not only surpass least common denominator decisions derived from pluralist 
compromise, they also surpass decisions made by Forest Service officials acting on the 
basis of traditional public input and arbitrary decisions made by judges.  These four cases 
confirmed collaborative theory.  The Lakeface-Lamb project achieved a higher level of 
forest restoration than would have been the case without active implementation by the 
community non-profit contractor.  By reaching out and collaborating with interest groups 
one-on-one, the Thompson Falls Ranger District was able to design a fuel reduction 
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project that won the active support of environmental groups because it preserved 
wilderness potential while reducing fuels through helicopter logging.  In the Big Snowies 
case, the final outcome did a better job of protecting wilderness areas than the original 
Forest Service decision, while committing more acreage to snowmobiles.  The outcome 
in Seeley Lake reopened several key areas of prime snowmobile country while also 
increasing the acres of potential wilderness.   In all of these cases, on-the-ground 
knowledge and trust made it possible for interest groups to maximize their gains by 
sharing information on priorities and identifying areas of use overlap.  An atmosphere of 
trust enabled opposing sides to look out for the interests of each other, as well as their 
own.  In Seeley Lake, leadership from environmental interests solved the final problem 
blocking snowmobile use; in the Big Snowies, an interviewee from the snowmobile 
interests recognized the safety issues of cross country skiers and volunteered to help 
groom cross country trails.  By integrating their concerns, opposing groups were able to 
make greater gains than would have likely emerged from either pluralist political 
compromise or the courts.  
How can you ensure that the outcome is fair?  The pluralist paradigm relies on a 
third party referee to enforce the rules of fairness, because people cannot be trusted to act 
fairly.  From the pluralist perspective, collaboration requires a third party mediator to be 
legitimate, but then raises the concern that mediators themselves cannot be trusted, might 
be biased or insufficiently trained to play the role effectively.  Participatory democracy 
relies on the dynamics of interpersonal and group trust to ensure the fairness of the 
outcome.  The effectiveness of group trust and interpersonal dynamics were confirmed in 
these cases.  None of the decisions analyzed in these cases used a trained mediator in 
formulating the solutions, but relied instead upon the integrity and trust established by the 
leaders in each case.  As one environmental interest group interviewee phrased it, “There 
was trust between the two (opposing interest group leaders); they know how to negotiate 
with each other.  If one party walks away feeling snookered, they won’t do it again.  If 
one party lies, the others won’t come back.  These was a strong sense of integrity 
between the two.”9  It is interesting to note that, in the follow-up to the Big Snowies case, 
the Forest Service brought in a mediator to assist in discussions with the summer use 
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groups.  Although the mediator was experienced and well-received by the groups 
involved, no agreement was reached except to disband the discussions because of the lack 
of agreement.  Subsequent efforts to work with a smaller representative group of summer 
interests failed, in part because the motorized interests did not abide by the rules.  With 
one of the key interest groups not operating in good faith, it was unlikely that a mediator 
would make a difference.  One interviewee suggested that a mediator might have 
improved the outcome of the winter use negotiations, not by helping the core negotiators 
with each other, but by influencing the leadership of each interest to take time and do a 
better job of consulting with their respective local chapters before group decisions were 
made.  This suggestion reflected a problem of leadership within the interest group, not 
between interests groups where mediators typically function. 
The last criticism of collaborative processes that stems from a pluralist paradigm 
is skepticism that people from opposing sides actually develop understanding and respect 
for each other through the collaborative process that in turn leads to increased capacity to 
work together in the future.  Pluralists expect people to maximize individual gain through 
unprincipled actions if need be.  Behaviors that build trust and community are anathema.  
Participatory democracy expects people to take community into account in making their 
decisions because community is built on relationships of trust between disparate 
members.  These four cases confirmed the participatory democracy paradigm.  Instances 
of interviewees reporting new respect and understanding of individuals from opposing 
interests were numerous, and occurred in all four of the cases.  All of the interviewees in 
the Seeley Lake case reported some form of increased respect and understanding of 
people with interests different from their own.  In the Thompson Falls case, this dynamic 
occurred between leaders of the environmental groups and the Forest Service through 
which staff from both gained respect and appreciation of each other.  In Lakeface-Lamb, 
main street businessmen from the Chamber of Commerce became good friends with the 
local environmental leader while Forest Service staff gained respect and admiration for 
community leaders, and community leaders developed appreciation for the constraints 
within which Forest Service people worked.  Negotiations in the Big Snowies case led 
one environmentalist to open admiration for the chief spokesman of the snowmobile 
interests.   In two cases, increased respect and trust increased community capacity to 
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work together in the future.   Success in Seeley Lake led wilderness interests to work 
with community groups, forging new agreements with the local lumber mill to support 
sustainable harvests to retain timber jobs while preserving wilderness and meeting needs 
for motorized and non-motorized recreation.  Now that the community leaders in 
Lakeface-Lamb are nearing completion of their first stewardship contract, they are 
seeking new contract opportunities with the Forest Service as well as expanding their 
outreach into the community.   
There are several concerns about collaborative processes that are not reflective of 
a pluralist paradigm but are more universal. The first of these concerns is that 
collaborative processes take too long and consume too many resources for an outcome 
that may not be worth it.  The preponderance of Forest Service interviewees were pleased 
and enthusiastic about working more closely with citizens and interest groups.  There is 
no doubt that most felt the processes used in these cases were superior to traditional 
public involvement.   Enthusiasm for having interest groups talk directly with each other 
to reconcile their differences and come up with a solution was widespread among Forest 
Service officials and interest group interviewees alike: 
 
Having everybody at the same table was way better than going out and fighting 
through judges and lawyers.  Using the lawyers and judges is still not local.  
Having everybody sitting together, having everybody give up and gain, it was 
spectacular at the time, the best way to do it.10 
 
From the Forest Service standpoint, narrowing the areas of dispute is very 
valuable.  If we can get to 80% to 90% of the solution, that is great.  We can go 
forward with this.  Getting people to talk directly to each other offers lots of 
benefits, even if they don’t resolve anything.11 
 
However, there was also no question but that these processes consumed more staff time 
and resources than most other projects with which they worked.  One Forest Service 
planner described this dilemma well:  
 
                                                 
10Big Snowies NFS # 3 Transcript, 3. 
 
11Bid Snowies FS # 1 Transcript, 5. 
 147
This was the Lewis and Clark National Forest’s first attempt at working with 
people this way.  This is the way to go.  Otherwise, you just spin your wheels and 
get nowhere.  It takes a huge amount of time, more than we are willing to give.  
One year, two years, it doesn’t happen that quickly.  The danger is in dragging it 
out too long.  We need to stay at it year after year after year and make it 
better…This is worth the effort and time to build these relationships.12 
 
Building relationships of trust offered advantages for the Forest Service in these 
cases.  While interest group engagement in a participatory democracy paradigm took 
more staff resources than would have been spent under traditional public involvement, in 
all cases the effort obtained strong support from the local community and from 
participating environmental organizations.  When two cases were appealed by outside 
environmental organizations, that strong support was instrumental in both the denial of 
those appeals and in dissuading litigation.  In the case that was litigated, strong support 
from both environmental and snowmobile organizations allowed the Forest Service to 
implement the agreements anyway.  Three cases demonstrated that the relationships of 
trust built with local community leaders served the Ranger Districts well.  The Thompson 
Falls Ranger District raised very little community concern when a fuel treatment burn 
accidentally burned too hot.  Both Thompson Falls and Priest Lake Ranger District 
interviewees reported multiple requests from landowners beyond project boundaries for 
fuel treatment in their areas.  In the Seeley Lake case, there were no appeals or litigation,   
and the individuals involved went on to form additional agreements much larger in scope 
integrating local sustainable timber harvest with expanded wilderness.  These cases 
support the conclusion that time and resources were well spent both in the immediate 
outcome and in building capacity for future agreements and support. 
The second more universal concern about collaborative processes is whether they 
produce better outcomes on the ground for the resource base.  This is a value-laden 
question; what is a better outcome for the resource base?  Rather than impose the values 
of the researcher, this question was addressed by taking interviewees responses at face 
value.  With the exception of a few Forest Service staff, interviewees in all cases reported 
that the final outcome was better than the Forest Service alternative.  Circumstances in 
both of the winter recreation cases offered the opportunity to compare potential Forest 
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Service decisions with and without collaborative group involvement.  In both cases, the 
citizen group solution provided a better answer for the resource as well as the interest 
groups.  In the case of Seeley Lake, snowmobilers regained 80-85 percent of the areas 
they had been actively using prior to closure, including those with most heavy use, while 
the net amount of potential wilderness was increased.13  In the Big Snowies case, the 
agreement protected large blocks of potential wilderness from snowmobiles while the 
total number of acres available for snowmobile use increased over the Forest Service’s 
proposed plan.  The Game Range project included design elements including helicopter 
logging that preserved roadless areas for future consideration as wilderness while 
accomplishing the thinning needed to restore wildlife habitat and reduce fuel loading.  
Without the strong concerns of environmental groups for wilderness and habitat 
protection, the Game Range project would have looked more like a traditional timber 
sale.  In the Lakeface-Lamb case, the quality of on-the-ground treatment was higher 
because of the strong local buy-in to the project and because the prime contractor was a 
local non-profit committed to a high quality outcome at every step of the implementation.   
All of these cases achieved better on-the-ground results because of collaboration, in part 
because of involving a broader range of interests more deeply in decision design, and in 
part because these interests were represented by people with on-the-ground knowledge 
that was more comprehensive than that of Forest Service personnel.  Interviewees 
reported several instances in which the Forest Service lost credibility when it used faulty 
data about the landscape.  At the same time, interviewees noted that staffing cutbacks 
significantly reduced the time Forest Service officials had to be on the ground.  Local 
knowledge provided useful information in fine-tuning these projects to fit the actual 
landscape.  As one rancher put it, “The difference between abstract theory and on the 
ground knowledge is the key to successful solutions.  The decisions need to be based on 
what is actually there, not on abstract understanding.”14   
To what extent did these cases confirm participatory democracy as envisioned by 
Poisner’s civic republicanism?  Civic republicanism defines the common good as being 
community based, “forged through the act of participation” as “citizens create the 
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common good through discourse.”15  This research used the term “public interest” to 
capture the same concept as Poisner’s common good.  The act of participating in 
discourse to define the public interest generates a sense of civic virtue, the positive 
expression of moral freedom, and leads citizens to go beyond tolerance to a genuine 
respect for each other.  Poisner identifies seven criteria that must be met to have true 
discourse, including dialogue, use of the community as a reference for the common good, 
critical reflection on values underlying the issues, focus on teaching civic virtue as part of 
the process, face-to-face communication, involvement of citizens rather than hired 
lobbyists, and representation of all significant interests in the community.  Two of the 
cases fell short of reaching this definition of participatory democracy.  The Game Range 
case used informed consent as the process to determine the public interest.  Informed 
consent did not include dialogue among interests; citizens did not create the common 
good through face-to-face communication with each other.  As a result, the other 
characteristics of true discourse were not present.  The focus for informed consent was 
public education about a specific fuels reduction proposal designed to obtain public 
support and information the Forest Service then used to fine tune the proposal to meet 
citizen concerns.  There was no focus on the larger sense of the public interest or 
development of civic virtue.  In the Game Range case, informed consent, while based on 
a reasonable model of human nature, followed the traditional pattern of synoptic expert 
public involvement outlined in Chapter One.  By using informed consent, the Forest 
Service enhanced its own credibility in the community, but did nothing to further the 
understanding and skills necessary for participatory democracy.  As a small, rural 
community, Thompson Falls had a sense of community that could have provided a 
context for participatory democracy, but the Forest Service did not engage the 
community at that level.  Informed consent focused on the task at hand and did not 
consider the larger implications that the process of finding the public interest could have 
had in promoting the ability of the community to work together on tough issues.  
The Big Snowies case lacked the dimension of community altogether.  The 
individuals involved in the Big Snowies case came from disparate locations, some urban, 
some rural, many miles from the mountain ranges that were the focus of the discussions.  
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The impetus for the negotiations was driven by a shared sense of mistrust in the ability of 
the Forest Service to formulate an acceptable solution rather than a positive shared vision 
of community among the various users of the Forest Service lands.  Interviewees 
described the discussions in the Big Snowies case as strategic negotiations, focused on 
how the interest groups could gain the most of what each wanted while recognizing that 
compromise was necessary.  As an example of stakeholder negotiations, the Big Snowies 
case provided an illustration of collaboration without community or shared vision.  While 
the individuals involved gained some understanding and respect for opposing views, 
there was no community context for that understanding and respect.  As with the Game 
Range case, the focus was on the task at hand.  It is interesting to note that this was the 
only case in which several interviewees made a point of reporting that they continued to 
distrust an opposing participant. 
In contrast, both the Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake cases evidenced all of the 
attributes of true discourse and civic republican participatory democracy.  Both were 
strongly rooted in a shared commitment to the community.  In both cases, a core group of 
citizen leaders actively formulated the proposed alternative that formed the basis for the 
final decision.  These community leaders modeled civic virtue through the process of 
discussions and reported gaining appreciation, respect, and friendship with leaders of 
opposing views through the process.   Other interviewees in each case reported learning 
aspects of civic virtue from these leaders.  In both cases, the communities emerged from 
the process with a strengthened capacity to integrate the range of interests in addressing 
new issues in the future.  The immediate need to resolve a problem or issue involving 
Forest Service lands provided a vehicle for the community to learn how to work together. 
The Seeley Lake community in particular has moved on to agreement on other issues, as 
noted above.  The Seeley Lake and Lakeface-Lamb cases were examples of civic 
republican participatory democracy come to life.   
Civic republicanism calls for government to play an active role in helping to 
instill civic virtue.  In the Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake cases, Forest Service leaders 
played key roles by modeling civic virtue while also accomplishing the immediate goals 
of the Forest Service.  However, the Forest Service leaders spent a great deal of time in 
doing so.  What is the proper role of government agencies in encouraging participatory 
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democracy?  Why should the Forest Service go beyond informed consent when, as in the 
Game Range case, informed consent served quite well to enhance the agency’s credibility 
and got the job done?  If one is working from the pluralist paradigm, there is no reason 
for government agencies to involve the public in defining the public interest beyond the 
traditional practice.  In fact, if one is working from a pluralist paradigm, attempting to 
engage the public more fully will likely make things worse.  Pluralism lacks the 
underlying belief in the human capacity to be reasonable and therefore cannot effectively 
model civic virtue.   However, if one is working from a participatory democracy 
paradigm, civic virtue is essential to creating leaders among the citizenry who can 
participate responsibly in defining the public interest.  One Forest Service interviewee 
from the Big Snowies case noted:   
 
Leadership has to help take the higher ground.  When we have community 
organizations run by doctors, mechanics, accountants, and just common people 
with a passion for the cause of their group, they are not trained in the negotiation, 
communications, partnership building and the leadership this task (of working out 
solutions) may require.  When the Forest Service brings them together, they may 
not be well prepared, or at a disadvantage in being able to work within their group 
and with the others…On the other hand, who better than those who have a vested 
interest to be at the table?16 
 
Another Forest Service interviewee from the Game Range case noted that the Forest 
Service cannot carry the ball alone to make collaborative processes work.17  In contrast, 
in both the Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake cases, the Forest Service officials had strong 
partners among the non-Forest Service community leaders who provided part of the 
leadership that made participatory democracy work.  The Forest Service has an interest in 
helping develop community leadership to the extent it can.  Opening up the process for 
defining the public interest through a collaborative interest representation process offers 
citizens an opportunity to engage responsibly in participatory democracy on issues that 
are real.  As one non-Forest Service interviewee put it, “The problem today is that people 
aren’t paying attention to community, only to their own thing.  We need ways to bring the 
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community together again.  You have to have the support of both sides or you have 
nothing.  Both have to want to do it for the right cause, the community, if it’s going to 
work.”18 
Some participatory democracy theorists argue that participation should be 
widespread to give as many people as possible the opportunity to engage with others of 
opposing interests and gain the skills and appreciation for community needed to make 
democracy work.  However, these cases did not involve large number of people.  Do 
collaborative groups discourage people from participating?  Does the commitment of 
time necessary to make collaboration work discourge participation and narrow the 
interests that can participate?  These cases offer some practical insight into how 
participation in local decision making actually works and achieves the goal of teach civic 
virtue.  In these cases, the number of people actively involved in determining the public 
interest was small by design.  Initial leaders chose to work with smaller numbers of 
people because problem solving discussions worked better that way.  In all but the Game 
Range case, these smaller groups were also designed to include interest representation for 
all of the interests while the culture of group interaction ensured that all interests were 
taken into account in formulating the solution. In the Seeley Lake, Lakeface-Lamb, and 
Big Snowies cases, leaders brought additional people into the discussions as local on-the-
ground knowledge was needed to refine the solutions.  As the leaders modeled how to 
listen to and respect opposing views, those new to the process reported gains in 
understanding and respect for opposing views as well.  These cases succeeded in 
imparting skills to a wider range of participants, many of whom subsequently reported 
that they viewed the process as a better way to solve problems than political fighting, and 
that they were eager to use it again.  Interviewee responses from both leaders of 
collaborative efforts and those new to the process confirmed that being involved in a 
successful collaborative process provided them with a positive example that allowed 
them not only to envision collaboration working in other situations, but also gave them 
confidence that they could help make it work again.  In fact, enthusiasm for more 
collaborative processes was contagious; once interviewees had a positive experience, 
they reported being eager to try it again.  Time commitment proved to be a constraint 
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only in the Game Range case which had no direct involvement of citizens in formulating 
decisions; interviewees involved in the Monitoring Committee for Thompson Falls 
expressed concerns about limited volunteer time.  Interviewees in the other three cases 
found the experience to be energizing and rewarding, even making the commitment of 
time a pleasure.19  These cases suggest that participatory democracy achieves its goal of 
helping individuals develop aspects of civic virtue when the processes in which citizens 
are involved actually engage them in formulating decisions, are successful in reaching 
effective solutions, and have effective leadership that model civic character.  Given the 
prevalence of pluralistic expectations in the political culture, the role of leadership in 
shifting the process of defining the public interest to a successful experience of 
participatory democracy is essential.    
This research also found a factor directly related to underlying paradigms that 
discouraged citizen participation in agency decision making.  Some interviewees 
indicated they would not participate in appeals or lawsuits because of the impact that 
adversarial processes have on the community.20  Adversarial processes set people against 
each other, encourage the exaggeration of claims, and foster an attitude of unconcern for 
the impacts of what one wants on others.  These expectations for behavior are integral to 
the pluralist paradigm, and characterize more traditional forms of public participation 
such as public hearings.  Many of the interviewees had never participated in public 
involvement with the Forest Service before.  This suggests that low levels of citizen 
participation in traditional Forest Service public involvement may be explained in part by 
the disinclination of people to participate in processes that are largely adversarial in 
nature. 
The overwhelming evidence in these cases confirmed that pluralism was replaced 
by a participatory democracy paradigm for those involved in the core group defining the 
public interest.  All cases confirmed participatory democracy theory to the extent that 
people developed understanding and trust; at a minimum, non-Forest Service 
interviewees gained understanding of the Forest Service and trust in Forest Service 
personnel as a result of the process of defining the public interest.  From a public 
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administration perspective, these cases confirmed that use of a participatory democracy 
paradigm not only offered an alternative to pluralism, but also garnered active allies and 
support for the resulting agency decisions.  Moreover, the resulting decisions were 
superior to decisions made by the agency through pluralist public involvement; the 
collaborative approach allowed citizens’ on-the-ground knowledge to improve the fit of 
the Forest Service decision with the both the physical and social landscape.  As a vehicle 
for determining the public interest in agency decision making, the participatory paradigm 
proved to be effective in addressing the Forest Service’s process predicament by building 
trust and minimizing appeals and lawsuits.  
Two remaining concerns about collaborative processes specifically and 
participatory democracy in general merit further discussion. One of the concerns that has 
been raised about the Forest Service working with local collaborative efforts is the lack of 
longevity.  Very few of the local organizations that have been written up as stellar 
examples of community collaboration affecting Forest Service management have lasted 
more than five years.  Another criticism of local collaboration is that it doesn’t work at 
higher levels of regional and national policy.  Both of these criticisms mistake the form 
for the content.  These concerns make sense from a pluralist perspective in which people 
are viewed as incapable of learning and changing; from this perspective the impact of a 
successful local collaboration is limited to the collaboration’s content and lifespan.  
However, from a democratic participation paradigm, the question is not how long a 
particular effort lasts, but rather how well did a particular effort contribute to changing 
the political culture from pluralism to participatory democracy?  Problems will continue 
to arise and decisions will need to be made, but the key question is how.  As has been 
shown in these cases, local Forest Service decisions at the Ranger District level offer 
individuals the opportunity to practice and perfect civic virtue.  Just as pluralism became 
the norm in terms of expectations of how to engage with people in determining the public 
interest, so too participatory democracy can become the norm that sets those expectations 
for behavior.  Civic virtue can be contagious.  As participatory democracy becomes the 
norm, longevity of specific efforts will no longer matter.  As people change their 
expectations for leadership, regional and national policy making will also reflect more 
civic virtue.  These cases have confirmed the theory that political behavior is closely 
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linked to our expectations for human behavior.  It is up to those who engage in public 
administration and political theory to take responsibility for the impact of those 
expectations. 
 
Leadership and the Role of the United States Forest Service 
 
Organizational theory predicts that the values and vision of human nature of a 
group’s leaders have a determining effect upon the character of group culture.21    In these 
four cases, the culture surrounding public interactions with Forest Service personnel 
shifted from pluralist at the beginning to collaborative for most of the groups’ 
interactions.  This research also examined organizational theory concerning how group 
cultures are formed.  According to theory, leaders model the tone and behaviors expected 
for the group, and members of the group recognize and respond to this modeling and 
behavior.  Conviction on the part of a group’s leader that the group will be successful is 
also a critical component for success.  These aspects of group cultural theory also were 
confirmed in all four of the cases.  When asked what qualities leaders possessed that 
helped the group to reach agreement, the vast majority of interviewees reported integrity 
and trustworthiness as qualities embodied in the individuals who provided the leadership.  
Interviewees also reported that group leaders expressed strong convictions that the 
discussions would be successful in defining a solution that would be better than one 
defined by the Forest Service alone, and would result in agreement and support from the 
interest groups involved.  As one of the community leaders put it, “People show up 
angry, but you need to have that much passion to hang in there for the whole thing.”22  
The challenge for leadership is to channel that passion from adversarial confrontation into 
constructive problem solving.   
If the Forest Service is going to pursue any of the alternatives for defining the 
public interest outlined in this research, it will have to pay attention to it’s role in 
                                                 
21Seeley Lake NFS # 1 Transcript, 6. 
 
21Edgar H. Schein,  Organizational Culture and Leadership,  (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
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providing leadership.  Each time the Forest Service initiates a process to define the public 
interest, it is creating a culture of expected roles and behaviors within which public and 
agency people interact.  The traditional process used by the Forest Service in defining the 
public interest reinforces a pluralist culture; people direct their comments and concerns 
directly to the Forest Service through public meetings, hearings, and written comments, 
without the concern or need to be aware of each other.  The Forest Service, in turn, 
responds with oral and written comments to each of the concerns.  There is no 
opportunity for either side to gain more than a superficial understanding of the other.  
Disagreements easily become adversarial, particularly if they move into the appeal and 
litigation stages of the process.   
 In all four of these cases, the Forest Service initiated processes to define the 
public interest that didn’t fit the traditional pattern.  As was evident from interviewee 
responses, the cultures of these processes were predominantly collaborative, although for 
many they started as pluralist.  According to Schein and numerous business researchers, 
the leadership of these groups is responsible for achieving the transition from pluralist to 
collaborative culture.23  Moreover, it isn’t so much what leaders do as who they are that 
makes the difference.  Effective leaders don’t just talk about what they would like to see 
in terms of culture and behavior, they model it.  Effective leaders of collaborative 
organizations believe in people’s ability to be reasonable.  As part of this research, 
interviewees were asked a series of questions about who provided the leadership in these 
cases, what characteristics were especially important in providing that leadership, and 
what expectations leaders had for the group.  The reported answers confirmed the nature 
and importance of leadership as outlined by Schein and others; leaders were perceived as 
having the characteristics of integrity, trust, and belief in the group’s ability to be 
successful in reaching agreement.     
 For Seeley Lake and Lakeface-Lamb, the two cases that met the definition of 
participatory democracy, leadership came from both the Forest Service and the 
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community.  In both cases, these individuals became a team that spanned the barrier 
between Forest Service and non-Forest Service.  Characteristics that interviewees noted 
about these leaders included trust, integrity, optimism, enthusiasm, positive “can do” 
attitude, straight-shooters, a commitment to the community (this was especially noted for 
Forest Service people in terms of active involvement in community groups), people-
oriented, and good listeners.  The theme of integrity came through over and over in all of 
the cases, and was best captured by one of the environmental leaders: 
 
I think you feel an allegiance to people who act with integrity, not because of their 
interests which are different from yours, but because of their integrity.  When you 
can talk with people like this, you do start to see things in a different light.  We 
can grow these relationships.  Even when you can’t agree, you can build these 
relationships.  You can sit down and talk.  Minimize the misunderstandings, see 
where all stand.24 
 
Interviewees also noted that leaders evidenced great confidence from the beginning that 
the projects would be successful.  Examples from the Forest Service: 
 
This can be done, if we just hang in there.  We need to get the different interests 
to trust each other.  We can’t define it as we/they, but recognize that we all have 
interests, but we are all people, we just have different values.25 
 
We approached every problem as an opportunity, with a very strong positive 
attitude that we could figure out a solution.26 
 
 
Part of what helped make these cases successful was that the core leadership 
knew other leaders in the community well.  They knew there were representatives of 
different interests that were respected and reasonable.  There were characteristics that 
core leaders appreciated in identifying others to serve as representatives of other interests 
in the effort.   
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26Lakeface-Lamb FS # 3 Tranascript, 2. 
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Initially, I expected people to be advocates for their positions, but I also expected 
them to be open minded, reasonable, have influence and credibility with the group 
they are representing, and be people I have credibility and faith in.  How to work 
together?  Don’t call people names, don’t denigrate people.  You don’t have to 
agree, just don’t be disagreeable.27 
 
We had dissenting votes from time to time, but we always talked things through, 
didn’t have big egos, no threats of “I’m out of here,” just lively discussions, based 
on the diversity of values in the group.28 
 
Everybody has to be honest, has to say what is true, not what you think you 
should say to get your way, and not based on theory.29 
 
There are three critical components to have this work:  accommodation, trust and 
respect.30 
 
 Leadership for the Big Snowies case came from the spokesman of the Montana 
Snowmobile Association and the Montana Wilderness Association.  In addition to the 
relationship of trust that existed between the two of them, their previous experience in 
negotiating the same issues on the Flathead National Forest was reported as a major 
factor in achieving agreement.  The core leadership of every case had some form of 
previous positive experience in getting people to sit down and work out solutions 
together.  Having been involved in a successful effort contributed to people’s willingness 
to try it again.  Enthusiasm for collaborative processes was contagious.   
 
 Wow!  This is great!  This can work, seeing enthusiasm grow, seeing 
possibilities.  This was a big change for me.  Having had one that works makes it 
easier to think about others.   It was a pleasurable experience.  I am very 
committed to it, others are too.  I would be pleased to do this again.31 
 
                                                 
27Seeley Lake FS # 1 Transcript, page 3-4.   
 
28Lakeface-Lamb NSF #3 Transcript, page 2. 
 
29Seeley Lake NFS # 2 Transcript, page 2.   
 
30Seeley Lake NFS # 2 Transcript, page 3.  
 
31Big Snowies FS # 3 Transcript, 4. 
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 Actions that leaders took to help groups be successful differed between 
community leaders and Forest Service leaders.   Interest group leaders focused on 
content, helped their constituents identify what was most important, and throughout the 
process took proposals back to their constituents for review and approval.  Several noted 
that simply communicating proposals back and forth was not enough.  Leadership also 
played a role in encouraging their constituents to see the larger picture, that they couldn’t 
have everything they wanted. 
 
We had resistance to having to say this area and not that area, but that isn’t 
realistic.  So, we needed to establish our bottom line.  It was hard to define, 
because we had to establish priorities.32 
 
Leadership is about moving people, challenging them to a higher level.  You can’t 
just say “They (your constituents) didn’t like it.” There is nothing wrong with 
talking to your base, then challenging them to a higher level of citizenship.  Our 
leaders can do that.  We should expect this of them.33 
 
In the Lakeface-Lamb and Seeley Lake cases, interviewees had a positive vision of the 
community as the larger picture towards which all were working.  In the Big Snowies, the 
larger picture was less positive as the need to give up ground stemmed more from a 
desire to come up with an agreement and not leave it to the Forest Service rather than a 
positive community vision.     
Where the Forest Service helped provide leadership, the Forest Service leaders 
helped to set the tone for the discussions and defined the parameters within which the 
decision had to fit:  
 
I knew Tim as a person of integrity, a person who can see the big picture for the 
community.  Tim is community minded, and he set the tone for the whole thing, a 
tone of respect for each other and for the community.34   
 
                                                 
32Big Snowies NFS  # 2 Transcript,  6. 
 
33Seeley Lake NFS # 4 Transcript, 7.   
 
34Seeley Lake NFS # 2 Transcript, 3.  
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The District Ranger set the tone by being himself, as a trusted presence in the 
community.  He just set out his constraints and defined where the decision space 
was.35 
 
Leadership is what’s needed.  The politics of polarity don’t help.  Instead, 
responsible efforts to arrive at multiple uses on the landscape make sense.   On the 
ground solutions – map out where the most desirable lands are, with the 
sideboards of the Forest Service setting up the regulations.  The Forest Service 
has to be able to say no to the idea that a group can have everything.  The Forest 
Service has to define the decision space.36    
 
Once the decision space was defined, Forest Service leaders reported they were neutral in 
terms of content.  Without any preconceived beliefs about what the decision should be, 
they were able to act with integrity in terms of the process.   
Interviewees noted several attributes particular to Forest Service officials that 
contributed to their ability to be effective leaders.  The most frequently mentioned 
attribute was having a personal relationship of trust with the local community.   Trust 
came from two factors, how long the person had lived in the community and whether the 
person had become involved in community organizations.   Situations of frequent 
turnover of key officials, losing key officials mid-project, or working with officials who 
were unknown outside of Forest Service functions, were noted as barriers.  Another 
barrier concerned use of the term collaboration.  Many of the non Forest Service 
interviewees defined collaboration to include being an active part of figuring out the 
solution.  A number of Forest Service interviewees gave definitions of collaboration that 
essentially outlined the NEPA process of public involvement, business as usual without 
any dimension of active involvement by the public.  Some interviewees had noticed this 
difference in definition and viewed Forest Service use of the term collaboration with 
suspicion.  
It should be noted that the exercise of leadership by Forest Service personnel in 
these cases was constrained by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and 
subsequent lawsuits filed under the act.  Congress passed FACA to address concerns that 
federal agencies were not being accountable in their use of advisory committees; 
                                                 
35Seeley Lake NFS # 4 Transcript, 4. 
 
36Big Snowies NFS # 5 Transcript, 4.   
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implementing regulations set out procedures and criteria that agencies had to meet before 
creating an advisory committee.   In February of 2007, the Forest Service sent out a 
clarification of how the Forest Service interprets FACA as applied to meetings that are 
managed or controlled by the Forest Service in which the Forest Service is soliciting 
consensus, agreement, or a common point of view.37  Such meetings would either require 
establishment of a formal advisory committee or would be in violation of FACA.  
However, if such meetings are not managed or controlled by the Forest Service, then 
FACA does not apply.  On the one hand, FACA limits the range in which Forest Service 
officials can manage and control efforts of citizens to formulate solutions.  On the other 
hand, as noted in the literature on leadership, managing and controlling citizen efforts is 
counter to the collaborative process which is emergent in nature.  Moreover, the biggest 
impact a leader has on a group comes from the character of the leader, not from the 
leader’s actions.  Forest Service officials are free to share information and make note of 
interest groups’ positions and views.  They are also free to participate in meetings that are 
controlled and managed by non-Forest Service people, including contractors hired by the 
Forest Service to obtain consensus from groups.  Within these parameters, Forest Service 
officials are free to provide leadership.  Whether that leadership reinforces a pluralist or a 
participatory paradigm is a choice that fundamentally affects the future of the Forest 
Service. 
 
Recommendations for the United States Forest Service 
 
There are two fundamental questions that emerge from this research concerning 
leadership and the Forest Service.  The first is whether the Forest Service is committed to 
building public trust in the agency.  Acting within a pluralist paradigm undermines public 
trust.  Acting within a participatory democracy paradigm builds trust.  The Forest Service 
has expressed a commitment to building public trust.38  This research has demonstrated 
that shifting to a participatory democracy paradigm achieves the goal of building public 
trust in the agency.  However, success in making this shift depends upon leadership in the 
                                                 
37USDA Forest Service Collaborative Planning Activities:  Compliance with Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA),  February 2, 2007 (received via email from Frank Yurczyk, Feb. 12, 2007)  
38USDA, Process Predicament.   
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Forest Service moving away from the pluralist paradigm and embodying the values of 
respect for others, integrity, and belief in the reasonable model of human nature.  As 
management experts in the business world have noted, this is not an easy shift to make in 
a large organization.   
The second fundamental question is whether it in the interests of the Forest 
Service to move beyond informed consent and embrace the civic republican charge that 
government take an active role in promoting civic virtue.   On the one hand, it takes time 
to build civic virtue.  On the other hand, once a community has a strong presence of civic 
virtue, the community can more easily partner with the Forest Service to tackle tough 
issues and come up with effective solutions that garner diverse and widespread support.  
Appreciation for what can be accomplished where civic virtue is strong can be drawn 
from the Seeley Lake case, in which the community had a strong core of community-
oriented leadership already in place.  The core group formulated the foundation for the 
Seeley Lake agreement within a few months.  The agreement was never appealed or 
litigated.   Those who worked on the agreement went on to work with the District Ranger 
to develop more agreements on thorny issues for the Forest Service,  initially for other 
winter use areas, then for a more comprehensive agreement on sustainable timber harvest 
with wilderness protections.  This more comprehensive agreement has the potential to 
resolve most of the significant conflicts in the Ranger District for a long time to come.  
The Seeley Lake District Ranger has invested a good deal of time in building 
relationships of integrity and trust with local interest groups and community leaders; that 
investment will pay off even more if this comprehensive agreement is adopted.  The 
proposed agreement would provide an integrated, sustainable management plan for both 
public and private lands within the Ranger District that has the support of the full range 
of affected interests, including those involved with the Blackfoot Challenge.39  If the 
Forest Service is in a community for the long haul, then Seeley Lake provides a model 
for how time invested by a Forest Service leader of high integrity in building 
relationships with community interests offers the potential for a good return on that 
investment as measured by strong community support and the ability to tackle local 
                                                 
39 The Blackfoot Challenge is a coalition of private landowners and government agencies that have 
been working together for over twenty years to preserve the quality of the Blackfoot watershed.  
 163
problems and formulate solutions that are in the best interests of both the community and 
the Forest Service.  
There are other reasons why investment in building trust and community capacity 
to work together and with the Forest Service offers advantages for the future.  As the 
Forest Service is asked to do more with less resources, partnerships with local interest 
groups may be the only way to supplement public resources.  Again, the Seeley Lake 
case is illuminating in this regard.  Faced with limited staff resources and a large area, the 
Seeley Lake enforcement officer recognized that he could not, singlehandedly, enforce 
snowmobile restrictions.  The solution was to work in partnership with local snowmobile 
clubs to groom trails, patrol and police the area, provide signage and public information 
concerning trails, safety, and restricted areas.  However, for this partnership to work, the 
snowmobile clubs had to understand and support the new use restrictions.  Being a part of 
the deliberations helped members of the local snowmobile club recognize that some 
limitations were better than no use at all.  The fairness and integrity of the process won 
their support for the outcome and their willingness to help implement it.  Another 
advantage of working with local citizens and locally-based interest groups is on-the-
ground knowledge.  As resources become more scarce, Forest Service personnel are 
finding it harder and harder to get out into the field to see the landscape firsthand.  The 
less on-the-ground knowledge Forest Service personnel have, the more likely that 
decisions will create unintended consequences.  Local citizens and locally-based interest 
groups offer a wealth of on-the-ground knowledge.  This knowledge is critical to making 
effective land management decisions.  The ability to make effective decisions fine-tuned 
to a specific local area is also critical as land management becomes more complex and 
“wicked,” and decentralization becomes essential.    
Skeptics of collaboration and participatory democracy are quick to attribute 
successes like that in the Seeley Lake Ranger District to the “personality” of the District 
Ranger, thereby dismissing the likelihood of replicating this success with any degree of 
predictability.  It is in the interest of countering this attitude, which inspired this research 
in the first place, that the researcher offers the suggestions outlined below. Successes like 
those in the Seeley Lake Ranger District are not easy to achieve, but neither are they 
unique to the individual involved.  There are core practices that come a long way toward 
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guaranteeing positive results from collaborative efforts.  Indeed, Crislip’s handbook on 
collaboration makes the claim that if you can create the conditions for successful 
collaboration, a successful solution will emerge.  The key ingredient is integrity, a pattern 
of behavior that comes from within, keeps commitments, respects every one, and doesn’t 
take advantage of any one.  People who have integrity inspire trust.  Integrity is not a 
matter of personality so much as it is a mark of character.   
The following recommendations come from the insights and advice gained 
through the interviews for this research, and offer a range of suggestions to create the 
conditions for successful interest representation problem solving as a means of 
determining the public interest.  The first set of recommendations is institutional, 
designed to help the Forest Service identify and develop more leaders with the character 
and skills necessary to support effective interest representation problem solving.   The 
second set is geared toward the individual Forest Service leader working at the local 
level.    
 
Institutional Recommendations: 
  
1.  Develop a system to identify and reward Forest Service employees who are 
effective in building trust with local communities through interest representation problem 
solving.   Develop a list of successful Forest Service District Rangers, biologists, etc. and 
bring them together to identify the core set of practices and beliefs they share.   Develop a 
pay scale for District Rangers and others that rewards the value of what they do so they 
don’t have to be transferred to climb the pay scale.  Have them remain in communities 
for a longer time (six to ten years) so they can work with communities in crafting 
effective solutions. 
2.  Develop a system in which these individuals serve as mentors to new District 
Rangers, biologists, and other key staff, initially by having the new staff work on location 
with the mentor, then by having the mentor available for assistance as the new staff 
engage in interest representation problem solving on their own.  An attitude of 
enthusiasm and belief that people can make it work is an essential; as these cases have 
shown, being part of a successful effort is crucial in helping prospective leaders develop 
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enthusiasm and belief in the process.  Have meetings that bring mentors together with 
other mentors and their students periodically where they can share their stories and learn 
from each other. 
3.  Maintain the legal framework for appeals and litigation.  The potential to 
challenge a project or decision is essential because it allows various interests to 
participate in the problem solving process as peers.   All interests have the capacity to 
challenge, delay, and even prevent a decision from proceeding; this reinforces the need to 
be sure that the concerns of all are taken into account and that the agreement includes all 
of the interests.  
4.  Develop a system of incentives to encourage various interests to participate 
with good faith in interest representation problem solving.  The dynamics of problem 
solving depend upon voluntary participation if solutions are to be lasting.  Look for little 
opportunities to reinforce an expectation of good-faith participation.  For example, 
snowmobile groups in Montana have a special tax on snowmobile gas that provides funds 
for local clubs to use in grooming trails, maintaining signage, etc.  While distribution of 
the tax is handled by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, local clubs 
work extensively on Forest Service lands.  Work with state agencies where possible to 
incorporate incentives for responsible participation into local use agreements.   
5.  Work with university and college forestry and wildlife programs  that teach 
prospective Forest Service employees to develop and include interest representation 
problem solving training in their curriculum.  Ensure that this training includes 
participatory democracy and the importance of community so that new employees 
understand the context of democracy and their role as public servants. 
    
Recommendations for local Forest Service leadership: 
 
1.  Become involved in the local community through membership in organizations 
that are community-based.  Get to know other community leaders. 
2.  When starting into an interest representation problem solving process, choose 
carefully which community leaders you encourage to participate.  Choose leaders that 
have the capacity to be reasonable and effective in providing leadership to their 
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organizations.  Characteristics to look for include integrity, the ability to accommodate 
others, respect for others, trustworthiness, and the ability to influence those whose 
interests the leader represents.   
3.  Set up participation in these efforts to be voluntary. 
4.  Include the policy, rules, and administrative constraints in the process of 
defining the area of discretion open at the local level for the decision and establish these 
constraints as sidebars for the ensuing discussion.  Do this with integrity, i.e., don’t use a  
policy or rule or scientific report to reinforce your own preferred outcome.  Rather, be 
sure that the sidebars accurately reflect the necessary constraints, then step back and 
allow the group to formulate the decision within the decision space.  Use of maps with 
overlays of various constraints is an effective tool for establishing and maintaining 
sidebars.  
5.  Include as part of the decision space the expectation that the solution will 
include multiple use to the extent uses can be supported by the resource base.  Encourage 
interests to recognize that they are part of a larger community of other users, none of 
which can have the forest all to themselves.  Where possible, work with community 
leaders to reinforce the links between sustainable forest management and long-term 
community viability.   
6.  After the initial round of posturing and ideology, encourage participants to 
focus on specific uses in specific places.  Include field trips to key areas to give the 
opportunity for people to see proposals first-hand, on the ground.  Seek on-the-ground 
knowledge from non-Forest Service participants.   
7.  Allow the decision to emerge from the discussions and deliberation of the 
group, supplying additional information as requested.  Avoid setting deadlines for 
progress and decisions.  Emergent solutions evolve at their own pace.  Leadership of 
various interest groups need time to take proposals back to their membership for review.  
Be patient. 
8.  Come from integrity throughout the process.  As one of the interviewees put it, 
“Don’t snooker anybody,” and help others not to snooker each other.   
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9.  Remember that there are allies in the public who are also seeking better ways 
of working working together with diverse interests and the Forest Service to formulate 
solutions for the future.  In the words of one of the interviewees: 
 
 
We are at a tipping point right now in terms of how the future is going to go.  The 
“politics of polarity” have had a huge effect.  This isn’t leadership; it will always 
fail Montana.  For the greater good, we need to accept some limits.  I think people 
want to be reasonable and responsible, to feel good about themselves.  This is us 
being good citizens.  This is the Montana I want my kids to grow up in, a 
Montana where we can sit down together to solve our problems, not one that is 
polarized and dysfunctional.40    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40Seeley Lake NFS # 5 Transcript, 6.   
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Appendix A:  Researcher Qualifications 
Researcher Qualifications 
 
Nancy Leifer began working with public involvement in natural resource planning in 
1973 as public involvement specialist for the Flathead River Basin Level B Study in 
northwestern Montana.  Through her work as a management consultant and as a bureau 
chief and administrator in state government, Ms. Leifer has facilitated or chaired 
numerous successful collaborative efforts, including: the Governor’s Task Force on 
Municipal and Industrial Bonds and the Governor’s Task Force on Infrastructure, both of 
which entailed building relationships across public/private boundaries; a collaborative 
group of 15 local government representatives who designed the state’s assumption of the 
federal Community Development Block Grant program;  many local nonprofit 
collaborative planning and problem/solving efforts with diverse organizations; the 
Missoula Housing Task Force (which at its peak involved 65 local government, 
nonprofit, and for-profit organizations); and most recently the Neighbor Works Missoula 
Homeownership Network, which involved the integration of program, budget, and 
fundraising across five nonprofit organizations.  These experiences at the state and local 
level, which entailed the integration of public, private, and nonprofit organizational 
interests and diverse personalities, have honed both her ability to create successful 
collaborations and her understanding of what makes collaboration work.   
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Appendix B:  Protocol for Interviews 
 
Interview was semi-structured around the questions given below.   
 
A.  Introduce researcher and give brief explanation of research project. 
 
B.   Review and obtain signed consent form. 
 
C.  Confirm: 
 
a. interviewee's role in collaborative effort, what interests participant had in 
being involved 
 
b. duration and frequency of involvement in case collaborative group 
  
D.   Conduct interview using the questions listed below. 
 
1.  What was your role in this effort? What interests brought you to participate? 
 
2.  Do you think this effort was successful? 
 
3.  One way to look at this group effort is a means for the Forest Service define the public 
interest.  What does the term “public interest” mean to you? 
 
4.  Do you think this group effort was engaged in a process to find the public interest as 
you think of it?    Was it successful in finding the public interest?  Why or why not? 
 
 5. Who in the group do you think provided the leadership and facilitation skills that 
helped the group work?   
 
6.  What specifically did this person (or each person, if more than one) do that helped?  
Examples? 
 
7.  If you are this person, did you have expectations about the group before the group 
started?  If so, what were your expectations?  If you were not this person, do you think 
this person had expectations for how the group would work together?  For you in terms of 
working as a group? What do you think these expectations were?  
 
8.  If you were not one of the facilitators of the group, did you make special efforts to 
support the group in working together?  What were these efforts?   
 
9.  In hindsight, are you aware of anything that hindered the group’s work? Examples? 
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10.  Did your level of confidence in the group change over time? Why?  
 
11.  Have you had previous experience with Forest Service citizen involvement?  With 
collaborative group efforts with other groups outside of the Forest Service?    How did 
people behave in these settings?  Were you anticipating similar behavior in this group?   
 
12.  Did you find yourself changing your expectations about how others would act in the 
group over time?  If so, did you change your behavior as well?  What happened to cause 
you to change? 
  
13.  Did your sense of what you wanted as an outcome from this effort change over time?  
If so, how did it change, and what caused you to change? 
 
14.  Were appeals or suits against the Forest Service filed once the group effort was 
finished?  By whom?  If so, were you surprised?   Were these concerns raised when the 
group was in progress?  If so, how did the group deal with the concern(s) raised in the 
appeal or suit while the group was meeting? Did you feel that the concern(s) was 
recognized and included as part of the group’s efforts to find the public interest?  Why or 
why not?  
 
15.  Please choose which of these two descriptions comes closer to describing how the 
group interacted.   
 
Paragraph 1 
People evidenced good humor and seemed to respect each other.  Over time they 
became comfortable with each other and talked informally about other things in 
their lives. During group discussions, they actively listened and sought to 
understand others’ concerns for the most part.  No one person dominated. People 
felt free to contribute new ideas and seek out information together.  
 
Paragraph 2 
People came in knowing exactly what they wanted in terms of the issues.  There 
was some degree of tension, and people didn’t try to understand each other.  
Much of the time was spent in people asserting claims and backing them up with 
their own arguments and statistics.  It seemed that some people had more power 
than others, and didn’t hesitant to use it to manipulate the discussion.  
 
16.  When did the Forest Service decide to make this a collaborative effort?  How did you 
know that the FS was intending it to be collaborative?  
 
17.  What does collaboration mean to you?   
 
18.  How do you know if collaboration is successful?   
 
19.  Was this project collaboration? 
